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City of crisis (Preface)
Frank Eckardt and Javier Ruiz Sánchez
The crisis continues. The accumulated debts of the European states is 
rising steadily. Despite the undertaken efforts, economy of the member 
states of the European Union has not regained its path of development. 
The consequences of this crisis are numerous, profound and difficult to 
oversee (Bitzenis, 2015). Only sketching the ‘maybe worst’ social aspects 
of these consequences, one has to think of the remaining high youth 
unemployment and the effects on the individuals (Antonucci, 2014). This 
clearly means that the effects of the crisis will last longer than the hoped 
for economic recovery and might create a generation of young adults with 
the experience of devalued biographies and social exclusion (cp. Friedrich 
and Schreiner, 2013, Dølvik, 2015). 
In political terms, the crisis has led to a vague emergence/ revival of 
nationalist, revanchist and populist movements, which in turn profoundly 
challenges the legitimacy of the European project (Macartney, 2013, 
Champeau, 2015; Dēmētriou, 2015; Scicluna, 2015). The political landscape 
in Europe has dramatically changed even in countries where the economic 
crisis is not as dramatic as in the Southern European countries, which this 
book intends to highlight.
Instead of defining any kind of theoretical starting point, the editors 
and authors of the book are trying to make sense of the current crisis 
by being both academic scholars and observers of the crisis, at the same 
time. Explanations for the current crisis might be formulated either in 
a more abstract manner or in a way that contextualizes the crisis with 
historical terms. Although contributions to this book are not restrained 
from heading towards these directions, the main direction of this work is 
to research on the interferences of the local, social and political contexts 
with the more global levels of the crisis. In this regard, the focus shifts 
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naturally from the global and national dimensions to local situations 
where coping with the impact of the crisis has to be realized. Cities are the 
place of vulnerability in this crisis (Ranci, 2014). 
Being urban scholars, the contributors are giving an insightful view at 
the local situations in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. They are trying 
to use their findings to contribute to the analysis of the crisis in general 
and for the respective countries in particular. As the author are following 
theoretical approaches, different ways of academic discourse deriving 
from the local case studies are represented in this book. This is because 
– at least at this moment – no single narrative seems to exist that can 
cover all the aspects which are worked out in the following chapters. In 
the eyes of the editors, one part of the crisis lies exactly here: There are no 
strong explanations and narratives available, which could counterbalance 
the omnipresent simplifications of the populist movements. The public’s 
inability to reflect on the crisis undoubtedly worsens the situation. This 
book is therefore motivated by the will to demonstrate that academia 
needs to face this dangerous lack of multifold narratives. As engaged 
academics, the sterilized form of reflection exposed cannot be the form 
of discussing the crisis where we are in. In contrast, the awareness of the 
incompleteness and temporality of the reflections represented on the next 
pages is taken up with a sense that voicing insights which admit turbulent 
changes might be the only way for a re-orientation.
Despite the fact that the urban level of society is the most vulnerable 
and therefore the most important area of people’s life, there has been 
little attention paid by political and social studies on the question ‘how 
the crisis impacts local societies’. Moreover, even in urban studies the 
crisis has so far gained little reflection. With a critical note, austerity has 
been identified as the main political ideology (Thompson, 2013) that has 
fostered the European crisis. While there is a good argument for this 
criticism, the complexity of the phenomena, which we subsume under the 
vague term of “crisis”, needs to be kept upright if we want to understand 
its full outcome and its causes (Griggs, 2014; Tabb, 2014). One aspect that 
has been neglected in this discourse on city and austerity politics is the 
role of intermediate institutions. Coming from fields of architecture and 
urban planning, most contributions in this book are especially looking at 
their programs, actions and rooms to manoeuver. 
To find out what planning and architecture has to do with the 
generation of crisis, in particular by following neoliberal mindsets, and to 
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what extent planers, practitioners, academics and architects can react on 
this today, was the initial idea that brought the editors together. In a joint 
study program of the Bauhaus-University Weimar and the Politecnico de 
Madrid, students worked together to get an understanding of the role and 
impact of urban planning in the context of the European crisis. While 
Madrid was the obvious case for the Spanish students, the German team 
had to notice that austerity politics have a severe impact on social and 
financial affairs in German cities as well. Very soon, it became evident, 
that in the Spanish and German cases more is at stake: Processes of 
deindustrialisation, regional inequalities, contested welfare states, post-
fordist modes of economy, increasing precariousness of work relations, 
and increasing hardship due to social exclusion cannot be left out when 
trying to understand the immense dynamics which are sometimes 
obscured by the discourse of “crisis”.
Thanks to the generosity of the German Academic Exchange 
Organisation (DAAD), this common learning process was financially 
supported. This also allowed us to invite scholars from other Southern 
European countries to exchange ideas on the topic of the “city of crisis” for 
a two-day seminar in Weimar, back in December 2013. This book is based 
mainly on the results of our debates and the shared feeling, which is that, 
it is most urgent to continue exchanging and reflecting on the crisis in the 
European cities, which is the final objective of this publication.
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City and Crisis: Learning from urban theory
Frank Eckardt
Georg Simmel has become famous in urban studies for his essay “Die 
Großstädte und das Geistesleben” on the mental effects of living in the 
metropolis (1995/1903). In this classical text, he is drawing conclusions 
from his life in Berlin at the turn of the century. The German capital at 
that time exploded because of an unknown flux of migrants into the city. 
The population density was higher than ever before and equaled that of 
Chicago and New York. Simmel asked himself on his daily walks through 
the overcrowded city, in what way people orient themselves and how 
do they come into contact which each other. In line with psychological 
discussion at that time, he described the urban dweller as a person who 
is overcharged by stimuli and thus developing a kind of nervousness. To 
protect against the massive flux of unfiltered stimulations, the urbanite 
hides behind a kind of defensive system (being blasé) and controls 
interaction by a process of directed intention. Simmel (Junge, 2012) 
saw this as a crucial socio-psychological competence by which to avoid 
outbursts of aggression between strangers and enable the necessary 
distances to unknown people. This profound insight, one can say, is one 
of the most influential ideas about why urban segregation is occurring 
and why cities are as unequal as they are even today. But Simmel has not 
worked out a theory on urban inequalities or any kind of theory on the 
development of cities in general. Rather on the contrary, Georg Simmel 
understood himself as a philosopher in the first place. Despite him being 
a founding member of the German Sociological Association and entitling 
a book comprising a series of his essays as “Sociology”, Simmel is often 
misunderstood as an “easy to take” reference for the urban social scientist 
in need of an ancestral thinker to help in making their point more than 
one-hundred years later.  
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It is no surprise that European intellectuals (Fontana, 2013; Händler, 
2014, Maggioni, 2012) are returning to Georg Simmel and his view on the 
city. His basic text on mental life in the metropolis has been reinterpreted 
in many ways before the current crisis reached the level of academic 
reflection. In their edited volume, Mieg, Sundsboe and Bieniok (2012) 
have discussed Simmel’s elementary idea of the metropolis in relation 
to various subjects like ethnic segregation, urban poverty, gentrification, 
architecture, marginalization, creative class, or postindustrial change. 
Apparently, the basic concept of Simmel remains powerful for enabling 
an analytical view on the city. While it is not here the place to review 
these attempts to give Simmel’s text an actual meaning in the current 
situation, one can draw a rough conclusion from these readings what the 
“actual Simmel” is and thereby avoid unfruitful debates about who has 
“really understood” him or what the better reading might be. It needs to 
be said, in the first place, that Simmel’s style of writing an essay provokes 
a rather “postmodern” and fragmented reading  of his article on the city, 
as his works are not put into any overarching theoretical framework, 
although lines to other articles and to his major philosophical ideas can 
certainly be worked out (cp. Frisby, 2013).  Most of the references in urban 
studies do not take full account of related perspectives in Simmel’s work 
but concentrate on his view of spatial sociology and are often missing 
the emphasis that he puts on the aesthetic dimension of the urban. 
This is particularly problematic, as it is with his view on aesthetics and 
perception that Simmel develops a theory of modernity. The following 
short interpretation of these three aspects of Simmel’s early reflection on 
the chaotic city of Berlin, with its immense suffering, estrangement and 
alienation, provides a starting point for discussion of the urban dimension 
of the contemporary crisis and possible alternatives.
1. Mone y and the cit y
As a philosopher, Simmel was more interested in explaining particular 
phenomena he observed by linking them to a consideration of how we can 
perceive the world rather than following an empirical research paradigm. 
The latter was more realized by the Chicago School of Sociology whose 
charismatic leader Robert Park had the chance to listen to Simmel’s 
lecture during his time in Germany. While Park and his colleagues had 
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been engaged in research that not only shared the academic interest in 
how the city develops but also wanted to explore the empirical reality as 
if the city was a laboratory, Simmel worked out his argument for such 
an explorative sociological research agenda. Simmel and the Chicago 
School shared a moment in time and opened the development of science 
to the inclusion of society in a naturalistic manner (cp. Hooker, 2013). 
While the Chicago School saw itself as part of a movement, still inspired 
by the Progressive Era and American Pragmatism, Simmel aimed at the 
predominance of some kind of European philosophy that blockades a view 
on the empirical reality of modernity. His major argument, working from 
the classical concepts of perception by Immanuel Kant, in short, lays the 
fundaments for a larger theorization of society based on the reflection of 
strangers and poor people and on modernity in general.
Modernity in the eyes of Georg Simmel is based on the same principal 
assumption that he worked out with regard to encounters and their mental 
effects in the metropolis. As referred to above, the main theoretical 
problem Simmel wants to clarify is the establishment of society by the thin 
lines between individuals. He assumes the city as worked up from below, 
in contrast to ideas where the city is the place of abstract social structures 
or in which the differentiation of society is only mirrored or reproduced 
in space without reflecting the effects of space on society.  Nevertheless, 
it is modernity, as such, that interests him in the first place, not so much 
the city.  The city however is characterized as being a describable unity 
with a clear distinction from the country-side and rural life.  And it is 
part of a modern life style that differs from the life on the countryside 
in a particular tension between closeness and distance.  Above all, the 
reflection on the city needs to be framed in a more general understanding 
of a modernity that is shaped by exchange. The nervous encounters in 
the city are of the same kind of exchange as are all affairs transacted in 
modernity. In this way, the city is a part of the “philosophy of money” 
which is by no coincidence the most important work of Simmel, as he 
himself saw it, and elaborates the character of exchange relations (cp. 
Rammstedt, 2003).  It is all about money in the city as this is the major 
driver of exchange. Money however is not a morally estimated goal in itself 
but an expression and a creation of value. While the stranger in the city 
seeks to find relationships valued for supporting a lifestyle similar to his 
own, money is a means to express values for objects. The interference of 
strangers can work out to create a common understanding and in its most 
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optimistic end point: love. Money undergoes changes as well. First it is 
an expression of a valued object (as for the stranger: a desired person), 
then the money becomes an object of estimation by itself.  Turning into a 
value, money becomes exchangeable.  The exchange of money, the urban 
lifestyle and the appearance of a modern individualism are interrelated 
aspects mutually supportive of each other and all are essentially based 
on the modern principle of exchange. The main question is how these 
exchange processes are generated and in what way individual appreciation 
becomes a social value producing tokens of exchange (money) which in 
themselves become valorized. In a second step, these valorized goods 
influence individual perception, identity and their systems of valorization. 
Simmel speaks of “Wechselwirkungen” (relations of mutual influences). 
Erotic, religious or just social drives are the starting point of these 
relations and motivate people to join struggles for, with or against the 
coexistence of others.  Play, teaching, help, attack and other forms of 
making these contacts differ, but the underlying intentions are similar. 
For Simmel, interaction, in its eventual sociological sense, still refers to 
the whole world of interaction and does not make so much difference 
between objects and other human beings.  Societal desire is the starting 
point for both, interference and exchange with others and with regard to 
goods. In his view, the city is a place for individualism as it needs a certain 
intellectualism based in the individual capacity to reflect on individual 
desires. The urban intellectual is the most outspoken figure of a modern 
citizen who undergoes the transformation of his desires by rationalization. 
It is not only that one needs to calculate cost-effect-relations for social and 
economic investment, but also the very estimation of values requires a sort 
of calculation. If money becomes a goal in its own, all other valued objects 
can be calculated in their monetary distance.  Everything becomes more 
or less – countable in euros and cents – equal important and close or far, 
because all desirable objects can be measured by money. In contrast to the 
Marxian observation that this transformation means a kind of alienation, 
it is rather a melancholic feeling that comes to mind (Rowe, 2005). Many 
of the contemporary discussions underlining the emotional meaning of 
the crisis share this point of observation when the greed and avarice of 
bankers and the rich are addressed. With Simmel, these criticisms can be 
linked to an understanding of economy where the equalizing effect of the 
monetization of individual desires is not fully accepted – which Simmel, 
reading sub alinea, seems to share as well. 
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Two other important aspects of the monetization of urban life 
are to be taken into account in contemporary discussions. Firstly, the 
transformation of desires into money and its “flattening” effect allows 
a calculated, industrialized and effective way to produce a consumptive 
answer to those desires.  In this way, the societal response to individual 
needs and wishes allows the construction of the paradox of individual 
mass society: everybody has different longings, but in this everybody 
is the same. Acceleration of interactions (Wechselwirkungen) can be 
ensured by mass organization. As an effect, the massification requires the 
installation of the individual offer as an illusion. The disillusion becomes 
sensible as soon as the effects of mass production are becoming obvious. 
That is the reason for a permanent reproduction of fashion. Intrinsically, 
mobility, fashion, and speed are the consequence of this upheld theatre of 
distinctiveness. The individual thereby is captured in the hiatus between 
the “objective culture” offering infrastructure, means of transport and 
goods and everything that objectively ensures our lives and his personal 
“subjective culture” which cannot hold pace with the general production 
of culture in society.  Most obviously, this gap between the objective 
and the subjective part of modern life expresses itself in the accelerated 
speed of society. Individuals attempt to cope with the “ups and downs” 
of the modern and urban rhythms but as the exchanges are realized in 
an increasingly faster process, the individual suffers greater difficulty 
to adapt. Individualism therefore is nothing that eo ipso is a beneficial 
achievement. It puts new challenges in front of society and burdens the 
individual with a fight against the predominance of objective culture and 
the ever faster speed of exchange caused by the monetization of individual 
desires. 
2. Le aRning fRoM siMMeL?
In sum, reading the city from Georg Simmel’s classical texts, the concern 
about the mental health and well-being of the individual person becomes 
evident. As some readers suggest, Simmel offers an additional point of 
view to the prevalent theorization in critical urban studies which takes 
much from Marx’ theory of exchange as a starting point (Cantó Milà, 
2003).  Simmel has put an “underground” in the Marxian theory on 
value creation that allows the capture of phenomena of modern society 
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into a theoretical understanding of money. Significantly, the appearance 
of an urban life style based not only on the idea of distinction – as in the 
classical concepts of class society up to studies on the “small differences” 
– offers a view on the effect of objectivation of spatial organization, the 
individualism of urban dwellers, the rise of a fashion type of industry and 
life style. It is the feeling of being separated, overwhelmed, fragmented, 
and the longing for others and beautiful objects rather than the facts of 
expropriation, class distinctiveness and alienation from production that 
are the concern of Simmel’s reflection on the city, the monetization of 
life and the challenged individualism. With his alternative reading of 
the “mental life in the metropolis”, the German philosopher emphasizes 
aspects of a crisis that derive from modernity and the modern city itself. 
While Marx would support the crisis nature of capitalism, with Simmel the 
focus lies on the intrinsic generation of crisis because of the psychological 
and social construction of life in the modern metropolis. 
Already the Chicago School did not follow the melancholic notion of 
the monetization and its encapsulating effects on urban life.  For Robert 
Park, the city was pushed by the processes of exchange and mobility to 
a large extent but these forces did not dominate as they did for Georg 
Simmel and even more so for the Marxists. “The city”, as Park wrote, 
is a place “in which more than elsewhere human relations are likely to 
be impersonal and rational, defined in terms of interest and in terms of 
cash.” But despite the strong effects of capitalism, the city remains a place 
of “collective behavior.“ (Park, Burgess and McKenzie, 1925/1997, 22). 
Conceptually, the city is not identical with society and the collective 
behavior of its inhabitants is worthy of study as an objective in its own: 
“The city shows the good and evil in human nature in excess. It is this fact, 
perhaps, more than any other, which justifies the view that would make of the 
city a laboratory or clinic in which human nature and social processes may be 
conveniently and profitably studied.“ (46) 
Social processes in this sense are also separated from a psychological 
starting point, as Simmel has argued for. In the Chicago School’s empirical 
work, especially with the introduction of first hand material, original 
wording, photographs, maps, and biographical reports, the individual is 
given a prominent place in their sociological studies. Nevertheless, it is 
not individualism and the individual suffering from the predominance of 
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the objective culture that is the interest here. The focus lies rather on those 
“little worlds” of which the city is composed and which make life exciting 
but also dangerous. In a more general comparison, the empirically open 
view on the city and society does not presume an automatic downward 
spiral of the individual because of speed, objectification and mass society. 
In a sense, the famous circle model of Burgess aiming at an explanation 
of urban development can be regarded as an optimistic perspective 
where people can potentially progress into a more liberal society where 
their feelings, memories and values are shared. Assimilation as a kind 
of final merger of cultures and people from different backgrounds has 
been therefore foreseen in Parks “race relation cycle”.  Indeed, the Chicago 
School can be seen as a kind of liberal criticism of capitalism as it leaves 
open whether “the good and evil in human nature” are getting to the 
foreground in history (Smith, 1988).
Placing the city into an historical dimension, however, remained 
a weakness in the sociological analysis of Simmel and the Chicago 
School alike. The conceptualization of modernity remained in loose 
contact with the historical narratives. In contrast, Max Weber has 
been the major thinker of the late 19th and early 20th century who saw 
the particularities of the European city. He worked out his intellectual 
position on the basis of the then available sources and contextualized 
the rise of European modernism as a result of a long lasting historical 
development overrunning other civilizations’ leading positions. As a 
core idea, the autonomy of the European city was for Weber a nucleus of 
development of a society where consensus and self-regulation could be 
achieved. His major concept was, as with Simmel, based on a small-scale 
construct of society. His focus on the “conjurations” however emphasizes 
the building of local society rather than the pressure that the individual 
feels in Simmel’s “modern metropolis”.  In Weber’s view, the meeting of 
strangers and their livingalongside each other is the key element for the 
development of the European civilization and its advantages comparable to 
others, especially Asian societies. Today, we know that Weber’s perception 
on the sharp differences between European and other cities does not hold 
ground and must be blamed on the generally little knowledge about Asia 
at that time (cp. Bruhns and Nippel, 2000). More critically reviewed, 
Weber has limited himself to the raising of a partly romantic idea of the 
Middle Age city in Europe where conflicts, discrimination, segregation, 
political and religious persecution and other aspects of the “ugly side” of 
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urban life were not appropriately considered. Even more problematic is 
the neglect of the effects of the industrial revolution on the concept of the 
“European” city.  Though Weber probably saw the technological progress 
that industrial society embodies as a result of European history, he seems 
to have closed his eyes to its character as a crisis driven society. 
3. the euRope an cit y
Considerations on the “European city” nevertheless remain in current 
discussion and are politically powerful constructs of imagination. In 
many intellectual and political discourses the very understanding of 
Europe being made up locally and the local as a backbone for democratic 
politics is simply unquestionable (Le Galés, 2011; Siebel, 2010). However, 
the debate on the European city is at least partially a normative one 
and fulfills a socio-psychological need as a quasi authentic place of 
democracy is identified in which freedom and economic progress are seen 
as intertwined. In the contemporary readings of the European city, the 
heritage of the welfare state, political accessibility and social integration 
are embedded. To some extent this recalls Weber’s idealization of the 
European Middle Aged city and the generation of a rational way of life 
(Domingues, 2000). While the return to the concept of the European city 
can be regarded as a counter position to the neoliberal city, its analytical 
strength remains highly questionable (cp.  Kemper, 2012). In the context 
of the current discussion of crisis, the most critical failure is the lacking 
notion of crisis at all.  This is in particular true for the violent 20th century 
which Weber could not foresee but which has brought the experience of 
totalitarianism and fascism with the most painful result that large parts of 
the historically “grown” European cities have been erased and destroyed. 
To explain these historical phenomena would require obviously more 
space than available. However, it is clear that there is not a convincing 
argument for the treatment of local and national levels of society in a dual 
and simplistic way, meaning that the cities have been the victims of nation-
wide, non-local structures and processes. On the contrary, local conflicts 
and crises can evolve and erupt from “local societies” in the Weberian 
sense and become a global disaster. In the post-totalitarian age, the lesson 
should not be forgotten that it all started small and local. A simple return 
to the notion of the historical European city will not explain how this 
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kind of very fundamental crisis of European civilization has happened. 
If one wants to keep upright the idea of a more democratic society based 
on the “local”, then the potential for crisis needs to be acknowledged and 
theoretically conceptualized.  
From a selective point of view, different accounts can be referenced 
as the working-out of a historical perspective on crisis that might help to 
re-conceptualize the European city as a legitimate description. Beyond the 
most prominent analysis in urban studies referring to regulation theory 
or neo-Marxist positions, a different approach can be outlined following 
the key idea of the historian Reinhard Kosellek (cp. Olsen, 2012). His 
major insight stems from various historical analyses but mainly from his 
research on the situation in France before 1789. Koselleck wanted to find 
out at what moment the French Revolution really started. Correctly, he 
linked the upcoming changes back to changes of thought in the first place. 
From a structuralist point of view, the social stratification did not change 
much in advance of the French Revolution. One can say that the consistency 
of the social inequalities did not have any direct influence on the events 
happening. Many acts of the revolution, like the storm of the Bastille, did 
not have a “real” link to a changed society or any other direct political 
intention. This symbolic layer of the revolution, according to Koselleck, is 
a consequence of the changes brought about by the long foregoing critique 
on the absolutist state. In other words, the changes in attitude towards 
the role of politics and the state are the starting point of a profound crisis 
of society. It is a critique that is deeply rooted in crisis and vice versa. 
The impact of critique is ensured by its moral position to question the 
architecture and the governance of the state. Modernity in this sense 
has changed the role of the Hobbesian state that needed to ensure peace 
between citizens but had not to fulfil any of the moral obligations that the 
Enlightment expected. In his further analysis, Koselleck explains the rise 
of terror and totalitarian rule as a reaction to the permanent tension that 
enlightened perspectives are putting on political leaders. 
In the light of the analysis of Koselleck, the idea of a crisis needs to be 
seen as an intrinsic moment of the culture of modernity. As it is correct to 
point at the role of critique, the term of “critique” should not be confused 
with a notion of “critical theory” that is often intruding on urban studies. 
Critique means here an intellectual challenge of politics in its by-then 
current state of mind. It challenges established ways of perception and 
self-description.  These challenges are not purely academic exercises but 
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are placed in an arena of political decision-making and preparation. As 
critique is interrupting the management of society, the urge to limit and 
overcome the questioning of the existing modus vivendi is high. Critique 
creates a loss of trust, insecurity, moral pressure and time gaps between 
decision-making and reflection. All this leads to the creation of essential 
moments where time pressure forces quick (alternative) decisions. If a crisis 
is understood this way, there is no way back to any kind of “normality”. 
Crisis is then not just a period between two phases of normal life.  Rather, 
modernity can be regarded as a permanent flow of faster or slower crises. 
Whether changes appear to us as “crisis” or not depends on the speed of 
these transformations. Critique however is the main source of provoking 
these crises as they produce permanent irritations.  Critique fulfills this 
societal function not only in its classical manner like the philosophers in 
the 18th century or the investigative journalists in the 20th century. Irritation 
of the normality of society derives from everyday life and actors (in the 
broadest sense) who act differently – the alternative milieu keeping old 
paper for recycling instead of putting it into the garbage, refugees crossing 
national borders or critical consumers. The existing socio-political order 
can integrate this critique by changing political frameworks or with terror. 
Critique can create dangerous and risky situations for the society and for 
particular social groups and individuals. Saying that in modernity crisis 
is normal sounds like neglecting the damaging aspect of crisis. Losing 
a house, your family, your health or your job or all these together can be 
the most serious threat in one’s life. However, what seems to matter is the 
speed of events in the first place and the interpretation of the “critique” 
that goes together with these crises with regard to self-understanding 
and valorization. Already Émile Durkheim (cp. Girola Molina, 2005) had 
pronounced that the sudden appearance of collapse creates a situation 
of losing orientation and an individual or collective status of anomy. As 
irritations can have different scopes and can concern more or fewer parts 
of society, the evoked crisis can include different layers of society, affecting 
socially different groups and impacting society at different scales. A 
general crisis, as “revolutions” might be counted for, distracts from the 
fact that the modern crisis has to be thought of on a scale of speed and 
depth from where it is correlating, impacting and causing other crises in 
society. If critique initiates crisis, the variety of critique – from small-scale 
“Manöverkritik” (critique de maneuver, debriefing) to the critique of the 
grand narrative – needs to be taken into account.
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Understanding the interference between crisis, modernity and 
critique in this way means that history itself can no longer be thought as 
a simple line of events or the producer of artefacts and achievements. The 
European city as a picture of a certain form of urban order, social tolerance 
and architecture therefore is a simplification of the “many histories” 
(Koselleck) running through at different speeds and on various layers. It 
has to be discussed what kind of critique this is and what are the reasons 
for the creation and proclamation of such a picture. Taking it as critique, 
the “European city” appears in times of a deep crisis but it does not 
question those forces promoting another way of thinking in Europe. This 
can be made clear by the example of the so-called “Leipzig Charta” which 
was launched by the European Union to acclaim the “Renaissance of the 
European City” in the early years of the 21th century (Eltges and Nickel, 
2007).  The text itself included not one single coherent new way of thinking 
but aimed at harmonizing the prevalent rebellion of neo-liberalism and its 
emphasis on economic competitiveness with the aggravated philosophy 
of social cohesion derived from the lasting intellectual social-democratic 
hegemony in Europe.  The criticism of the current intellectual basis of our 
societies by using the stereotype and kitsch version of the “European city” 
shows only that new ideas that would irritate the current self-descriptions 
of Europe and the routines of political crisis management are not deriving 
from a reorientation that once contested the predominance of the modern 
city.
It remains thus to be critically discussed what kind of critique is 
produced, if formative and guiding thoughts are still related to the “city” 
(cp. Bourdin, 2010). The obvious danger is the illusion that local actions 
can provide an irritation that can challenge the installed narratives of 
austerity and competitiveness. Will it be possible to think of a critique 
that allows the creation of another intellectual attack on the omnipresent 
self-descriptions in the European societies while still talking about the 
city and referring to politics of nearness and planability?  The replacing 
of the self-descriptors, the “urban” and the “locale”, – outside of the 
neo-liberal attitude to the city as a purely economic entity to be steered 
and governed as an enterprise – already takes place, but the intellectual 
powers working in this direction do not irritate the social order in a way 
that classical left criticism intended. The contemporary re-orientation to 
the city has nothing to do with a form of societal provocation of existing 
hierarchies of values and social positions. It is all too well known that 
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gentrification, NIMBY-politics and the panoptical control of the city do not 
intend to break up existing orders of social perception and interpretation. 
On the contrary, we can observe more rigid interpretations of norms in 
the public, a less tolerant attitude to socially deprived persons and an 
increasingly invisibility of the “unsuccessful”. Academic discourses have 
produced overwhelming evidence and have placed the “just city” at the top 
of urban research.
4. cRitique of the cit y
Apparently, attempts to cope with the crisis are related to the establishments 
of new practices or at least reactions and adaptations on the local level. At 
the end of the day, the crisis always manifests itself into something material 
and tangible, something than can be felt and that exists in some way or 
the other in the symbolic order of individual life.  This is the description 
of the crisis that is nevertheless hard to represent. It is assumed to be 
“visible” and able to be told in a story of before and after-situations with 
actors which “act” and victims. The relevance of this crisis narrative is 
related to the communicative situation it is anchored in, that is a mostly 
multi-media setting combining a real and a textual and metaphorical 
picture. The logic of the creation of a crisis and the representation of a 
crisis do not fall together. It can be stated with more accuracy that these 
two aspects of the crisis are de-coupled and the representation of the crisis 
is either part of the irritation ongoing or it is bound to be reclaiming the 
old social order. In this sense, the linkage of crisis to a local representation 
needs to be reflected as a form of critique that, to a very limited extent 
and in a particular way, represents the current multiple crises of Europe. 
If a particular point of the contemporary situation is characterized by 
financial markets which are “out of control” and are so because they are 
no longer linked to the “real economy” then how could this feature of the 
present economic crisis be reflected in representations of the so-called 
local impact or the urban dimension? The logical argument would derive 
from a chain of presumed causalities that leads from quasi-bankrupt states 
to localities without financial space to maneuver, so that the social aspect 
of the crashes of the job and housing market cannot be counterbalanced. 
Obviously, the attempt to tell a “local” story of the crisis requires a certain 
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narrative that leaves out many complex layers of society and selects the 
events, actors and policies. 
This crisis narrative reestablishes the city as a place of public drama. 
In a time where the local has been virtualized in an extensive way 
and democracy became exhausted, the narrowing of perspectives on 
something visible, local and which can be represented in a public space is 
an understandable attempt to revitalize the idea of the city. In the nation 
state, the public space had an established function for expressing demands 
and critique and it was part of an opposition to a well-defined government. 
It is however questionable today whether this kind of “city politics” has 
the same role. In a globalized world the role of the urban has taken on 
a different meaning and in this political framework is serving another 
function. As sympathetic as the newly emerging social movements are 
to the local story, especially the “Right to the City”-groups everywhere, it 
needs to be recognized that the idea of a city and the political and societal 
significance of the “locale” have been transformed in the last thirty years. 
It is not only that the regime of capitalist accumulation has been changed 
from a fordist to a post-fordist logic, more important might be that this 
foregone structural change has been prepared and legitimized by a 
fundamental critique that wanted to overcome the narrowness of the local 
and the cemented order of social networks in the welfare state. 
“Think global, act local” was the slogan of an internationally oriented 
ecological movement, but it could have also been the motto of the neoliberal 
reforms. Thinking local in times of global interferences means something 
profoundly different when the world market is opened up completely, 
mobility of goods and people seems to be unlimited, global flow of images 
and ideas and the speed of technological innovations transform the most 
private and personal affairs (cp. Bourdin, Eckardt and Wood, 2014).  What 
the city has become or still is remains an open question. Competing ideas 
are circulating. In the nineties, attempts for new descriptions wanted to 
irritate the existing concepts by pointing at its fragmentary, dispersed, 
splintering, regional, virtual, aestheticized, emotionalized and networked 
character. The coining of another term has not been successful and those 
that have been proposed remained alive only for the time of an academic 
fashion (Metapolis, Zwischenstadt, Global City, Postmetropolis etc.). 
Intentionally understood, these formulations wanted to create a space to 
recognize the crisis of the city already happening. In its darkest colors, 
Mike Davis and his “City of Quartz” gained some prominence but a 
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general interruption of the blinded view on the disappearance of the city 
“as we know it” was not achieved by this noir urbanism. Looking back 
on these writings of urban scholars, the return to a terminology of the 
city appears as a capitulation of the critique on the idea of the city. It is 
obvious that most intellectual responses on the current situation refer 
back to theoretical discussions before the appearance of the mentioned 
reformulations of the significance of the “urban”. We are “excavating 
Lefebvre” (Purcell, 2002) with his claim for more accessibility to the city 
in general and to the street, as it was important for the May 68-movement. 
In this way, we return to a terminology of “rebellion” like David Harvey 
which reminds of that same kind of spirit.
It is not clear what kind of effects the rebirth of the idea of the city will 
have It might be a mighty weapon for some local movements and actions 
to make their point and to influence certain areas of politics. Conceptually 
spoken, their terminology of the city differs not from the one that is 
installed by their ideological enemies, as it reassures the importance of 
the locale and denies the complexity of global embedding which produces 
global-local places, so called “glocal” societies. These glocal societies drive 
on networking thoughts and pictures about “place” which are disturbing, 
transforming, interrupting, expelling, destroying and recreating local 
communities and making them losing the power of defining the local. 
The multiplication of the crises starts, as Koselleck would formulate, with 
a change of thought – think globally. Yes, we do and we do in all regards. 
Can we really still act locally when everybody is consuming, producing, 
travelling, communicating, dreaming and marrying globally? Insisting 
on the remaining meaning of the city and consequently looking for 
rebellion – which is a typically local phenomenon – does not give us the 
necessary answers on this question. Once a powerful critique against the 
failures of the nation state, globalism has abolished the idea of the city 
as a Weberian “local society” and has devalued the importance of urban 
exchange as in the classical concept of Simmel. Intellectualism is no 
longer the consequence of too many stimuli on the street and the objective 
culture is deeply embedded in our imaginations of the local.
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5. Re tuRning to uRban cRitique
The resurrection of protest in the cities as reaction to the multiple crises 
has nowhere led to a change in the main fields of neo-liberal activities. 
Still, the European banks are regarded as little resistant against the next 
financial crisis. The budgetary reforms have by far not equilibrated the 
social costs incurred. The disastrous unemployment, especially among 
the youth, has not been addressed in a substantial way. Nevertheless, 
many local initiatives have organized their forces to return to some 
kind of a more solidary way of living. These activities are criticizing the 
predominant way of capitalist thinking in a more substantial degree. It 
remains however clear that they cannot evoke a crisis of neo-liberalism. 
There are many discussions among activists about their own weakness, 
about why in these times many people do not trust alternatives and why 
the desire for “business as usual” seems to be the strongest wish. One 
could say, the crisis has reached all parts of society but not our thoughts 
about us. 
Understanding this book as a contribution towards challenging 
existing perceptions of the Southern European cities and the multilayered 
crisis, it was the foremost intention of the editors and authors to make that 
step. In different ways, the contributions from urban theory and empirical 
urban studies intend to find a way out of the most concerning situation 
with its multiple dimensions of crisis.. Learning from urban theory so 
far, means that we have to struggle forward to a critique of the city, if we 
want to overcome the crisis of our cities.  Learning from urban theory 
does not mean that we have to see the crisis through the eyes of one 
theoretical guide like Weber, Simmel, Lefebvre or whosoever. It is rather 
the treatment of their thoughts that can us help to cope with the current 
intellectual blockades. The conceptual contradiction between the existing 
theoretical approaches warns us about the failing attempt to see the city as 
the key idea of a potentially progressive critique of society. The disillusion 
with the “lasting” European City (whatever that was), the vulnerability 
of the “local society”, the dangerous isolation of the individual amidst 
strangers, the overwhelming principles of competition and ownership 
form the massive intellectual barricade that an urban critique must run 
against. It is no longer the city but it is a new form of urbanity that has 
been established in the recent struggles. Often ridiculed or stigmatized 
as “Facebook revolution”, the power of the idea that individuals can meet, 
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cross borders, join forces and return to the essentials of life has been 
demonstrated: 
“There were first a few, who were joint by hundreds, then networked by thousands, 
then supported by millions with their voices and their internal quest for hope, as 
muddled as it was, that cut across ideology and hype, to connect with the real 
concerns of the real people in the real human experience that had been reclaimed. 
It began on the internet social networks, as these are spaces of autonomy, largely 
beyond the control of governments and corporations […] By sharing the sorrow 
and hope in the free public space of the Internet, by connecting to each other […] 
individuals formed networks […] They came together.” (Castells, 2012, 14) 
The new social movements from Brazil to Turkey, from Tahir Square to 
Wall Street, have produced a new way of social networking, something the 
conventional location-based public would have never been able to create. 
Interestingly, however, the streets and squares have not become irrelevant 
and there has been a revolution not only on Facebook. Highly visible, 
this is an emotional urbanity that strives via physical presence after the 
authentic experience in the encounter of the others. Physicality and spatial 
structure are the targets of these activities. You learn to know about these 
others not only in the public squares, but you already know – or rather feel, 
wait and hope – who may come. 
Therefore, it is short-sighted, if now a renaissance of public spaces is 
discussed, as if it would matter that places are provided for demonstrations, 
as was the case in the modern city. Strikingly, the speeches of the great 
“leaders” of the rebellions and the Arabic revolutions play no role. This 
applies especially to the Occupy movement, which deliberately wanted to 
initiate an alternative speech culture. Artists, musicians, journalists and 
a few politicians in the modern sense can be seen at these places. The 
new urban movements are not oppositional in the classical sense. That 
is why there is no opposition leader who can be either arrested or even 
identified as a legitimate representative. In the light of modern democratic 
thought these movements are weak because they produce no organized 
opposition and provide no alternative personages and programs. Such a 
requirement is, however, completely misleading, because it is not at all 
about being an opposition with a unifying narrative that could also be 
action-oriented. The one-issue movements such as the ecology protest 
have been thoroughly integrated today into the narrative of the “policy 
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for all”, however the digitization of the urban – the number of existing 
narratives – potentialized to almost infinity. Therefore, the logic of these 
processes is not based on finding one unifying narrative, but to allow 
the diversity of existing narratives and thus allows very personal body-
reconstructing and emotive interactions that provide for the individual 
search for experience and meaning thereby reacting to the uncertainty 
of the multiple crises. The common sense structures are fragile and are 
based on relatively rudimentary statements, but they are an expression 
of “mass self-communication” as Castells called them. Their structure 
is diversity. You will not be able to enforce them to be integrative into 
further existing authoritarian, uniform and abstract narratives, even if 
they were temporarily transformed into a single narrative. The cracks 
and contradictions of the dominant narratives, the wild knowledge and 
unplanned spatial constructions and reinterpretations of existing places 
are the breeding ground of diversity that can be sometimes subversive 
and inclusive, sometimes aggressive and sometimes poetic. For this “city”, 
the descriptive vocabulary is missing, because it is a bulky, irritating, 
exhilarating, seductive and intensive experience of oneself and of others, 
which you do not want to tame by any language. Rather, the new urban 
critique derives more from gestures, looks, acts, mimicry and non-verbal 
symbols and infinite fictional constructs. As a carpet it lays out pieces 
of a critique in search of new narratives with challenged perceptions, 
innovated perspectives, dared actions and reconstruction of social lines 
beyond the “urban” – the city as we have known it so far.
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Crisis and the city 
Neoliberalism, austerity planning and the production of space
Álvaro Sevilla-Buitrago
The current crisis, with its particularly severe configuration in Southern 
European countries, provides an opportunity to probe the interrelation 
of economic crunches and the production of space, and also to imagine 
potential paths of sociospatial emancipation from the dictates of global 
markets. This introductory chapter offers a preliminary interpretive 
framework exploring the fundamental role of urban and territorial 
restructuring in the formation, management and resolution of capitalist 
crises and, conversely, periods of crisis as key stages in the history of 
urbanization. I will begin by contextualizing the 2007-8 economic slump, 
the subsequent global recession and its uneven impact on states and 
cities in the longue durée of capitalist productions of space, studying the 
transformation of spatial configurations in previous episodes of economic 
stagnation. This broader perspective will then be used to analyze currently 
emerging formations of austerity urbanism, showing how the practices of 
crisis management incorporate a strategy for economic and institutional 
restructuring that eventually impacts on urban policy, and indeed in the 
production of urban space itself. 
I will start this discussion with two basic premises. Firstly, capitalism 
is a crisis-prone system. Crunches and recessions appear as the aggregated 
result of a continuous and contradictory process of expansion of value; 
they are structural aspects of capitalist development, not an aberration in 
a naturally balanced economic organization (Harvey, 2010). According to 
this viewpoint, the history of capitalism is staged as an evolution through 
successive regulatory regimes articulated around the emergence and 
overcoming of recurring crises of overaccumulation (Aglietta, 2000). 
The current predicament is therefore not an exception but just another 
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manifestation of a broader developmental pattern that we can compare and 
contrast with previous conjunctures and political-economic responses. 
Secondly, the production of space and the regulation thereof are key 
moments in the dynamics of capitalist accumulation and its reproduction. 
Spatial configurations work at many levels of a given social formation, 
either as means or sites of production, as productive forces or social 
relations, as governmental apparatuses or collective representations, and 
so forth (Lefebvre, 1991). The circulation of capital under capitalism relies 
heavily on a relentless reorganization of these configurations at several 
scales, both to expand the network of production and as a means to absorb 
surplus value (Harvey, 1975). 
What happens when both phenomena overlap in time? How is the 
logic of capitalist production of space transformed in a time of crisis? 
The capitalist mobilization of the production of space is especially acute 
during economic crunches (Gottdiener and Komminos, 1989). In such 
conditions the very creative destruction of territorial formations turns 
into a key vehicle for crisis management through the orchestration of 
successive layers of spatial and economic restructuring. As Lefebvre 
suggested, ‘[c]apitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) 
its internal contradictions for a century … We cannot calculate at what 
cost, but we do know the means: by occupying space, by producing a 
space’ (Lefebvre, 1976:31). David Harvey (2006a) has elaborated upon 
this hypothesis in his analysis of short- and medium-term ‘spatial fixes’ 
to capitalist crises. Amongst other means, capitalism tends to overcome 
recessions through inner and outer rearrangements of space that allow 
the displacement and deferral of contradictions geographically and 
temporally so that immediate devaluation of capital is avoided. In a recent 
work Harvey (2014) extends this idea by suggesting that capitalism thrives 
and resolves its crises through a constant shift of its contradictions from 
one structural or productive moment to another, from one economic 
sector to another, from one scale to another, from one region to another, 
or between these different elements themselves. By circulating local 
and context-specific conflicts capital manages to reconfigure the limits 
to accumulation. However, this procedure simply internalizes capitalist 
contradictions in new temporally and spatially evasive maneuvers. In 
the long run there is no possible ‘absolute fix’ for the system and local 
crises develop into global depressions. As these preliminary propositions 
suggest, there is a particular dialectic whereby spatial (trans)formations 
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are fundamental to understanding the onset and subsequent evolution of 
any given crisis and, vice versa, crises management patterns are essential 
indexes to grasp how the regulation and production of space is constantly 
recast under capitalism. 
Let us consider this dialectic movement in detail with a first glance at 
the development and spatial mutations of the current conjuncture. As a 
result of the dotcom bubble at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
and the parallel decline of stock-markets, surplus capital changed the 
target and investment in property and related assets soared worldwide. 
The pace of urbanization and construction was particularly intense in the 
US until 2007, when the crisis broke as a compounded result of housing 
overproduction and speculation in real estate and mortgage markets. From 
the US, the crisis spread unevenly around the world, impacting on diverse 
regions depending on their position in the international division of labor 
and the geopolitical scene. Through these trends the crisis has developed 
and deepened previous patterns of uneven geographical development, an 
aspect that is completely obvious in the European case, where the crisis 
has widened the gap between Southern and Northern Europe. There 
is, therefore, a horizontal, geopolitical distribution (or spatial mutation) 
of the crisis. It is also important to consider the transformations in the 
nature and scales of the crisis throughout the years. Starting as a crash at 
the level of built environment production and the related credit system, 
the crisis adopted a financial form soon. The collapse of stock-markets 
turned into a global recession and a sovereign debt crisis when certain 
governments decided to save their banks from bankruptcy. Finally, the 
nation-state crunch is becoming a crisis of particular regions and cities 
as national and supranational agencies push down budgetary pressure 
to regional and local governments in the form of new austerity policy-
regimes. Hence there is also a vertical, scalar circulation of the crisis, 
from one country to the globe, to specific regions and cities —and, even, 
particular neighborhoods— in other countries.
The synthesis above may oversimplify the actual intricacies of 
recent economic decline, but it allows us to grasp the crucial role of the 
production of space as both a cause of the crisis and a strategy to manage 
and overcome it. Two spatial fixes stand at the temporal extremes of 
the recession, showing that the absorption of surplus capital at a given 
point provides just a temporary solution, one that is likely to generate 
deeper contradictions in a subsequent stage of development. The 
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potential administration of this conflict-ridden process through rational 
management — such as that provided by the most lucid manifestations of 
reformist town and regional planning — is always abandoned in the long 
run. The circulation of capital through built environments demands a 
systematic, ever-expanding reconfiguration of inherited spatial formations 
in order to avoid obsolescence and devaluation, and as a material basis for 
subsequent rounds of investment and accumulation. In that sense, real 
estate speculation and constant urbanization and re-urbanization are 
not a deviation, but are essential to the survival of capitalism (Harvey, 
2006a:398). As Brenner and Theodore argue: 
[C]apital continually renders obsolete the very geographical landscapes it 
creates and upon which its own reproduction and expansion hinges. Particularly 
during periods of systemic crisis, inherited frameworks of capitalist territorial 
organization may be destabilized as capital seeks to transcend sociospatial 
infrastructures and systems of class relations that no longer provide a secure 
basis for sustained accumulation. As the effects of devaluation ripple through the 
space-economy, processes of creative destruction ensue in which the capitalist 
landscape is thoroughly transformed: the configurations of territorial organization 
that underpinned the previous round of capitalist expansion are junked and 
reworked in order to establish a new locational grid for the accumulation process. 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002:354-5).
These spatial transformations require and at the same time trigger 
associated processes of institutional and regulatory change, new modes 
of urban and regional government, new modes of intervention, and so 
on. Each stage of capitalism generates specific regulatory arrangements 
that produce a series of historical regimes of urban and regional policy, 
including particular assemblages of the state and the private sector, 
particular articulations between different state levels and jurisdictions, 
and particular interrelations of planning practices and policy with other 
moments in the production of space.
1. space and cRisis in the longue durée of capitaLisM
In this section I will briefly explore several historical episodes in order to 
illustrate how different assemblages of capital and space generate diverse 
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crisis regimes in the longue durée of capitalism. Each historical stage of 
development privileges certain scales, territories and agencies in the 
deployment of new waves of spatial creative destruction in times of crisis. 
Accordingly, cities, urbanization and urban policy take on different roles in 
the process of spatial and economic restructuring and are in turn reshaped 
as they become instrumental in the strategies to manage and overcome 
stagnation. These cycles rework not only the urban fabric, but also the 
techniques we use to govern it. It is helpful, therefore, to look backwards 
in order to understand the material conditions for the transformation of 
urban policy and planning in the past, and to gain some insight about the 
potential evolution of the field in the future and the possible scenarios we 
will face.
This cursory review starts with the classic case of mid-nineteenth 
century Paris, an interesting example for many reasons. First of all is the 
fact that Haussmann’s grands travaux in Paris and the broader programs 
of infrastructural development in the country at large during the Second 
Empire were devised strategically to absorb capital and labor surpluses 
after a crisis that had threatened to reactivate revolutionary change 
(Harvey, 2003). The slump originated abroad; indeed the contradictions 
of the production of space had a role in the formation of the crisis: by 
the mid-1840s, the railway mania in Britain had unleashed a spiral of 
investment and speculation in related assets (Evans, 1848; Berger and 
Spoerer, 2001). French capital partook in the short-lived feast. The impact 
on French investors and banks was hard when the bubble burst; the Bank 
of France, for instance, saw its deposits reduced from 320 million in June 
1845 to 57 million in January 1847 (Traugott, 1983:457-8). France was not 
alone in the repercussions of the British crash. The crisis spread to the 
entire continental Europe, galvanizing a chain reaction of revolts and 
riots in France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the Austrian Empire in 1848 
— the so-called Springtime of Peoples (Hobsbawm, 1975:21-40). Hence 
a crash generated as the combined outcome of overproduction of space 
and associated financial speculation triggered a sequence of economic and 
political crises that developed unevenly throughout the continent. 
In France the change of government after the uprisings and the 
subsequent coup d’état paved the way for a new approach that relied 
heavily and consciously on urban- and national-scale spatial fixes to exit 
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the crisis.1 The vast program of public works in Paris included not only 
the opening of new boulevards carved through the dense city center, but 
also the widening and extension of existing roads, the creation of new 
parks and hospitals, schools and colleges, markets, prisons and barracks. 
New water, drainage and gas systems were adopted as well (Girouard, 
1985:288-9). Radiating from Paris, the new national railway system 
constituted another (ironic) element of Napoleon III’s fix to the crisis. In 
the 1870s, immediately after his mandate, ten railway lines arrived in the 
capital; three decades before there was only one. France passed from less 
than 500 km. of railway line in the 1840s to more than 2.300 km in 1880 
(Martí-Henneberg, 2013). In brief, a major process of urban and regional 
restructuring reshaped the economic and social landscape. Together with 
the reinforcement of its centrality in the country, Paris experienced a 
complete reconfiguration of the relation between the inner city and the 
peripheries, with the reorganization of residential areas along class lines 
and new locational patterns for industrial and retail activities.
These spatial transformations required parallel efforts of institutional 
and regulatory restructuring. New legal and technical frameworks 
were developed to implement the interventions. A new urban form of 
governance emerged, with distinctive relations between the national and 
the local state, as well as novel alliances between public administration and 
private enterprise. Indeed, the Second Empire’s growth machine hinged 
as much upon Haussmann’s vision and managerial capacity as it did upon 
his financial creativity and relation with venturesome investors. Only in 
Paris the public works expenditure between 1853 and 1869 amounted to a 
previously unseen figure of 2.5 billion francs, which Haussmann would 
gather from a number of sources including public bonds and loans from 
new financial agencies such as Crédit Foncier de France and the Société 
Générale du Crédit Mobilier, both created by the Pereire brothers, who 
were also directly involved in the creation of railways, gas supply, public 
transit systems and, of course, residential building (Harvey, 2003:113-120). 
In short, the rescaling of urbanization and infrastructural development 
triggered the formation of the modern credit system in France. Both the 
spatial and the financial fixes of the Second Empire collapsed together in 
1 | Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had expressed beforehand his support for the 
active promotion of economic prosperity through investment in public works 
(Bonaparte, 1840:59).
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the late 1860s, when their aggregated contradictions hit again. The crash 
of risk capital put an end to Haussmann’s projects and Napoleon III’s 
mandate. The resulting crisis would incite anew the specters of revolution 
in the 1871 Commune. 
Jumping forward a few decades we meet another key crisis period, 
the 1930s Great Depression in the US. Despite the huge number of 
studies on the 1929 crash, few economists have taken note of the previous 
development of a real estate bubble and subsequent fall in the mid-1920s, 
starting in Florida and spreading to the whole country. In just a few years 
land development and housing rose irrationally in Florida, fuelled by a 
feverish wave of investment that galvanized an emerging middle-class. 
By 1925 the exchange in land property and associated shares had become 
a purely speculative dynamic, with scarce relation to actual construction 
activity: lots could be sold several times in a single day (Frazer and Guthrie 
Jr., 1995). The bust in the state was just the tip of the iceberg and the 
whole country experienced a steady decline in real estate development 
the following year. As White (2009) shows, this contraction marked the 
starting point of the stock issues boom, with massive doses of surplus 
capital being transferred to the equity market as an alternative investment. 
Again, we see the close relation between the conflicts at the level of spatial 
production, financialization and economic crises. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal tried to tackle the depression by mobilizing 
spatial policies in several ways. Firstly, during the intense years under 
the dominance of the first Brain Trust —including strong supporters of 
central planning such as Rexford G. Tugwell and Arthur E. Morgan— 
a program blending civil works in both the city and rural areas and 
a back-to-the-land vision promoted a substantial restructuring of the 
social geography of the country. Agencies such as Milburn L. Wilson’s 
Subsistence Homesteads Division, Morgan’s Tennessee Valley Authority 
or Tugwell’s Resettlement Administration were attempts at countering 
the spontaneous deterioration of rural regions under capitalist uneven 
spatial development, taking the regeneration thereof as an opportunity to 
foster economic development and pacify urban unrest by moving surplus 
labor power to the countryside. After 1936, however, a more pragmatic 
anti-cyclical approach was adopted to stimulate construction activity 
that would reshape the social landscape of the nation. One the one hand 
the federal government guaranteed private domestic mortgages for the 
middle-classes in order to ease credit flow and prevent foreclosure; on the 
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other hand, the administration launched a concerted effort to build public 
housing for the working-class and the ‘deserving’ poor. While agencies 
such as the Public Works Administration and the United States Housing 
Authority and its state branches focused on building collective housing in 
inner-city neighborhoods for low-income population groups, the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation and later the Federal Housing Administration 
established redlining practices using class, race, typological and locational 
criteria, insuring mostly middle-class, white, single-family houses in the 
suburbs (Jackson, 1985:190-218). Together with the investment in the 
expansion of the road and highway system, this strategy secured new 
niches of household consumption, fostering a process of suburbanization 
and spatial segregation that would pervade the post-war era (Hayden, 
2003:128-153).
Thus a new national horizon of economic recovery was established 
based on a profound reconfiguration of preexisting social divisions of 
space. The polarization of housing patterns along class and racial lines 
remained as a contradictory legacy of an alleged progressive period. At all 
events, the New Deal restructuring was not limited to a reorganization of 
core-periphery-suburb relations. As was the case with nineteenth-century 
France, the redesign of the urban fabric required major regulatory and 
governmental reforms – with the federal and regional administrations 
assuming an unprecedented role in the management of local activity – 
and also a strong reorganization of the relations between the state and the 
financial sector. The 1930s crisis paved the way for an increased presence 
of the nation scale as the pre-eminent level for accumulation and the 
regulation of political-economic life (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:358). 
I have focused here on the US for its central role in the geopolitical 
context and its ascendancy in this path at that time, but of course similar 
arguments apply to most of the contemporary Western world and their 
concurrence in what some have termed the Fordist exception (Neilson and 
Rossiter, 2008).
The US and, particularly, New York City, led the outbreak of the next 
episode in this quick overview of the connection of crises to major spatial 
restructurings, and indeed one that might be read as the inception of our 
current predicament. Several authors have identified the management of 
New York City’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s as the blueprint for subsequent 
nation-wide neoliberalization agendas in the US and abroad, inaugurating 
a trend of austerity measures in social welfare, incentives to business, 
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and intervention in local affairs by supra-municipal agencies, corporate 
interests and unelected institutions (Harvey, 2005:48; Tabb, 1982:9; 
Zevin, 1977).2 In the late 1960s the decline of manufacture and suburban 
flight eroded the local revenues; the city was more and more dependent 
on federal funds. In view of the growing deficit, however, the Nixon 
administration changed its approach and began to diminish federal aid 
in 1972. ‘The urban crisis’, declared the president, should be refashioned 
as an ‘urban opportunity’ (Nixon, 1972). The Manhattanite financial 
elite understood the gist behind the message: urban restructuring could 
become not only a chance to exit the crisis but also a bridge to restore 
upper-class power and capital preeminence after a long period of state-
rule oriented to maintain welfare programs. 
For a couple of years the banks covered the gap left by federal 
retrenchment but in 1975, amidst a global recession, they finally decided to 
stop rolling the debt over (Tabb, 1982:21-2). New York City faced technical 
bankruptcy. In lieu of direct subsidies, the (Republican) state government 
and financial institutions put the city under the control of a bailout 
agency, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, followed by the Emergency 
Financial Control Board, incorporating representatives from the financial 
and corporate spheres. The new agenda should be as innovative as 
exemplary. According to Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, the 
program had to be ‘so punitive, the overall experience so painful, that no 
city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same 
road’.3 And so it was. In little more than a year the city fired almost 50,000 
employees and cut down welfare departments’ budget by 25 percent; 
additional rollback would ensue after the initial shock treatment (Tabb, 
1982:30). The new agenda also included a transition to entrepreneurial 
approaches to urban governance, whereby the local administration should 
not only strive to create a good business climate through all manner of 
incentives, but also to brand the city itself as a major cultural hub and, 
of course, as a succulent niche for real estate investment (Greenberg, 
2008). Together with finance and ancillary activities, the restructuring 
of the urban fabric through successive rounds of gentrification reshaped 
2 | Of course, more violent, merciless versions of a new experimental 
neoliberalization were imposed on a national scale in contemporary Chile and 
other Latin American countries afterwards.
3 | Quoted in Harvey (2005:46).
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the local economy (Harvey, 2005:47). In these processes new alliances 
of public and private actors fostering corporate profit opened a path of 
institutional change that would spread later to other scales and regions. 
The neoliberal agenda imposed by Reagan in the US, Thatcher in 
Britain, and in Europe and other countries afterwards, had of course a 
national and global horizon, but its impact was especially severe in cities. 
May large metropolises bore the brunt of budgetary austerity and became 
the major victims of rollback policies. Indeed, as Brenner and Theodore 
(2002) suggest, in the following years they became a crucial arena for 
economic and regulatory restructuring, a pivotal point to displace and 
manage the crisis. Certain cities and city-regions transformed into nodes 
of a new planetary division of labor that would widen the gap between 
global centers and global peripheries. They worked as the engines of a 
new round of uneven spatial development and as key sites for regulatory 
experimentation, with state institutions being constantly recast at the 
local scale as protean galvanizers of transnational surplus capital. This 
blend of intense governmental restructuring, inflexible austerity and 
entrepreneurial urbanism is at the root of today’s round deepened urban 
neoliberalization. 
2. the age of austeRit y and the aLteRnatives  
 foR pL anning
[E]conomic recovery was never the point; the 
drive for austerity was about using the crisis, not 
solving it. (Krugman, 2012:n.p.)
The crisis today presents strong structural similarities with the cases 
above. Again, following conditions of capital overaccumulation, a massive 
switch of surplus wealth from the primary (production of standard 
commodities) to the secondary (production of space and the built 
environment) circuit of capital triggered property market speculation and 
securitization, which in turn led to the collapse of the financial system 
and a global recession. Far from inciting institutional change oriented 
towards a progressive reform of the system, the outcome in terms of 
policy is a redoubled effort to extend the neoliberal agenda further (Hall 
et al, 2013). In fact the 1970s recession and subsequent transformations 
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in urban governance are especially relevant in the context of the current 
conjuncture for several reasons. Given that Western governmental 
agencies and international economic institutions are pushing to ‘exit’ that 
model’s crisis through a development of its main tenets, many authors 
suggest that we are undergoing a stage of deepened neoliberalization (e.g. 
see Callinicos, 2012; Peck et al, 2012). Of course, the austerity recipe and 
the strategic use thereof are not new. A common mantra since the early 
1980s, ‘austerity’ is the perfect euphemism for fiscal retrenchment and 
the dismantling of the welfare state. Left aside of the severe rollback as 
a necessary evil, the veritable cause for the sovereign debt crisis — the 
trillions spent in the public bailout of private banks and other financial 
institutions — becomes an opportunity to further downsize the public 
sector. As Harvey (2006b:154-5) contends, crisis management is in fact one 
of the fundamental modes of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession — 
that is, of accumulation through direct extraction of profit out of public or 
common forms of collective wealth.
But the distribution of this agenda is spatially variegated, socially 
unequal, and it deepens earlier paths of policy rescaling and restructuring: 
the impact is most severely felt by certain population groups living in 
vulnerable areas in cities located in already weak regions and countries. As 
was the case during previous crises, the outcome of the recession intensifies 
preceding trends of uneven geographical development according with 
specific patterns of path-dependency in terms of economic restructuring, 
social change and policy innovation (Brenner et al, 2010). In the US, the 
epicenter of the crisis, there are around 300 municipalities nationwide in 
default on their debt (Peck, 2012:633). But the origins and the solutions for 
their problems are very different and vary depending on the recent history 
of these places. In Rustbelt cities subprime lending was especially intense 
in deprived African American neighborhoods, but minor in comparison 
to the Sunbelt real estate boom, more focused on middle-class buyers and 
speculative investment, which made ‘the housing bubble … bigger and 
more likely to bust’ in the South (Aalbers, 2012:7). However, it is precisely 
those states already under structural weaknesses that face harder times 
now. For instance, in view of the fiscal emergency at the local level, the 
state of Michigan made a controversial move and bailed out cities through 
external management, which have taken hold of local policies at many 
different levels, including planning programs (Peck, 2012:635).
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The situation is more dramatic in Europe. As Costis Hadjimichalis 
(2011:255) suggests, the foundations of the sovereign debt crisis are 
embedded in the patterns of uneven regional development at the heart of 
the structure of the European Union. In fact, the imposition of extreme 
austerity measures in the wake of the financial crisis has reactivated 
regional divergence, doing away with the EU’s alleged goals of territorial 
cohesion and reinforcing the economic and political hegemony of 
particular regions and certain forms of capital in central European 
countries. Before the crisis 43 percent of the EU GDP was produced in 
only 14 percent of its territory; since the euro’s introduction Southern 
Europe had become a main destiny for German exports, exceeding the 
total dispatches to US, China and Japan together in 2007 and developing 
a spiraling negative trade balance with Germany (Eurostat, 2009:148-9, 
152). Both aspects, uneven production and commercial dependence, are 
likely to worsen after the imposition of bail out programs which render 
the South increasingly subordinated to political decisions coming from 
Northern and central countries.
The spatial unevenness of the reaction to the crisis also incorporates 
a scalar element. Cities —or, more precisely, particular cities and 
neighborhoods within them— are likely to become the major victims in 
the medium and long term for several reasons. Firstly, they experience 
greater impact from the construction slowdown following credit scarcity 
(and, in some cases, the collapse of real estate markets) since housing 
and infrastructural development have a stronger role in their economies, 
including the collection of public revenues through building taxes; a 
general state of depressed consumption also hits fundamental sectors of 
urban economies such as tourism and conspicuous commercial activity. 
Furthermore, compared to rural areas where family and kin networks are 
tighter, urban populations are more dependent on formal mechanisms 
of social reproduction such as those provided by public services, a sector 
under special pressure in a context of austerity. Of course, it is the 
disenfranchised population living in large urban areas that bears the brunt 
of welfare cuts (Matsaganis, 2011; Hall et al, 2013). Finally, in recent years 
certain countries have developed a trend to push down the management 
of austerity-derived conflicts to lower levels of government, what Jamie 
Peck terms ‘scalar dumping’: ‘[c]ities are … where austerity bites … The 
projection downward of these pressures establishes a socially regressive 
form of scalar politics — with cities positioned at the sharp end’ (Peck, 
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2012:629,631,647). Together, these phenomena create the conditions for 
the emergence of an ‘austerity urbanism’ — again, Peck’s (2012) term 
— with variegated manifestations across the world but common features 
related not only with cities’ shared structural elements but also with their 
role as key sites to overcome the depression. 
Just as this double movement of conflict condensation and regulatory 
restructuring in urban areas prolongs the path opened in the 1970s, we 
can expect emerging forms of urbanism and urban policy to deepen 
the features of previous rounds of policy innovation and institutional 
transformation. For the time being we are perhaps witnessing only the 
‘destructive’ moment of this deepened neoliberalization of urban agendas 
along the line of the earlier dismantling of managerial, Fordist-Keynesian 
urbanism. Public assets and facilities are at the frontline of this new attack 
on already meager forms of welfare: public estate and companies are sold, 
granted or pulled to pieces as part of the downsize program; potentially 
profitable services and goods such as healthcare, education, security and 
even public space itself are privatized, submitted to private management, 
or charged with user fees; the public administration surrenders normative 
and economic prerogatives to corporate agencies and developers, and so 
forth. 
Though still inchoate, the ‘creative’ moment of the process is likely 
to revisit previous aspects of entrepreneurial urbanism starting from 
the new platform provided by these measures. In a context of limited 
investment and lending, cities and city-regions will have to reinforce their 
strategies to attract capital amidst intensified inter-urban competition. 
This trend will widen the gap between the top and bottom tiers of urban 
areas, aggravating the predicament of those already under pressure from 
economic and social conflicts. Megaproject- and megaevent-oriented 
initiatives are to galvanize the public sector of those cities who can afford 
such enterprises, and structural developments will probably adopt the 
public-private partnership formula on a regular basis, with corporate 
investment leading the initiatives in search of profit and leaving the public 
sector to assume the risk and unprofitable expenditures. Private interest is 
likely to embrace previously progressive urbanisms as novel accumulation 
niches, including environmental management and city greening, as 
well as urban redevelopment and regeneration of both city centers and 
historic peripheries. In a context of construction decline soft urbanisms 
will privilege the reorganization of the city’s content —rather than the 
Álvaro Sevilla-Buitrago44
built environment itself— as a realm of commodification, as is the case 
with the pervasive initiatives of smart cities and the urban mobilization 
of big data through new electronic devices and communication services. 
However, once real estate markets are reactivated we can expect new 
urban developments to spread that, especially in the case of Southern 
European countries, could be increasingly targeted at international 
corporate investment in high-end touristic areas and capital cities. At an 
everyday level traditional public services will probably undergo a process 
of segmentation along class lines depending on the users’ capacity to 
afford fees and extra taxes for enhanced assistance and facilities; those 
lacking economic resources will face the bare support of basic assistance.
In any case, this dismal view on our urban futures presupposes a 
preliminary achievement that is still to be proven: the capacity of deep 
neoliberalization to fix the growing contradictions resulting from the 
crisis and to govern the intensification of uneven development without 
triggering further social upheaval, armed conflicts, environmental 
disaster and, of course, new economic collapses. Instead, Brenner et 
al (2010:339-341) consider the possibility that a dysfunctional ‘zombie 
neoliberalism’ is developed as a ‘putative [solution] to persistent regulatory 
dilemmas across scales, territories and contexts’. Given the undesirability 
of any of these scenarios, it is extremely urgent that we think of potential 
alternatives to revive the social breath of planning and urban policy. Four 
levels and scales of engagement should articulate this endeavor:
• Activist urbanism: The crisis has sparked an archipelago of small-scale 
interventions and public space occupations as a direct response to state 
retrenchment in fundamental dimensions of sociospatial regulation. 
Together with traditional forms of urban social movements and ephe-
meral guerilla urbanisms these new experiences show ‘the potential 
of the temporary and the mobile to refigure the city around spaces that 
were dormant, disregarded or dead’ (Tonkiss, 2013:322), but also and 
especially the importance of laying claim to public space and produ-
cing new regimes of publicity by an active, collective self-management 
of the city (Harvey, 2012). Both everyday, piecemeal reappropriations 
of the streets and massive urban protests can be assembled through 
activist urbanisms to engender novel forms of urban commoning that 
palliate the crisis of formal social reproduction and create the oppor-
tunity for a more human urban life.
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• Progressive urbanism: On a more formal basis, we need an alliance for 
a new progressive alternative to neoliberal planning and urban policy, 
including civic leaders, planning practitioners, the non-profit sector 
and scholars on the left. These actors should operate as an advocacy 
body mediating and aiding the penetration of social movement’s 
demands in governmental agendas, promoting the renovation of 
urbanism’s social function and undoing recent entrepreneurial 
approaches. At the same time they should develop a convincing 
discourse to underpin such new forms of urbanism, appealing to 
social justice and democratization to counter the devastating effect of 
‘common-sense’ neoliberal ideologies. 
• Urban-regional solidarity: The efforts on a local level should be 
paralleled with the creation of a network of inter-urban solidarity across 
regions and nations so that the harmful effects of spatial competition are 
lowered. Such networks ought to exchange experiences in regulatory 
experimentation, establish common political agendas and elaborate 
protocols to resist and support each other in case they undergo fiscal 
problems or face attacks from corporate capital or institutions. Within 
Europe this network should include not only cities across the South, 
but also those suffering from endemic structural conflicts and social 
vulnerability in depressed regions in the North and the East.
• Rescaled social struggle: The city is not enough. Current patterns of 
intensified uneven geographical development show the urgent need 
for a realignment of national and supranational levels of government 
pursuing to rebalance social and territorial inequalities. Certain 
aspects of the regulation of contemporary social formations cannot 
find an appropriate solution through urban and regional strategies 
alone, but need to be orchestrated from higher agencies. In Southern 
European countries the main lines of austerity agendas are imposed 
by bodies including representatives from national governments, EU 
institutions and international financial agencies, while the detailed 
distribution of budgetary retrenchment is pushed down to lower levels 
of administration — a clear evidence of the need to rescale social 
struggle to target power centers beyond the urban scale.
Taken together, these moves gesture towards a collective reappropriation of 
planning at several scales, including both those in which the state stands 
as the fundamental agency and those currently undergoing a transition 
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to a growing presence of forms of commoning and self-management. 
Of course, the state is still the fundamental actor in terms of economic 
and regulatory innovation; but it is also —as it always was— the main 
promoter of advances in the field of planning and the orchestration of 
spatial production. In my opinion, the point —at least from a possibilist 
perspective departing from the reality of our cities and not from a timeless, 
placeless ideal— is to take the state and put them to work for the collective 
interest. This does not mean that we have to focus on taking formal, 
institutional power and forget about the commons for a while, rather the 
reverse. We need to mobilize the energies of commoning to define what 
the common good should be, to reorient the state in the right direction. 
At the same time, the re-socialization of the state must be implemented 
in such a way that, by creating a new public, the state no longer erodes 
the commons but, on the contrary, it concentrates efforts to become a 
formal infrastructure from which new forms of commons can blossom. 
Both projects, the commoning of urban space and everyday life and the 
constituent reconfiguration of the state should strive to palliate the current 
crisis of socioenvironmental reproduction, pursuing a new notion of good 
living based on the achievement of real sustainability —realized through 
the transformation of our lifestyles, not through the proliferation of new 
marketable technologies— a project of care and mutual aid —capable of 
combining formal and informal networks of social reproduction— and a 
commitment to radical democracy.
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Contest Discourses of Austerity in the 
Urban Margins (A Vision from Barcelona)
Nuria Benach
“...the contradictions of capitalism may be 
witnessed more clearly at the margins” (Katz 
1996:172)
“Sin trabajo, sin casa, sin pensión, sin miedo”
(“No job, no house, no pension, no fear”,
street protests of the youth in Spain, 2011)
The global crisis has been the perfect excuse for the deployment of 
neo-liberal policies that have had their most visible effect in the severe 
cutbacks of social rights and the growing concentration of both public and 
private investments in certain privileged issues and spaces. As a result, 
there has been an accentuated social and spatial polarisation at all levels, 
from the global to the urban. These policies have been accompanied by the 
existence of a tremendous gap between a hegemonic neo-liberal discourse 
that evaluates the present crisis in very abstract terms (such as foreign 
debt, markets weakness, risk premium, investors’ confidence and so on) 
and the terrible effects of such policies in the spaces of people’s daily 
lives. In these spaces, the so-called economic crisis is by no means an 
abstraction but a very material and tangible situation that has appalling 
effects on the weakest population: foreclosures, lack of social assistance, 
increasing waiting times, environmental degradation, urban stress. Very 
often, the worst side of this so-called economic crisis is not the crisis 
itself but the effects of the unfair policies that have been deployed. For 
this reason, in recent times the global crisis appears to have awakened 
the social unrest that seemed to have been dormant in a welfare state that 
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once was perceived as everlasting. Today, the very same cities that keep 
their discourse as motors of economic growth and as strategic nodes of 
capital concentration have increasingly become the centres of protest and 
resistance as the many urban mobilizations all over the world demonstrate 
during 2011 and 2012. The aim of this chapter is therefore to explore this 
urban discontent by analysing the potential of urban spaces as sites of 
generation of alternatives to the social and political crisis. To do this, I 
will base my argument on the many contributions from the critical urban 
theory that have recently reworked some of Henri Lefebvre’s ideas on the 
urban process, urban centrality and the right to the city.
1. the Right to the (iMagined) cit y
Let us start with the evidence of how neo-liberal policies generate growing 
social and spatial inequalities. Any analyses of the evolution of a variety 
of social indicators in the last ten years in most western cities would show 
that the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened. For the less 
privileged it can be an extreme economic situation without the minimum 
means necessary to guarantee their basic needs. For the middle classes, 
who during the years of economic growth lived a “golden age” of high 
consumption – and also of high indebtedness –, it has meant a progressive 
impoverishment and a drastic reduction of their consumption levels, 
which is assumed to be both a symptom and a cause of the recession.
Austerity is indeed a very aggressive way of doing politics, the last 
facade that neo-liberal politics uses to undermine the basis of a welfare 
state that was created to save the system but that in the end turned out 
to be too expensive and inefficient for capital’s interests. Capitalism has 
already shown many times its capacity to restructure and to survive even 
at the cost of the use of violence and of unbearable human suffering. 
But unjust, violent and intolerable as it is, alternatives to capitalism have 
become less and less imaginable, especially for the left. It was Neil Smith 
who stated that “the tragedy is less the political onslaught by the right 
than the political non-response of the left” (Smith, 2009:51). A couple of 
examples can evoke the state of mind of some leftist intellectuals. It was 
Fredric Jameson who echoed the idea that it was easier to imagine the end 
of the world than the end of capitalism (Jameson, 2003:76). Moreover, 
in any case, one may wonder how a non-capitalist world would be? And 
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it was Donna Haraway who openly complained about having almost lost 
her capacity to imagine such a different world (quoted in Smith 2009:51).
Such a collective incapacity could leave us in a difficult situation for 
thinking about alternatives. A possible hint takes us back to the urban 
ground. Back in 1968, Henri Lefebvre wrote that capitalism could not be 
understood nor resisted without understanding and re-imagining the city 
(Lefebvre, 1974). This was a bold statement made by someone who firmly 
believed that the city was nothing but an abridged model of society as a 
whole. There is no question that studying cities from a critical perspective 
means to contextualize the process of urbanization in the present form of 
capitalism. And similarly, following Lefebvre’s train of thought, the urban 
must be a key element to understanding the contradictions of capitalism. 
Thus, fighting for a new city (for the right to the city as Lefebvre would 
say) inevitably means fighting for a new society. But we need to be able to 
at least think of it, to be able to imagine it. Hence, we urgently need to use 
the right to imagine the city, another city, another society. 
Our first step to inspire such imagination could be then to unmask 
the neo-liberal ideology, to look for the creation of some rupture in this 
hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. Thatcher’s famous (or infamous) 
“there is no alternative” narrative, like it or not, went directly against our 
imagination since it is difficult to counter any discourse based on the 
same logic that supports it. The necessary rupture can only be created 
from other values and logic than the ones that support the neo-liberal 
discourse, that is, from the values and logic of the materially lived-in space 
and not from economic abstractions.
Let us discuss now for a moment the common hegemonic discourses 
on cities. The usual aims pursued by city governments have been the 
adjustment of urban space to their potential demands, transforming some 
areas in a frantic and sometimes ephemeral way, and converting them 
into a commodity ready to be sold. Urban politics and urban planning 
have been rapidly adapted to these new priorities and selling the city 
has become a normal item on the agenda since the 1980s. But besides 
producing the commodity (adapting spaces), urban marketing experts 
would say one needs to sell them, find potential consumers, position the 
merchandise in the market, and compete with other possible alternatives. 
This is about promoting and expanding urban qualities, availabilities, 
comparative advantages and about finding ways to do it (Harvey, 1989). 
But when citizens realize that their needs lie outside such commercial 
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logics, then the only thing that can be sold to them in order to maintain the 
necessary social harmony is ideology: to persuade them that the decisions 
are beneficial to everybody, that they serve the principle of the common 
good. The weight of urban discourses has thus inevitably become heavier: 
what is said that it is done, what is said that it is, what is said that is wanted, 
are all part and parcel of “what is done” to occupy a better position in 
this international context and at the same time a way to try to convince 
everyone that this is the correct and only path to be followed. For many 
years, this hegemonic discourse on the city succeeded in stopping the 
emergence of alternatives, transgressions and resistances to that “imposed 
point of view” as Sharon Zukin once put it (Zukin, 1995:23-24). Thus the 
right to the city must also be about having a “different point of view”, about 
envisioning the city as a space for living, as having use value and not only 
as exchange value. The right to the city must start with the right to the 
(imagined) city.
2. questioning the hegeMonic coMMon sense
It is nothing new to say that power uses every possible means to reach 
its goals. And language, if properly used and amplified, can be very 
powerful in creating “truths” and make any other different explanation 
look unreasonable and even ridiculous. The main strategy used by the 
hegemonic neo-liberal discourse is to describe the situation as being so 
far away from any personal experience we may have that it is actually very 
difficult, almost impossible to counter. Moreover, when said discourse, 
often unintelligible and therefore practically unquestionable, seems 
not to be enough, it is immediately added that, anyway, “there are no 
alternatives”. With the never-ending echo of the media and the complicity 
of intellectuals, neo-liberal ideology creates in this way a hegemonic 
“common sense” that naturalises all kind of decisions as unavoidable 
and undermines all possibilities of resistance to that extremely critical 
situation.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, it can be said that those strategies, 
when looked at closely, are not very sophisticated after all. They consist 
of blaming people (guilty for being too indebted, guilty for having lived 
beyond their means, guilty for having a job so they don’t have the right 
to protest, guilty for not having a job and being a burden on the entire 
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society, guilty for being ill, guilty for demanding care for kids and old 
people instead of personally taking care of them…), in being confused (a 
situation too complicated to be explained to ordinary people, use of lies or 
euphemisms like “healing or recapitalizing or injecting liquidity standing 
for giving public money to private banks), or creating a state of collective 
fear by threats or even repression if needed (Valverde, 2013).
However, despite an unemployment rate that seem out of control1 
and growing levels of poverty, there is an increasing perception among 
people that the no- alternatives discourse is actually hiding a reality of 
public resources spent in benefit of financial capital and the already 
very rich (Peet, 2012). This growing perception cannot be said to be 
a counter-discourse since it is not so well organised but it does indeed 
open an important fracture in this incapacity to respond to this direct 
alliance between economic and political power. Looking to open fractures 
to this common sense was the objective of Doreen Massey’s 2011 paper 
called precisely “Ideology and Economics at the present moment”. In 
that paper we were urged to think of the relations between economy 
and ideology in some other way if we were to fight the neo-liberal space. 
Massey was of course talking from and for London but lots of things she 
talked about are perfectly applicable to other contexts (paradoxically, the 
magic of theorizing from the ground up that has always characterized 
Massey’s thought). For Massey a real space seemed to exist for an effective 
answer and to produce any breaks to that hegemonic ideological common 
sense considering three areas of potential engagement. These areas are: 
1) considering the economy with a completely different prioritisation of 
values (one that stresses the cooperation needed in social reproduction 
instead of the exchange in markets), 2) putting equality back on the agenda 
and into the discourse (as opposed to the neo-liberal stress on liberty), 
and 3) reinforcing the collective self-organization of people in relation to 
growing individualism.
With these three possibilities in mind, we move from the abstract 
and ideological to the personal and political, where we address the effects 
of the crisis in the urban spaces where the abstract explanations of the 
1 | The unemployment rate in Spain is over 25%, in Barcelona it’s “only” over 
15% although the rate in the worst neighbourhood can often double that in the 
best one, not to mention the scandalous rates of youth unemployment all over the 
country that are currently over 50%.
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neo-liberal discourse have now a material and real form: people at risk 
of losing their house, people who cannot satisfy their basic needs, people 
who are tired of growing waiting times, people who get demoralized with 
their progressive worsening of the conditions of their life. Put another 
way, what it is hidden by global neo-liberal ideology is indeed shown in 
space. 
3. fRoM gLobaL discouRse to e veRyday Life:  
 the scaLes of the uRban
Merrifield has sensibly pointed out how easily we identify the dominant 
role of financial capitalism in the global neo-liberalism and at the same 
time how easily we accept the idea that “the urban” is the natural place 
to contest the neo-liberal project, as the wide-ranging and relevant social 
movements at the present time show (Merrifield, 2013). For decades, we 
had witnessed with some puzzlement at first, then with much avidity to 
understand, a systematic oblivion of the “urban scale” in the claims of 
social movements. In the so-called new social movements, there has been 
a change in the goals and ways of organising but also a change in the 
scale of the issues they are concerned by. Complaints move very naturally 
from the smaller local (my house, my street) to the global (third world 
debt, environmental crisis, super exploitation of labour etc.) skipping 
that urban scale than once was so characteristic of social movements (as 
described, for example, in Castells, 1983). Notwithstanding this change of 
priorities, the city has forcefully remained as the place for the expression 
of complaints and protests. Andy Merrifield again gives a possible answer: 
“It is too vast, because the scale of the city is out of reach for most people 
living at street level; yet it is too narrow as well, because when people do 
protest and take to the streets en masse, they frequently reach out beyond 
the scale of the city. What is required is something closer to home—
something one can touch and smell and feel—and something larger than 
life, something world-historical: a praxis that can somehow conjoin both 
realms at once” (Merrifield, 2011:108).
Again Lefebvre provides a framework of how to conceptualise the 
question in his notion of social totality, this is, society as formed by three 
levels of socio-spatial reality: the global, the urban, and the quotidian 
(Lefebvre, 1983). For him, revolution should be based on the possibility that 
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the quotidian acts over the urban and the urban over the global although 
they should not be seen as separated scales but simultaneous ones. The 
big episodes of social fights against capitalism have not only been political 
events but revolutions of the urban space and of daily life; changing the 
world has meant changing the way that every day we live our daily life 
(Goonewardena, 2012). And although not comparable to Lefebvre’s big 
cases such as May 68 in Paris or the Commune in Paris in 1871, the occupy 
movement fits very well into this new definition of social movement and 
also in Lefebvre’s idea of taking urban space and the will to change the 
way we live our daily life. However, even though these are exciting and in 
some way “new” movements, our former question still remains: whatever 
happened to the urban scale as the target of protest at the moment when 
it seems that urban inequalities are growing even faster? The distinction 
between “the city” and “the urban” that Lefebvre so decisively stated and 
that has been retaken so convincingly by the urban critical theory is a key 
issue to answer (Brenner and Schmid, 2011; Merrifield, 2013). Despite its 
“tenacity”, the city concept has been superseded by a changing reality to 
the point that it has become practically useless in many senses. A good 
strategy here is the idea to approach the city not as a category of analysis 
but as a category of practice, not as a place but as a process (Wachsmuth, 
2014).
4. the Right to (centR aLit y at) the MaRgins 
One of the key aspects of Lefebvre’s thought is the notion of “implosion-
explosion” that has also been redeployed to analyse the re-scaling of neo-
capitalist forms of urbanization. (Brenner, 2000:369). The capitalist 
process of urbanization constantly destroys and creates urban centres to 
create generate new forms of urban centrality and peripheries (what I call 
here margins to escape from a geometrical determinism). This is a crucial 
point. It means that centres created by capital by definition generate new 
peripheries or margins left without necessary urban qualities such as 
accessibility, connectivity, quality of the spaces of encounter, a good urban 
image… Thus, in creating such new centralities, spatial inequalities are 
also created. The state always works in favour of mobilizing space as a 
productive force (planning, investment, infrastructures) and, under 
particular conditions, it becomes the mediator of such inequalities, 
Nuria Benach78
regulating the worst effects of socio-spatial polarization and preserving 
social cohesion (Brenner, 2000). However, in the present neo-liberal 
context, public intervention focuses exclusively on the forms of capitalist 
centrality, leaving aside its mediating role (thus leading to the austerity 
discourse for the poor). Abandoned spaces are those with less capacity 
to generate profit. David Harvey, basing himself on Rosa Luxembourg’s 
theories on imperialism, stated in his well-known thesis on “accumulation 
by dispossession” that capitalism needs to exploit non-capitalist territories 
to survive or, in other words, that capitalism perpetually needs something 
“ outside itself” to survive as a system” (Harvey 2003:137). Harvey applies 
this idea, this time following Marx directly, to the notion of the creation a 
reserve army of labour (capitalism would expel workers outside the system 
to be able to use them later). The same logic can be applied to urban 
spaces: central spaces –this is, spaces of capital accumulation – need 
non central spaces as reserve spaces for future needs of expansion (Tello, 
2005). Around the centres, Lefebvre would say, there are only subjugated, 
exploited and dependent spaces. These reserve urban spaces are in many 
senses “colonized spaces” with their own symbolic codes, their diverse 
forms of resistance, all of which is rendered invisible and dismissed (and 
if needed, repressed) for the sake of the colonizer, this is, the capital. In 
other words, centres and peripheries are immanent to accumulation of 
capital, immanent to the secondary circuit of capital. The more profitable 
locations are squeezed while the rest are of disinvestment (Merrifield 
2011).
Capitalist urban dynamics always creates by definition social and 
spatial inequalities, in moments of expansion and creation of new 
central areas (with episodes of serious urban violence against individual 
and collective spaces of existing residents, as Neil Smith so positively 
theorized (Smith 1996) but also during times of crisis (with disinvestment 
in non-central areas, this is, without regulating the extreme effects of 
the polarization that is inherent to the functioning of the system). In 
the last decade, we have witnessed these two extreme situations and in 
both cases, there has been one single ideology although with different 
discourses. Until the outbreak of the crisis in 2007-08, the voracity of 
capital was obvious in massive urban transformations where the profit 
expectations were high. It involved the destruction of collective spaces 
and often involved the rendering invisible and criminalization of entire 
neighbourhoods while owners were responsible for vicious episodes of 
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mobbing. The general discourse was nevertheless of extreme optimism: 
it was about opportunities for economic growth that benefited “the city” 
and that would eventually trickle down positive effects for everybody. 
After 2008, optimism has been replaced by the growing pessimism of 
inaction both in the private and in the public sector because of the lack 
of expectations or the lack of money to invest. However, the political 
action continues attached to the discourses of urban competitiveness 
(paving the way for private investment to levels that would have been 
considered unacceptable, at least on paper, until recently) and renewed 
urban discourses of growth that respond to the same ideology (urban 
regeneration, creative cities, smart cities).
In those areas, which we have called “urban margins“, one can see 
more clearly the social effects of rising social inequalities and also where 
disinvestment and being rendered invisible points to a growing spatial 
injustice. In many ways, all complaints made  from the margins are but a 
cry to become central, not with those centrality features that feed capital 
accumulation, but at the service of an improved urban collective life: “You 
cannot forge an urban reality (...) without the existence of a centre (...) 
without the actual or possible encounter of all ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’” 
(Lefebvre 1976:18-19 quoted in Marcuse, 2011:19).
Centrality is therefore the essential feature of the urban and thus, it is 
necessary to redefine it in order to formulate alternatives. In “The Urban 
Revolution” Lefebvre argues that if the dialectic explosion/implosion 
characterizes the various manifestations of centrality that are created 
and destroyed, overcoming the process of creative destruction of late 
capitalism will involve the emergence of a “higher form of centrality“ 
until the reaching of a radically new “space of encounter” (Goonewardena, 
2011). In other words, the right to the city of Henri Lefebvre would not be 
anything but a “right to centrality” (Merrifield 2012).
5. anotheR baRceLona uRban L ab
“Barcelona Urban Lab” is the name of one of the projects of the 22@
Barcelona municipal company designed to consolidate Barcelona’s 
role as an innovative city through which “companies with innovative 
projects can test their infrastructures and services for the future in a real 
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environment”2. However, perhaps we can also think of some other ways 
to use the city as “an urban laboratory”. We would like to think of it as 
a place to check the creation of centralities and as a space of resistance 
where experiments of counter-neoliberalisation are produced and can be 
assessed. At first sight, it may be somewhat shocking trying to look for 
growing urban polarization in an apparently successful case of urban 
management such as Barcelona. At the beginning of the 1980s, Barcelona 
was not even on the map, as proudly stated by current political leaders to 
highlight the international recognition achieved since then. In 30 years, 
the city has indeed experimented a profound urban transformation that 
had been widely acclaimed by politicians, journalists and not least by 
academics. The hegemonic discourse was one of an urban model that had 
presumably found the magic formula of being simultaneously capable of 
satisfying investors and citizens, foreigners and local people, a recipe that 
was able to combine economic promotion with social cohesion (Benach 
and Albet, 2005; Benach, 1993, 2004). The brand “Barcelona model” was 
used to legitimate the diverse interests involved in this process of urban 
transformation and at the same time to promote the city internationally 
but that, in the end became a taken for granted myth that did not need to 
prove its very existence. During the 1990s only a few realized what was 
going on (Benach, 1993; Lopez, 1993; Tello, 1993) and the bulk of critical 
visions did not appear until much later, when the problems generated 
by such transformations became rather obvious (Capel, 2005; Delgado, 
2007; Unio Temporal d’Escribes, 2004). It can be said that such a model 
started showing its limitations precisely from the very moment it worked 
according to their objectives, and contradictions rapidly arose. In the 
process of stimulating the entry of capital and people (tourist), tensions, 
conflicts and inequalities were more and more visible (i.e. high rocketing 
housing prices, limited maintenance of public spaces, urban pressure 
on popular neighbourhoods, loss of memory and social spaces…) while 
the public sector was diminishing its mediating role to compensate for 
inequalities and polarization. The glossy city of the tourist guides had 
definitely another more complex and not always so bright side. After 
2008, the social situation has become more dramatic with rising levels of 
unemployment, with many people overly indebted (with immoral figures 
of evictions) and visible poverty in many parts of the city.
2 | http://www.22barcelona.com/content/view/698/897/lang,en/
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What we have been able to see in the last 30 years of urban regeneration 
is that renewed areas (new centralities) have always created new margins 
around them as reserved spaces waiting for a new round of investments. 
These areas are being left aside on purpose, stigmatised or rendered 
invisible as if nothing had ever existed there (Benach and Tello, 2013). 
The economic crisis suddenly stopped most real estate investments but 
also public expenditure was dramatically blocked, and these areas, with 
no economic expectations and no urban visibility, became more and 
more irrelevant. At a time of crisis, these reserve spaces have become 
“anomalous spaces”, they are not central nor they have any expectation 
to become so, they have plenty of problems and needs but there is no 
public money to invest, they are outside the system. However, residents in 
those areas have shown enormous capacity of resistance, organization and 
creation of new ways to face urban pressures in the past and in the present 
“nothingness”, they have been able to read unusually well the global roots 
of daily situations.
In the last few years, we have seen at least three different kinds of 
responses. First, the progressive creation of a global counter-discourse that 
started affirming the possibility of alternatives with the slogan of “another 
world is possible” (and it is at least somewhat curious that because the 
proposed alternative does not please the powerful, it has been accused of 
not providing an alternative). This is the example of an urban movement 
with complaints that are able to clearly relate local, even personal, issues 
with global trends. Secondly, there has been a variety of openly spatial 
claims such as the defence of spaces of social interaction (for example, 
regaining public spaces from privatization projects with self-management 
forms of organization), the appropriation and production of space with 
collective aims (from community gardens to precarious occupations by 
the most excluded). And, finally, the important movements related with 
the needs of social reproduction in defence of basic rights have to be 
mentioned such as housing, education or public health care (in Spain 
these have been called “human tides” that identify themselves for the 
colour they wear in mass demonstrations).3
What is most interesting is that, in all three cases, this resistance 
show how the feasibility of the triple possibility stated by Massey, in which 
3 | A good account of these movements can be read in English in Méndez de 
Andés (2014).
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cooperation, equality and self-organization show how to move, in a good 
lefebvrian sense, from the everyday space to the urban and to the global.
6. concLusion: the Right to Re think the Right  
 to the cit y 
There is something interesting regarding these small-scale spatial 
initiatives that are often analysed with undoubted sympathy but as isolated 
cases with no real relevance. With some good sense they have been labelled 
as limited “experiments of counter-neoliberalization” (Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore, 2011) that are insufficient to resist the tremendous attack to the 
rights of people (Harvey, 2012). There are, clearly, many dangers: to have 
no other consequences beyond themselves, to be repressed or destroyed, 
to be tamed or co-opted. Many authors have called to look farther, to work 
in another scale, to relate what goes one in the daily sphere with global 
processes for which we urgently need explanatory theories. However, 
others have asked for caution, to avoid building theories in the air for what 
happens on the ground. Merrifield has widely reflected on the difficulties 
and huge possibilities of bridging theory and daily life practices: “Theory 
can guide the latter [the action]: that is its acid test. But it can only do 
so if it articulates within it a discourse of daily life.“ (1997:419) And he 
goes further by putting the question on how to build such an articulation 
elaborating from Gramsci: “knowledge and feeling should and can 
mutually interlock and dialectically fuel each other” (1997:427)
He has forcefully argued that nobody mobilizes for a theory, and it 
could thus happen that a good theory could be hardly useful. This is the 
case, for Merrifield, of the almost unquestionable idea of “the right to 
the city” that is no longer working according to its initial objective. Even 
before it was made banal and depoliticised as Mark Purcell has shown so 
well (Purcell, 2013), it was probably too abstract an idea. Merrifield has 
almost proposed to abandon the idea of the right to the city, seeing the 
city as being too vast and at the same too narrow an idea to fit the scale of 
people’s needs and expectations. And he has found some alternative in the 
same works of Lefebvre, in his notion of “spaces of encounter” which, if I 
understand him correctly, refers exactly to that notion of the new forms of 
centrality (Merrifield 2013). When the city has no defined shape nor limits, 
nor even a clear identity in a completely urbanized planet, and when the 
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forms of communication are increasingly virtual ones (Diaz Parra and 
Candon Mena, 2014) and facilitate new encounters, we should look at the 
emergence of new forms of encounters and new forms of spaces. Here 
is where rethinking the geographical scales as socially produced is most 
important, where spaces are crossed, the personal becomes collective, the 
daily life spaces become global and where these new forms of centrality can 
question the whole functioning of the capitalist process of urbanization. 
RefeRences
Benach, N. (1993) Producción de imagen en la Barcelona del 92. In: 
Estudios Geográficos, LIV(212), 483–505
Benach, N. (2004) Public spaces in Barcelona 1980-2000. In T. Marshall 
(ed.) Transforming Barcelona. London: Routledge,151–160
Benach, N. and A. Albet (2005) Barcelona 1979-2004, entre el modelo 
y el espectáculo. In C. Minca (ed.) Lo spettacolo della città. Padova: 
CEDAM, 1-34
Benach, N. and R. Tello (2013) Les transformations du centre historique de 
Barcelone. Des espaces-réserve versus des espaces de résistance? (avec 
la collaboration de Andoni Egia et Elisabeth Rosa). In: N. Semmoud, 
B. Florin, O. Legros, and F. Troin (eds.) Marges urbaines à l’épreuve 
du néolibéralisme. Regards croisés sur les villes méditerranéennes. 
Tours: PUFR, Presses de l’Unversité François-Rabelais de Tours, 41-55
Brenner, N. (2000) The Urban Question as a Scale Question: Reflections 
on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of Scale. In: 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24/2, 361–378
Brenner, N., J. Peck, and N. Theodore (2011) ¿Y después de la 
neoliberalización? Estrategias metodológicas para la investigación de 
las transformaciones regulatorias contemporáneas. In: Urban, (NS01), 
21–40
Brenner, N and C. Schmid (2011) Planetary urbanisation. In: M. Gandy 
(ed.) Urban Constellations, 20–13
Capel, H. (2005) El modelo Barcelona: un examen crítico. Barcelona: 
Ediciones del Serbal
Castells, M. (1983) The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press
Delgado, M. (2007) La ciudad mentirosa. Barcelona: La Catarata
Nuria Benach84
Díaz Parra, I. and J. Candon Mena (2014) Espacio geográfico y ciberespacio 
en el movimiento 15M. Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía 
Y Ciencias Sociales, XVIII(470). Retrieved from http://www.ub.es/
geocrit/sn/sn-470.htm
Goonewardena, K. (2011) Henri Lefebvre y la revolución de la vida 
cotidiana. In: Urban, (NS202), 25–39
Goonewardena, K. (2012) Space and revolution in theory and practice: 
eight theses. In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse and M. Mayer (eds.) Cities for 
people, not for profit. Criticar Urban Theory and the right to the city. 
New York: Routledge, 86–101
Harvey, D. (1989) From managerialism to entrepreneuralism: The 
tranformation in urban governance in late capitalism. In: Geografiska 
Annaler, 71B(1), 3–17
Harvey, D. (2012) Rebel cities. From the right to the city to the urban 
revolution. London: Verso
Jameson, F. (2003) Future City. In: New Left Review, 21, 65–79
Katz, C. (1996) The Expeditions of Conjurers: Ethnography, Power and 
Pretense. In: D. L. Wolf (ed.) Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldword. 
Westview Press,170–184
Lefebvre, H. (1974) El derecho a la ciudad. Barcelona: Península
Lefebvre, H. (1983). La revolución urbana. Madrid: Alianza
Lopez, P. (1993) Barcelona 1992. La requisa de una metrópoli. Villes et 
Territoires, 217–236
Marcuse, P. (2011) ¿Qué derecho para qué ciudad en Lefebvre? Urban, 
(NS202), 17–21
Massey, D. (2011) Ideology and economics in the present moment. 
Soundings, 48(29-39).
Méndez de Andés, A. (2014) Spain’s radical tide. Red Pepper, 195, Apr-
May, 17–19
Merrifield, A. (1997) Between process and individuation: translating 
metaphors and narratives of urban space. In: Antipode, 29/4, 417–436
Merrifield, A. (2011) Crowd Politics. Or, “Here Comes Everybuddy.” In: 
New Left Review, 71, 103–114
Merrifield, A. (2013) The Politics of the Encounter. Urban Theory and 
protest under planetary urbanization . Athens and London: The 
University of Georgia Press
Contest Discourses of Austerity in the Urban Margins 85
Peet, R. (2012) Crisis financiera y catástrofe ambiental. In N. Benach (ed.) 
Richard Peet. Geografía contra el neoliberalismo. Barcelona: Icaria 
editorial, 265–285
Purcell, M. (2013). The right to the city: the struggle for democracy in the 
urban public realm. In: Policy and Politics, 43(3), 311–327
Smith, N. (1996) The new Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the 
revanchist city. London and New York: Routledge
Smith, N. (2009) The Revolutionary Imperative. Antipode, 41(S1), 50–65
Tello, R. (1993) Barcelona post-olímpica: de ciudad industrial a escenario 
de consumo. In: Estudios Geográficos.
Tello, R. (2005) Areas metropolitanas: espacios colonizados. In A. F. 
Carlos and C. Carreras (eds.) Urbanizaçao e mundializaçao: estudos 
sobre a metrópoli. Sao Paulo: Editora Contexto
Unió Temporal d’Escribes (2004) Barcelona, marca registrada. Un model 
per desarmar. Barcelona: Virus
Valverde, C. (2013) No nos lo creemos. Una lectura crítica del lenguaje 
neoliberal. Barcelona: Icaria editorial
Wachsmuth, D. (2014) City as ideology: reconciling the explosion of the 
city form with the tenacity of the city concept. In: Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, 32/1, 75–90
Zukin S. (1995) The Cultures of Cities. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers

Italy

Urban crisis or urban decay? 
Italian cities facing the ef fects of a long wave towards 
privatization of urban policies and planning
Maria Cristina Gibelli
Considering the urban crisis and the spatial planning crisis affecting 
cities in advanced countries, the Italian case presents some peculiarities 
closely linked to reforms in spatial planning implemented in the past 
two to three decades. Owing to these peculiarities, exit from the crisis 
seems rather uncertain and difficult.Italian urban policies have been 
characterized by a continuous and pervasive deregulation process that has 
led to generalized disregard for common goods and a reduction of urban 
quality and livability, though not everywhere with the same intensity.What 
has happened is a sort of bifurcation of planning culture and planning 
practice, with some instances of innovative and rejuvenated planning 
in a few regions and middle-size cities, but a radical back-to-the-market 
approach in spatial planning in many others – especially large cities like 
Rome, Milan and Naples (Baioni, Boniburini, Salzano, 2012).
 Today, the list of unsolved problems and emerging new ones is lengthy: 
high levels of old and new urban poverties impeding exercise of the right 
to the city; ceaseless agricultural and open space land consumption due 
to uncontrolled sprawl; poor safeguarding (or outright abandonment 
to degradation) of an immense cultural heritage; inertia in activating 
preventive strategies in a country affected in large part by seismic and 
hydrogeological risk, growing infiltration by organized crime in building, 
construction and large-scale projects, not only in southern regions but 
also in northern ones, particularly in Lombardy (Legambiente, 2013).
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These problems combine with, and are exacerbated by, the uneven 
distribution of power between rent interests (landowners/finance) and 
public administration due to the weakness of regulation in the field of 
urban transformation. Instead of a tough but fair confrontation between 
the private and the public spheres, this condition has generated what has 
been called a “monstrous brotherhood” (De Gaspari, 2013), hampering 
the chances of exiting the crisis through advanced and forward-looking 
regeneration projects, improved livability and social cohesion, and 
advanced economic development schemes. These are the main causes of 
an urban crisis that I interpret as a true and unrelenting process of ‘urban 
decay’.
Section 2 presents evidence of urban decay in Italian cities and their 
underlying causes. Section 3 conducts more in-depth analysis of Milan 
and its urban region, which still represents the economic capital of Italy, 
but no longer its ‘moral capital’, at present losing competitiveness in the 
European context. The peculiar kind of spatial planning adopted by the 
municipality will be analyzed, because it is considered to be one of the 
major causes of Milan’s decay. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
1. a countRy that seeMs to have foRgot ten  
 its past uRban e xceLLence. 
Italy is a ‘country of cities’, where the urban hierarchy has evolved in close 
and harmonious relationship with the countryside. As Carlo Cattaneo 
wrote1 in the mid-19th century, in the age of “free municipalities” dating 
back to the medieval era, cities in the Northern and part of Central Italy 
became powerful hubs of political control, production of sophisticated 
goods, supralocal trade, financial innovation, sublime art and culture. 
Cattaneo maintained that their “intimate union” with the agricultural 
hinterland, especially in North and Central Italy, was the main reason 
for the formidable competitive advantage with respect to other European 
countries that Italian cities achieved in the long term. 
This competitive advantage was very evident at the beginning of 
the industrial revolution, especially in Lombardy, an “industrious and 
1 | In particular, in his essay of 1858 on “La Città considerata come principio ideale 
delle istorie italiane” (Castelnuovo Frigessi, 1972).
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civilized” region (Cattaneo, 1975). Here, as in many other European 
regions, industrialization began in rural areas – in the dry piedmont 
areas – where capital deriving from primitive accumulation in a highly 
modernized agricultural region located south of the River Po was first 
invested. But a more important and generalized competitive advantage, 
which concerned the entire national city system, was the cultural heritage 
and beautiful landscape accumulated across the centuries which made 
Italy and its cities the destination of the grand tour by European intellectual 
élites, and which still survive despite constant assaults (Bevilacqua, 2005).
Moving to contemporary times, it looks rather paradoxical that, in a 
country so rich in urban history as the “Belpaese” (a term dating back to 
Dante and Petrarca), spatial planning and cultural heritage conservation 
have received such little attention from public opinion and large part 
of cultural and technical debate, especially since the 1980s. From the 
reconstruction period after World War II until the 1980s, urban policies, 
and the relative urbanization processes, generated rather controversial 
outcomes ranging between two extremes: from pillage of big and 
beautiful cities like Palermo, Naples and Rome assailed by building 
speculation, to some significant conquests in the fields of general interest 
and safeguarding the cultural heritage (the latter constantly put at risk 
by private-interest oriented interpretations of the Constitutional Law (De 
Lucia, 2006 and 2013). But a radical attitude in favor of delegitimizing 
urban planning and its comprehensive and regulatory approach has 
appeared only in the past twenty years, with the approval by Regions of 
many ‘second generation’ spatial planning laws2 of diversified nature and 
deeply influenced by the political majorities ruling the individual regional 
governments. 
In parallel, during the 1990s the country saw the political success of 
a radical back-to-the market, neo-liberal approach to planning policies 
and tools clearly influenced by the centre-right majority ruling the central 
2 | In Italy, legislative power on spatial planning has pertained to regional 
governments since 1972: the first generation of laws on spatial planning (lasting 
for two decades) was reformed in the 1990s, giving way to legislative apparatuses, 
which dif fer, greatly across regions.
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government, but which was also legitimized by strong cultural and 
technical support.3
The Italian case therefore presents significant specificities in the 
international context because, in the past twenty years, it has undergone 
one of the most radical processes of urban planning de-regulation and 
privatization of urban policies ever experienced in advanced Europe 
(Salzano, 2011)4. The main outcomes have been that Italy has not invested 
sufficiently in improving the public city, guaranteeing social cohesion, 
safeguarding the commons, or upgrading economic and transportation 
infrastructures. This is because the spatial transformation process 
has been mainly assigned to market mechanisms, thus weakening the 
essential role of the state as the regulator, and not just the facilitator, of 
private interests (Calafati, 2009).
It is for these reasons that, with regard to Italian cities, it seems 
more appropriate to use the term ‘decay’, rather than ‘crisis’ to portray 
and interpret what has happened: a long-lasting trend of destruction 
of common goods, involving above all the major urban poles but also 
the country as a whole, and which has relentlessly consumed open 
and agricultural periurban spaces around cities, irreversibly degraded 
wonderful landscapes and cultural heritage, and cementified coastal areas 
in both the densely and sparsely populated regions (Settis, 2012a). The 
negative effects of this decay are very evident: a constant loss of quality for 
both cities and countryside exacerbated by recurrent natural and human 
disasters5. This long-lasting process of urban decay has accelerated and 
intensified in recent years with the global crisis affecting advanced 
3 | One of the favorite catchphrases of erstwhile Prime Minister Berlusconi was 
“everyone is master in their own house” (Gibelli, 2006).
4 | Somewhat comparable to urban policies under the Thatcher government, 
but implemented in a dif ferent phase of urban development: a phase in which 
qualified development had already become the main challenge for cities and their 
regions; not a phase of decline and deindustrialization as it was in the UK when the 
Inner City Policy was implemented.
5 | Italy has a fragile territory, largely ar tificial, second only to the Netherlands 
with regard to hydrogeological risk, struck by earthquakes every five years, which 
require constant prevention and care. Guaranteed over the centuries, this has 
been entirely neglected in recent decades (Guidoboni, Valensise, 2013). The failed 
reconstruction of L’Aquila after the earthquake, with the correlated episodes of 
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countries, and it has impacted on spatial planning in two ways. First, 
resources for the provision of public infrastructures and public goods have 
diminished further. Second, in very recent years, a major crisis has hit 
the building and construction sectors after the ‘golden period’ 1996-2007 
when transactions and private surplus values skyrocketed.
The crisis, or better the decay, should have been countered by 
relaunching national spatial guidances and rules, supported by critical 
reflection on the negative effects of the privatization of urban policies 
and planning. In parallel, required at local level were new visions and 
strategies for cities based on a renewed attention to sustainability and 
livability. This did not happen; and responsible was also the considerable 
part of planning culture fascinated by the discourse on ‘streamlining the 
city’. Some quantitative empirical evidence can be cited in this regard. 
From 1990 to 2005, the surface of cultivated agricultural land abandoned 
or urbanised amounted to 3,663,000 ha (more than the surface area of 
two Italian regions – Lazio and Abruzzo).
The loss of agricultural land was accompanied by heavy land 
consumption for urbanization due to the constant urban sprawl allowed 
by the ‘flexibilization’(in fact, the delegitimization) of planning rules and 
tools, and the simplification of implementation procedures. However, 
despite the economic downturn, land consumption and soil sealing 
continued to grow in 2012, doing so at a pace of 70 ha/day. Northern 
Italy leads the phenomenon because the Lombardy and Veneto regions 
have permanently sealed 10% of their territory. At municipal level, Milan 
was top of the list in 2012, having consumed 61.7% of its open space 
resources, immediately followed by three middle-size cities of Northern 
Lombardy (Monza: 48.6%, Bergamo: 46.4%, Brescia: 44.5%) (ISPRA, 
2014). Moreover, all these data are underestimated because they do not 
include illegal building (probably 9% in 2006; 16.9% in 2013) and ‘ghost’ 
building.
Whilst at the turn of the century, sprawl containment became an 
important issue on the EU’s environmental agenda (EEA, 2006) and in 
many national policies and local plans, in Italy, despite the alarming 
evidence of growing public and social costs (Camagni, Gibelli and 
Rigamonti, 2002), no national or regional guidance to halt urban sprawl 
corruption, the frequent collapses in Pompeii are only recent examples – reported 
also by the international press – of a constant assault on common goods. 
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was approved or implemented (with some rare exceptions in certain 
regional and municipal contexts) (Gibelli and Salzano, 2006).6 Thanks 
to national and regional laws aimed at dismantling previous urban 
planning rules and operational tools through simplification of building 
permits procedures – by allowing cubage bonuses and even, as in the 
case of Lombardy, by abolishing functional land use zoning, and thanks 
to condono edilizio (legalization of illegal building upon payment of a 
fine7) – from 1995 to 2009 in Italy, at a time of demographic stagnation, 
4 million houses were built: mainly second homes or buildings which 
did not remedy the huge housing shortage for lower income groups; or 
constructed without building permits8.
Moreover, one should add the generalized weak commitment to 
transparency, accountability and citizen involvement and, most of all, the 
widespread corruption and the persisting uneven distribution of powers 
which favors rent interests (landowners/finance) rather than safeguarding 
the commons. 
However, the so-called “monstrous brotherhood” is probably the main 
factor responsible for urban decay in Italy. With this phrase, which I 
borrow from De Gaspari (De Gaspari, 2012), I refer to the alliance among 
landowners, developers, banks and local administrations that has created 
a sort of parallel currency, the “cubic meter”, thanks to flexible land-use 
plans, piecemeal public/private negotiations and extended use of TDRs. 
The “cubes”, i.e. the building permits issued by the local administration, 
represent in fact a guarantee of future earnings, an asset on companies’ 
balance sheets, and a guarantee to banks for super-loans to developers. In 
addition, this alliance has certainly hugely amplified the ongoing building 
crisis (Tocci, 2009).
With regard to the real estate sector and the burst of the bubble, we 
can identify another anomaly of the Italian case compared with other 
6 | A bill on curbing land consumption has recently been presented in parliament, 
but it is unlikely to be approved soon.
7 | The condono edilizio has been approved three times by national governments: 
in 1985, when Bettino Craxi was prime minister in a center-left coalition; in 1994 
and in 2003 under the government of Silvio Berlusconi.
8 | Between 1995 and 2006 local governments issued building permits for 
almost 723,509,845 square meters (60%: retail, of fices, industrial spaces; 40%: 
marketable housing) (Bellicini, 2013).
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EU advanced countries. Between 1997 and 2006, Italy’s building sector 
registered a boom phase, with an increase in the average price of realties, 
in real terms, of 35% overall and 55.6% in big cities, and an increase in 
total transactions of 57.0%.9 All these factors generated skyrocketing real 
estate prices and skyrocketing profits for developers, banks, loan brokers, 
real estate agents and sellers, lenders and builders. 
Thereafter, starting in 2007, the crisis began. With respect to the 
peak of 2005, investments in the building sector decreased by 30% in 
2012 (in new housing by 51%, in new nonresidential building by 39%), 
while housing transactions collapsed (-47%). Strangely, housing prices 
decreased much less (-28%), and only in the last two years. In the early 
phases of the crisis, whilst in other countries severely hit by the bubble 
burst, like Ireland, Spain and France, prices were abundantly reduced, 
allowing faster realization of unsold properties and an easier relaunch of 
the building sector, in Italy they remained substantially stable until 2010 
(Figure 1).
The reasons reside in the low interest rates keeping the cost of unsold 
estate low; in the interest of banking institutions, because decreasing 
prices would reduce guarantees on their loans (the banks kept refinancing 
large debtors, some of whom were later investigated by the judiciary 
and convicted or still on trial); in the huge surplus values made in the 
preceding ‘golden decade’, thanks also to the very light taxation on real 
estate rents.10 
The paradox is that, at present, 350,000 unsold residential units of poor 
quality and unsuited to demand are on the market, while no affordable 
housing has been built for a long time, while 650,000 households are still 
9 | The record of annual transactions was reached in 2006: 1,000,000. 
10 | Share of public obligations on the market value of transformations (housing):
Munich: 30-32%
Milan: 5-8%
Rome: 4-4.5%
In Rome, a recent study on important new housing schemes realized through 
negotiation with the public administration in the years 2000 found that the share 
of land rent in the market value of buildings reached 34-36%, and that the total 
share of land rent + profit of the financier, net of the profit of the builder and 
developer, reached 54-57%. (Camagni, 2008; Camagni and Modigliani, 2013).
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in search of a house (whilst the Italian Constitution stipulates the right to 
own a dwelling: Art. 47) (Bellicini, 2013). 
Another serious problem concerns the huge wastage of public money 
and the skyrocketing corruption associated with the so-called “great 
public projects” and “great events”. Apparent here is another anomaly of 
the Italian ‘governance’ system: with the purported aim of accelerating 
decision-making, but in reality in order to avoid controls, for decades 
emergency procedures have been privileged. This happened, for instance, 
in the cases of the World Football and World Swimming Championships, 
the Jubilee in 2.000, and many large-scale infrastructure projects. The 
story is always the same: many years devoted to preliminary debates on 
the projects; then headlong acceleration accompanied by exemptions, 
direct award of contracts without competition or through rigged bidding, 
extraordinary powers attributed to a commissioner, spiralling costs 
compared to those budgeted through cost/price revisions, costly 24-hour 
construction sites, relaxed controls on subcontracting firms and, last but 
not least, growing risks of mafia infiltration. 
Fig. 1: Average prices of residential units in a selected group of EU countries. 
(Average variations with respect to the same period of the preceding year)
 Source: Nomisma, 2012.
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The more recent and striking case erupted in May 2014. It involves more 
than thirty persons arrested and many more investigated for corruption 
concerning the “Progetto Mose”: the construction of underwater mobile 
barriers to protect the historic center of Venice from flooding when “acqua 
alta” occurs. Although criticized by many experts11, the Mose construction 
work began in 2003. At present, it is one of the most expensive public 
projects in Italy and probably the most grievous case of corruption in the 
history of the country. The investigating authorities seem to have proof of 
huge corruption practices and of an immense flow of money for bribes: a 
flow deriving from the consortium of construction companies, “Consorzio 
Venezia Nuova”, and distributed to institutions, which should have 
performed functions of supervision and control (local administrators, 
excise officers, the water magistracy, the state audit board…). If the trial 
will confirm the results of the investigation, this will demonstrate that 
since “Clean Hands” of the first ‘90s corruption has not stopped, but has 
evolved into a much more structured, costly and entrenched system12. 
Some risks are also apparent in the field of national urban and 
territorial planning reforms. The present government headed by Matteo 
Renzi seems determined to proceed towards a more simplified and 
market-oriented planning system. The present minister of Transport and 
Infrastructure, Maurizio Lupi, who will be cited below because he was the 
strategic initiator of the Milanese model of deregulation in urban planning 
in the late 1990s, recently again submitted13 a draft bill on national 
principles for urban and territorial planning which is an accumulation 
11 | The increasingly frequent episodes of “acqua alta” cannot be attributed to 
climate change alone because, in order to enable big ships, and especially cruise 
liners, to enter the lagoon, the access channels have been dredged and deepened, 
while routine maintenance work has been neglected (Mantovani, 2014).
12 | The increasingly frequent episodes of “acqua alta” cannot be attributed to 
climate change alone because, in order to enable big ships, and especially cruise 
liners, to enter the lagoon, the access channels have been dredged and deepened, 
while routine maintenance work has been neglected (Mantovani, 2014) .
13 | Maurizio Lupi had already presented a similar draft bill during a Berlusconi 
government in 2005. Approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the bill was not 
approved by the Senate because of strong cultural opposition – of which eddyburg.
it was a protagonist – and, above all, due to expiry of the government’s mandate 
(Gibelli, 2005).
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of provisions with a specific beneficiary: the real estate sector (Ministero 
delle Infrastrutture e Trasporti, 2014). 
Without going into details, in Article 1 (Object and purpose of the law) at 
Paragraph 4, the draft bill assigns to private owners the right to participate 
in planning in order “to guarantee the value of their property”. This is the 
Milanese model that it is extended to the entire national territory, but, 
most of all, it is a reversal of a principle of the Italian Constitution which 
imposes constraints and obligations on private property in the name of 
collective utility and which states the principle of the “social function” of 
property (Baioni, 2014). 
2. MiL an and the cRisis
Let us now turn to Milan’s urban crisis and its spatial planning crisis. In 
2012, the population of the municipality of Milan was 1,262,101, which was 
one-third of the total population of the province (the Milan conurbation) 
encompassing 134 municipalities in only 6.6% of the territory of the 
Lombardy region, but 30% of the population and 31% of the housing stock. 
The Milan urban region extends far beyond the province and 
has between 4.5 and 6 million inhabitants. Land consumption for 
urbanization is very intense in the province: according to DUSAF14, the 
anthropized areas in the province of Milan represent 39.76% of its total 
area (62,620 ha) and, considering the new expansions made possible by 
recently approved municipal plans, they reach 42.3%. With its extremely 
high density (1,983 inhabitants/sq.km), the city of Milan had an average 
annual per capita income of 31,980 euros in 2009 (the highest in Italy 
after Bologna). 
Assuming the EUROSTAT definition, the urban region ranks 4th in 
Europe in terms of economic and demographic size, after Paris, London 
and Düsseldorf-Ruhrgebiet. Its medium-term annual average growth rate 
from 1995 to 2009 (GDP at current prices) was 0.4%. This was indubitably 
substantial?, but it was mostly determined by its past splendor, rather than 
by its more recent performance, which has been among the weakest of the 
EU, together with that of the country as a whole.
14 | DUSAF is the database of the Lombardy Region that since 2001 monitors the 
Use of Agricultural and Forest Land. 
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Compared with the other Italian big cities, Milan excels in living 
standards and certain public services (like public transport), but not in 
urban quality (exceeded by Bologna and Florence). Milan’s most critical 
weaknesses –which have worsened in the past twenty years due to the 
local administration’s urban planning policies – are over-density coupled 
with congestion, spatial segregation, low quality of recently-built fabric, 
and the irrational location of large functions in relation to transportation 
infrastructure. However, other major weaknesses of Milan have been 
highlighted by recent international comparative analyses based on 
quantitative indicators and the perceptions of international city-users. 
Urban ranking exercises refer to Milan as the capital city of fashion, design 
and publishing; an engine of vitality at the core of the Lombardy region; 
one of the richest and most advanced areas in Europe; and a modern and 
international metropolis. But the same analyses also underline that in 
recent decades the city has been unable to build a long-term vision; that it 
appears no longer credible in the role of national leader (the label of ‘moral 
capital’ is no longer applicable after the ‘Clean Hands’ investigation15); 
unable to counter the assaults of real estate and building speculation, 
with heavy symptoms of mafia infiltration; and burdened by worsening 
environmental quality and livability (OECD, 2006; Meglio Milano, 2013 
and various years). 
According to recent studies on competitive positioning, Milan now 
ranks fifth among the ten best European cities from a strictly economic 
point of view (number and quality of firms, advanced services, finance 
and congress sectors), but it is well below tenth place in regard to other 
aspects (science, politics, culture, international transports) (BBSR, 2011). 
CushmanandWakefield’s annual Report on 2010 performances, based 
on a survey of 500 major European firms, lists Milan as twelfth, behind 
London, Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin, but also Amsterdam, Barcelona, Madrid, 
Zurich, Geneva and others16 (Cushman and Wakefield, 2011).
15 | The expression ‘Clean Hands’ (Mani Pulite) denotes the investigations 
initially conducted from 1992 by the public prosecutor’s office of Milan against 
exponents of the political, economic and institutional system of both Milan and 
Italy. The investigations uncovered a web of corruption, bribery, and unlawful 
party financing at the highest political, financial, and administrative levels. 
16 | In particular, Milan ranks 32nd for environmental quality; 22nd for quality of 
life; 27th in value for money for office space.
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Gone are the days when studies on Europe’s urban hierarchy assigned 
to Milan the role of “economic capital of Southern Europe” (Camagni and 
Pio, 1988) and of “unique brilliant princess”, ranking second after the 
queens: London and Paris (RECLUS/DATAR, 1989).
In sum, Milan today maintains its role as the international gateway to 
the large North Italian market, the main international headquarter city and 
the principal financial marketplace in the country, but it has deteriorated 
in terms of physical, urban and metropolitan structure and design, and of 
environmental quality, owing to the peculiar model of city planning and 
management pursued by the regional and municipal governments since 
the late 1990s mainly dedicated to ‘privatizing and streamlining the city’. 
Milan has forged and pioneered this model in the country. 
Since the late 1990s, urban planning in Milan has been based on two 
main principles:
• private initiative must have the main role in shaping the metropolis, 
without merely building upon the basic framework and rules of a well-
defined public planning policy;
• public interest can ensue from private choices, and more specifically 
from the results of public-private partnerships (Bottini, Gibelli, 2012). 
On these principles, a negotiated process of planning took place without 
clear rules and procedures, and without adequate transparency, growing 
haphazard for years. It was often unbalanced due to the relative strength 
and management competencies of private actors, with a communication 
flow that was mostly market-oriented instead of being characterized by 
public responsibility and accountability. The process was mainly managed 
by the private sector for private purposes, and it resulted in questionable 
renewal plans and projects devised without citizens’ involvement.
Clear signals of this market-oriented planning perspective emerged 
in the late 1990s with the Lombardy Regional Law 9/1999 establishing 
the Programmi Integrati di Intervento whereby individual developers were 
expected to propose complete urban regeneration projects derogating 
from the existing land-use plan; and new simplified procedures of 
approval were established, allowing virtually any proposal to pass quite 
Urban cr isis or urban decay? 101
rapidly from the drawing desk to the building stage.17 This planning 
model eluded fundamental principles of spatial and social solidarity and 
of sustainability, leaving all problems without proper solution and placing 
excessive trust in the invisible hand of the market.
The Lombardy Region waited for a long time before approving a 
second-generation general planning law, passing through various stages 
of progressive deregulation whose explicit aims were: simplification, 
acceleration, flexibilization, and debureaucratization. All these laws and 
rules generally tended to legitimate the experiments conducted on the 
living body of the city of Milan. 
These general aims seemed to be inspired by the contemporary 
European discussion (on sustainability, urban densification against 
suburban sprawl, affordable and social housing, subsidiarity, strategic 
assessment, and monitoring of projects and plans). But the real aim, and 
the result, was in fact a radical simplification coupled with a downgrading 
of the public role in strategic choices. All assessments were confined to 
academic debates, without any real impact on the final decision; all the 
laws and rules weakened the protection of green belts or agricultural areas, 
even in classified regional parks; and no fixed percentage of affordable and 
social housing was imposed, unlike in other advanced regions and cities 
(for example, Emilia-Romagna).
The contribution of the planning culture was crucial: many steps 
in the deregulation process were strongly supported by the Milanese 
professional and academic milieu disillusioned with comprehensive 
planning. Nevertheless, a critique somehow justified by past errors and 
failures strongly pushed for the dismantling of the entire planning system 
(Palermo, 2001; Mazza, 2004; Moroni, 2007). With the enthusiastic 
support of all categories of owners and interest groups, the foundations 
were laid for a new market-oriented planning model with blind belief that 
public benefit would derive automatically from private initiatives, with no 
real checks and balances; a model quite unprecedented even in the liberal 
economic tradition.
17 | As Maurizio Lupi, now minister in Renzi’s government and at that time urban 
planning councilor in the local government, declared: “Now investors are free to 
propose, and if their proposal is accepted, specific design rules are drawn ad hoc, 
and not superimposed” (Comune di Milano, 2001: p. V). 
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In Lombardy, the new regional Urban Planning Law (Legge per il 
governo del territorio: n. 12/2005) was approved in 2005: an act entirely 
consistent with the former free-market oriented laws approved since 1999. 
And the pillars of the new General Plan of Milan which resulted from the 
Law (Piano di Governo del Territorio/PGT)18, approved by the right-wing 
municipal government in 2010 and adopted by the subsequent left-wing 
government with minor revisions in 2012, are rather questionable. Aside 
from a substantial reduction of the absurd development rights admitted 
in the 2010 version, it seems burdened by the same weaknesses and risks.
Simplified procedures for approval of regeneration projects are still 
in place; true subsidized rental housing is residual: only 0.05sq.m./sq.m. 
and only within projects of at least 10,000 sq.m. of land area, and anyway 
always monetizable; the “free functional mix” has been generalized to the 
entire urban fabric with no restraints; 182,873 new inhabitants (14% of 
the present total population) in an already hyperdense city are predicted19 
(Gibelli, 2012a).
Even more questionable and worrying is the use of the TDR (Transfer 
of Development Rights) tool in a new, generalized and ‘extended’ way so 
that development rights assigned to some properties (even in a peripheral 
location) are transferable anywhere in the city where development is 
admitted (and therefore, also in the city center) (Gibelli, 2012b)). This 
mechanism, present with no change in both versions of the Plan, 
represents in reality an undue premium to real-estate speculation20. The 
Plan does not seem to tackle either the true economic problems of the 
economic capital of Italy or the social and environmental emergencies. 
In particular, recent reports on land consumption show that in Milan 
urbanization grew between 1999 and 2007 by 10.5%, and that not just 
the municipality, but the entire northern part of the province of Milan is 
reaching total saturation (over 90% of urbanized land) (CRCS, 2012).
18 | A synthesis of the Plan, made by the technical scientific committee consisting of 
university researchers appointed by the municipal government is online (AA.VV., 2013). 
19 | However, a much larger estimation of more than 500,000 inhabitants has been 
made by some critical commentators of the Plan (Boatti, 2012). 
20 | See the criticisms by planners (Gibelli, Goggi), jurists (Roccella) and urban 
economists (Camagni) collected in a special issue of the journal “Scienze Regionali-
Italian Journal of Regional Science” (Camagni, Micelli and Moroni, 2014). 
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Overbuilding is already high, and will be even more so in the future 
due to new development rights guaranteed by the master plan, with 
an already enormous supply of vacant office space of low quality and 
irrationally located.21 The imbalance in the housing supply is a problem, 
with a huge availability of luxury or expensive apartments, and a severe 
lack of affordable and subsidized housing.
The option in favor of the free functional mix has generated through 
gated communities even in central areas, within large regeneration 
projects that could represent an outstanding opportunity for Milan to 
create new public spaces, better facilities, and a renewed urbanity. This is 
the case, for instance, of the “Citylife” regeneration project for the re-use 
of the old trade fair site. Designed by international archistars, this is now 
transformed into a luxurious residential neighborhood (over-)filled with 
condos and towers and accessible for pedestrians only through a patrolled 
gate. 
The future realization of CERBA (Centro Ricerche Biomediche 
Avanzate) in Parco Agricolo Sud Milano – the largest agricultural park 
in Europe, situated in Milan’s southern urban fringe and the only large 
‘green lung’ in the city – also seems risky, as a ‘Trojan horse’ for wide 
residential developments. Also still uncertain is the future of EXPO 2015 
project, located in the northern periphery of Milan: an event that since 
the outset had been mainly supported by rent-seeking real estate interests 
but presented by the public administrators as an important opportunity 
to relaunch Milan and the entire country. Due to long delays and the 
subsequent adoption of the above-mentioned emergency procedures for 
“great events”, EXPO 2015 is now in the midst of a storm and, for the time 
being, stands out as an example of bad practice: with bipartisan corruption, 
investigations, arrests, and dramatic uncertainty about accomplishment 
of the project in due time22. Everywhere in Milan and its hinterland, what 
has happened in recent years is the mere adding of cubic meters, with 
21 | At present, there are 1,500,000 sq.m. of empty offices, of which 150,000 
sq.m.built in 2012 and 76,000 sq.m. in 2013. The vacancy rate is 12.6% (source: PNB 
Paribas Real Estate, City News Milano, 2013). 
22 | Already arrested have been the general director of Infrastrutture Lombarde, the 
operational arm in public projects of the Lombardy Region, the general director of EXPO, 
the owner of a large construction company who received important contracts through 
bribes, and the collectors of bribes for the political parties. 
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almost no attention paid to new qualitative functions that could be hosted 
and usefully developed. 
In sum, considering the planning negotiation introduced in Milan and 
in other cities of Lombardy, we can itemize the following weaknesses:
• a generalized lack of vision concerning Milan’s economic role and the 
new functions that could be developed in a public-private partnership; 
• lack of a comprehensive structural plan for the urban region;
• locational randomness of single projects submitted to the administra-
tion and approved in an incremental way; 
• weak public control over duties assigned to private parties in planning 
negotiation, especially with regard to infrastructure building and 
provision of public spaces and facilities, not to mention the generalized 
low local taxation on building permits and developments;
• no transparency in the private/public sharing of surplus values and 
costs; 
• a scandalous premium to real-estate speculation inbuilt in the new 
extended procedures of tradable development rights and the lack of 
control on urban transformation;
• densification without intensification, considering the poor and free 
functional mix allowed; 
• overbuilding coupled with increasingly empty buildings, which boosts 
vacant built-up spaces;
• risk of unsustainable greenfield building amid the present severe 
shortage of green spaces;
• increasing qualitative mismatch in housing demand and supply and, 
in particular, an extreme shortage of affordable housing.
3. soMe concLuding ReMaRks
In Italy, the effects of the present urban crisis have been amplified by 
the long-lasting and uneven distribution of powers which has favored rent 
interests (landowners/finance) rather than safeguarding the commons 
and, for at least two decades, by deregulation in urban and regional 
planning. These features are very evident in big cities like Milan, Rome 
and Naples, but they are widespread throughout the country.
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Although crucially required to overcome the present crisis, strategies 
for a new pattern of livable and sustainable urban policies are hardly 
visible: local public administrations seem powerless and shortsighted, 
while proposals by the entrepreneurial milieu continue to be rather 
conventional in that they ask for incentives, tax reductions, increased 
development rights, and building opportunities. On the public side, 
one notes renewed attention to the opportunities offered by the new 
programming period of UE Structural Funds, but not yet a true project 
capability, while opportunities may arise from the recent constitution of 
an Inter-ministerial Committee for Urban Policies and from the recently-
enacted law (Law n. 56/2014) establishing “Metropolitan Cities” (Gibelli, 
2014). Nevertheless, many issues remain unresolved. 
The need to rethink national and regional laws and rules in order 
to remedy the disastrous effects of deregulation wave is not felt to be 
crucial and no longer postponable, with the exception of some regional 
governments like those of Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna and Puglia. Likewise, 
building new spatial visions and relative planning agreements in order 
to face the crisis with new and shared rules and tools does not appear 
on big cities’ agendas, with the (partial) exception of Bologna. Given the 
unbalanced powers of the public and the private sphere, low transparency 
and skyrocketing corruption in planning agreements, urban decay in Italy 
seems bound to last for many years to come. 
Some signs of possible change, however, are apparent in a new 
consciousness arising from below (Settis, 2012b; Maddalena, 2014), the 
process being supported and disseminated by cultural associations and 
websites like “eddyburg.it”. A new grass roots activism, nurtured by 
social networks and citizens’ associations, is emerging with issues like 
sustainable and inclusionary urban regeneration, renewed urbanity, halt 
on land consumption and soil sealing, defence of the commons against 
privatization: for advocating, in sum, the right to the city. 
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The city and its crises 
Francesco Indovina
Since the crisis of the city is above all a crisis of resources, it seems 
appropriate to start by referring to a text that was very successful when 
it was published (in 1973 in the U.S.A. and in 1977 in Italy): James 
O’Connor’s “The fiscal crisis of the State”. The author maintained that the 
fiscal crisis of the State, caused by growth in public expenditure without 
an equivalent rise in revenue, was not the result of some abnormality in 
the system, or the outcome of bad administration, but constituted a need 
for “monopoly capitalism”. Nowadays we can safely, and with good reason, 
expand the author’s point of view: the reference should no longer be to 
“monopoly capitalism” but rather to “financial capitalism”.
O’Connor’s conclusion, which Federico Caffè adopted as his own in 
the introduction to the edition of 1979 of the essay, was: “To conclude, 
in the absence of a socialist perspective able to propose alternatives for 
every aspect of the capitalist society […], trade union militancy, organisers 
and activists will continue to proceed in a relative theoretic void. […] what 
it is felt is required is a socialist perspective that will make the effort to 
redefine needs in collective terms. In actual fact, even if the working 
class were to manage to nationalise the whole share of national income 
absorbed by profits, the fiscal crisis would reappear in a new form, unless 
both social investment and social consumption were redefined as well as 
individual consumption and individualist life models”.
Times have changed, conditions have undergone great transformation 
and the forms of fiscal crisis of the State have taken on new, more dramatic 
aspects, but both the reference to the “theoretic void” and the need for a 
socialist perspective fit for the present time still seem to be valid.
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1. the conoMic cRisis
If we wish to refer to the economic crisis we must necessarily try to outline 
its features. 
That it is not a question of a, let us say, short-term crisis seems very 
clear and this has been stated by many, just as it appears equally clear that 
the “policies” adopted to overcome it seem to be totally inefficient. But 
this inefficiency cannot be attributed only to the aberrant austerity policies 
which, imposed by Germany, have characterised the interventions of the 
group of European Community countries (an indirect confirmation exists 
of the relation singled out by O’Connor). The instruments proposed fit 
into “tradition” and do not seem to grasp the novelty of the crisis; this 
is the reason for their inefficiency. The negative outcome is the result 
of a refusal to look directly at the nature of the crisis that is afflicting 
all economies (including those not adopting austerity policies). Just as 
virgins were offered to the Minotaur to keep it happy, so men, women and 
entire countries are offered in sacrifice to the crisis, while no Theseus can 
be seen on the horizon who will be able to kill the beast.
The economic crisis is the offspring of a systemic change in capitalism. 
It was not the excess of credit that led to the “bubbles” which caused the 
crisis as they burst; the excess of credit is the effect, not the cause, while 
the latter was to be found in the new (speculative) way of accumulation 
of wealth issuing from the production system. Within the logic of the 
functioning of the social relations of production in capitalism explanations 
are found for the continuous increment in “capital” to the detriment of 
“income”, and it is in this outcome that the base of the current crisis is to 
be found, which corresponds to a change in the substance of capitalism. 
The accumulation of capital appears to continue to occur according to the 
well-known formula ‘money-commodity-money’ (M-C-M), but actually 
the larger part has separated itself from this mechanism to create growth 
in capital without the production of commodities. Money has become the 
direct means to produce other money (we could write M-M). The value of 
World Finance is ten times greater than World GDP.  
At the origins of the modern age, merchants, or the richest of them, 
acted as a “bank” and lent money to kings, princes, emperors, etc. for 
their adventures (mostly warlike) in exchange for a tax, often exorbitant, 
or for trade concessions or other advantages. Modern financiers do the 
same today (including some State financiers, like China); they lend to 
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States, regions and municipalities, encourage the middle classes to get 
into debt (house mortgages, consumer good finance schemes, etc.) and 
cover themselves against certain insolvency (the famous “bubbles”) by 
inventing financial mechanisms (derivatives) to find who they can unload 
their insolvency on.
It appears obvious that this is a route leading to suicide of the social 
system itself, which we call capitalism; we are not saying that we are at the 
end of capitalism, but that the structural conditions are favourable for a 
change in the social regime (while political subjectivity in this direction is 
lacking – who, how, what, when – for ideological reasons). Buffer measures 
can be taken, and are, in a contradictory way, being taken, which do not 
reverse the tendency underway but may constitute “rest” stations along 
the route of the crisis train; but the convoy goes on. 
For example – and this has to do with the specific theme of the city – 
not understanding that the crisis is not the offspring of the public finance 
break-up (sovereign debts), but that this break-up was born of the needs 
and impositions of finance, which constitutes a power in itself, and has 
deprived all national dimensions of strength. When national politicians 
are incapable and corrupt, they let their hand be taken by international 
finance; when they are capable and not very corrupt, they practically put 
themselves at its service, laying claim to both the objectivity of processes 
and the alleged future improvement in the situation of peoples. After 
colonial occupation the whole world has been colonised by financial 
capital. The supranational political institutions that should protect peoples 
against the excessive power of finance, protect the latter against peoples, 
also because these institutions have techno-structures at their disposal 
that often come directly from the financial institutions. 
Common sense also suggests – and this holds not only for public 
finance but also for families – that debts paid with other debts cannot 
be the solution: the debt actually ends up taking on such a size that it 
will never be possible to settle it. The example of Greece, which, despite 
having obtained a reduction in their debt, will not manage to pay what 
is left, and will therefore be punished further with new restrictions, is a 
demonstration of how the mechanism revolves on itself.
The so-called “chain letter” is not just the expedient of those who 
want to cheat their clients by paying old clients’ interest with new clients’ 
subscriptions (like Bernard Madoff), but a benchmark that has been 
revived, though in a different form, at all levels of international finance. 
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Creative “finance” and its specific instruments, which, though resisted, are 
continually renewed, are used by international finance that has determined 
a new economic structure in which it adds to “wealth” production by direct 
exploitation of workers, peoples being shorn to pay debts, and “builds” a 
world of depression and ever greater inequality. The ‘financialisation’ of 
the economy and the speed of technical progress are clenching the world 
social-economic system in a deadly grip, in which superfluous capital and 
superfluous labour do not find (and cannot find, the way things are) real 
employment.
Real economics, in this picture, seems like an appendix to financial 
economy, at the same time insignificant and useful. Useful for 
accumulating those resources that the contraction of demand still 
permits, to then be “withdrawn” by finance; insignificant because it is 
an increasingly modest share of total “wealth” (which actually does not 
exist, but whose existence is determined by the decision to “want to settle 
debts”).
Awareness is increasing in many observers that the social pyramid of 
various countries is undergoing deep tensions and changes. The middle 
class has become greatly compressed, an outcome that is taking away 
one of finance’s privileged “markets” (this was the class that supplied the 
various forms of demand for getting into debt: house mortgages, loans for 
consumer goods, etc.), while the market of the old and new rich does not 
guarantee general accumulation. The compression of the middle class, 
moreover, produces a fracture in continuity between the different social 
strata, often compromising, but also a source of conflict and contrast, of 
development and organisation of mass struggles.
2. the cit y in the cRisis
The reverberation, so to speak, of the phenomena mentioned above 
(though briefly) on the government of the city and territory is one of the 
dramatic aspects of the current situation, also because the policies that are 
adopted end up unloading their outcomes precisely on urban organisation.
Local Authorities have always been praised as the political link that 
more than any other could exercise the promotion of democracy. The 
“closeness” between political decision and the people should (could), 
in fact, constitute a virtuous relationship, making politics (the Local 
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Authorities) more sensitive to the needs of the population and, at the 
same time, making it possible for the population to pay greater attention 
to politics and to their electoral choices (voting with their ‘feet’). It is well-
known, however, that this virtuous relationship did not work anything like 
as much as hoped for, with both sides being responsible, and especially due 
to indifference and uneasiness on the political side. The latter, basically, 
did not like the oppressive control of the population and did not accept 
that conflict, an expression of the needs of the people, could become a 
fundamental fact for “good politics”. The crisis of democracy is not, in 
effect, just national, but also local.
The worsening of the situation of cities, as an effect of the economic 
crisis, has actually made local politics less self-referential in some cases, 
due both to the obvious privations in the life of many men and women and 
to the growing pressure of the population and respective organisations 
(traditional and new, structured and casual) for decisions to be taken that 
would help alleviate the situations of hardship. But this change in attitude 
has not, generally speaking, had positive outcomes. 
The hardships the population face because of the crisis are added 
to the structural ones produced by traditional economic mechanisms. 
In particular, the most important phenomena concern: poverty, 
unemployment, growing demand for economic support, increased 
demand for services, the housing issue (its absence and cost), assistance 
for the elderly and disabled. Fundamentally, the phase in which each 
one could imagine cancelling out the shortfalls arising at an urban 
level (dissatisfaction with services, housing situation, quality of the 
environment, etc.) with his own resources (a sort of privatisation of 
solutions), seems to be followed by a phase in which the demand for more 
cities, a better city and an increase in public intervention is strong and 
significant.
Note that relative poverty in 2013 at a national level was at 12.6% of the 
population, while the figure for absolute poverty was 7.9%. The data are 
worse for the south of Italy, and for large families and those with an elderly 
head of family.
That the crisis is deeper in Southern Italy is confirmed by other data: 
in this area the number of people in a state of absolute poverty rose by 
725,000 in 2013, to reach a level of 3,072,000. The relative poverty figure 
also has a severe influence in Southern Italy, reaching 26%, compared 
with 6% in the North and 7.5% in the Centre. The worst situations are 
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seen in families resident in Calabria (32.4%) and Sicily (32.5%), where a 
third of the sample is relatively poor.
This is not all: monthly expenditure fell by 4.3% between 2012 and 2013, 
while 65% of families reduced the quality and quantity of their purchases. 
Credible statistics do not exist for homeless people, forced to live on the 
street or in makeshift living spaces. Only the Caritas, a Catholic church 
facility, distributes meals and offers some beds for the night; in its reports 
the Caritas highlights that immigrants are diminishing in proportion to 
an increase in Italian citizens, that it is often a case of families and not 
individuals, that the Italians have a mean age double that of immigrants 
and are mostly unemployed, and so on. A dramatic picture (if we consider 
that in Orvieto and Todi, two cities of average size not considered at the 
epicentre of poverty, last year the Caritas distributed 30,000 meals).  
In Milan, the economic capital of the country, average monthly 
expenditure in 2013 was 2,874 euros, against 3,068 in 2012.
Faced with this situation, Local Authorities have less and less resources 
at their disposal. Whereas the reduction in State transfers continues to 
be constant, fiscal revenue (direct or per share of national taxes) is lower 
due precisely to the economic crisis and, in the economic difficulties of 
families and businesses, the tendency towards tax evasion is greater. Then 
a number of Local Authorities are in debt both with banks and suppliers 
(and while the former are those that impose settlement according to the 
commitments made, the latter tend to get postponed over time, thus 
contributing to depressing the economy). 
Finally, the stability pact is a burden on regional boards, imposed by 
the European Community on Member States and passed on to the regional 
boards by the Italian government, introducing an expenditure ceiling also 
for those Authorities that had their own resources (the more virtuous local 
boards end up suffering greater penalisation).
The result is that many municipalities (a couple of hundred) find 
themselves in difficulty, on the verge of “bankruptcy”. We are not 
just speaking about large municipalities like Naples, Catania, Reggio 
Calabria, Messina, etc. but also small and medium-sized ones. And if the 
government intervened to save Rome (with the Rome capital law), for the 
other municipalities it does little.
In this situation, which will certainly last a long time (each year the 
end of the crisis is announced but then postponed till the following 
year), the Authorities are in a cleft stick between limited resources and 
The city and its cr ises 115
the growing demands of the population, with no capacity to intervene. 
“Pressure” on Local Authorities often becomes intimidation against 
administrators or technical office staff: wrecked cars, threats against 
people and their families, car tyres slashed, front doors burnt down, etc. 
In 2013 the ascertained cases of intimidation were almost 300 (nothing 
being known of those not verified). Being closest to the population, the 
Local Authorities end up being pinpointed as responsible for the social 
disasters.
It is useful to give a brief outline of the situation in many Italian cities:
• growing social polarisation and a reduction in the “middle class”. This 
is a condition that tends to disintegrate the “social continuity” which, 
though it made turning demands into conflicts more complex and less 
straightforward, guaranteed them a manageable political outlet;
• deterioration of collective services with increasing phenomena of 
exclusion of the most needy social strata, thus substantially reversing 
the actual purposes of those services; 
• abandoning of any urban maintenance action, with consequent 
worsening of liveability of the city;
• deterioration of the environment (quality of the air, for example) due to 
a reduction in controls and to the choice of more outdated technological 
solutions that cause greater pollution (e.g. means of transport), etc.
Each of these situations could be subdivided into various sub-items able to 
specify better the condition referred to, but for the purpose of this article 
the list proposed appears adequate.
At a municipal level, too, the crisis does not hit everyone in the same 
way, to the extent that social segments can be singled out that have 
obtained economic advantages, and continue to do so, from the crisis. 
In this situation it would be advisable to go into detail as regards the 
hardships, so as to define coherent political action; territorial authorities 
also have the knowledge to define ranges of realistic hardships.  
Segments of population exist, in fact, that for their demographic 
condition alone prove more at risk than others (the elderly, large families, 
unmarried mothers, the disabled, etc.). If the grid of economic situations 
(unemployed, pensioners, temporary workers, etc.) is superimposed on 
the previous breakdown, then the conditions of hardship are multiplied 
but their features become clear. The formation of a map of hardship 
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conditions should be a reference point for organising Local Authorities’ 
interventions. But this singling-out operation is not always carried out.
The conditions the local boards work at concern: the universality 
of collective services (even if weakened by part-payments and the like), 
progressive nature of taxation (never respected), liability towards 
creditors (more or less upheld depending on the power of the creditor), 
administrative transparency (virtually a fantasy), proper administration 
(‘after’ spreading corruption), defence of common assets (often neglected 
and abandoned), democratic nature of decisions (subordinate to the power 
of strong contracting parties), responsibility for urban quality (best not 
mentioned). These conditions are expressed and applied in a variety of 
ways in the different situations and actually contribute to determining 
the quality of the different cities, also creating their capacity to intervene.
“Good politics” in this situation should suggest to the Local Authorities 
that they increase their economic availability and aim at reducing their 
citizens’ claims. Neither of which is easy. 
Regional Authorities, encouraged by the European Community and 
the government, as well as being drained by mass media pressure, picked 
out the sale of their property assets as the first operation to be carried 
out. The sale of these assets (social housing, abandoned buildings, ex 
barracks and factories, land and endless other kinds) is truly absurd: it 
impoverishes the seller (i.e. the community) giving short-lived “relief” 
that cannot be repeated (a part of these assets, not actually useful at an 
operative level and insignificant from the cultural and historic point of 
view, could also be sold with discernment). 
But precisely because the seller is “forced” to get rid of some assets, 
the buyer finds he has a handful of good cards that he uses first of all 
to undervalue the property and then to place “straightjacket” conditions. 
The Public Authorities (local and national) are practically forced, in 
these conditions, to undersell rather than sell. But this is not enough, 
the buyer’s interest, as is obvious, is to transform the acquired property 
functionally and volumetrically, so the purchase is strictly tied to a change 
in intended use and an increase in size. Change in future use and volume 
is not a “crime” in a city that is changing, but it is nevertheless a case 
of very delicate operations, which change the pressure of population in 
that specific zone (including traffic), requiring services to be provided 
that were not envisaged, etc. Altogether, “changes in use” do not respect a 
“project for the city” but are just an opportunity to make “cash”.
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With discerning politics Local Authorities’ property assets (but 
also national ones) could partly be reactivated for collective, social and 
productive purposes without the need to sell, perhaps by proposing self-
restoration and self-renovation mechanisms on the part of those who 
will use them in the future (housing, handicraft production, innovative 
businesses promoted by young people, etc.).
But the municipalities’ assets do not only consist of property, under 
the greedy eye and claws of finance; there are also many services that 
the authorities provide for citizens through their own, or participated, 
companies (water, electricity, refuse collection, etc.). 
It was stated in a report submitted by the Deutsche Bank to the European 
Commission (2011) that Italian municipalities show high potential for 
privatisation. This bank, as is well-known, is an expert in financial operations 
that dispossess peoples. Essentially, the European Union suggests this and 
the national government presses for it; they would like many of the services 
provided by local companies belonging to the municipality to be privatised, 
too. A trend all to the advantage of the citizens: services will be managed 
better, companies will achieve adequate levels of efficiency, citizens will have 
better services and, perhaps, will pay less for them. Moreover, the possible 
losses of these private businesses will not weigh on the Local Authorities’ 
budgets (but will end up weighing on family budgets). This efficiency-
minded ideology has been contradicted by experience: private companies 
that took over to achieve the desired levels of remuneration for capital 
invested have raised tariffs or caused services to decline (contradicting the 
fact that privatisation is to the advantage of the people).
We cannot fail to acknowledge that management of these services has 
often constituted centres of waste (and not infrequently of corruption); 
departing from this situation, however, it would be easy to improve 
their efficiency and the satisfaction of families. The fiscal crisis of the 
organisations and the subsequent reduction in the capacity of Local 
Authorities to create investment in these companies have thus become the 
justification for boosting privatisation.
It is precisely the lack of resources that tempts Local Authorities to put 
these companies on the market, with a consequent impoverishment both 
of the Authority and the citizens forced to cope with rising tariffs. We are 
basically faced with an attempt to take the companies providing services 
away from the communities, so as to make money machines of them, with 
no respect for meeting the needs of the people, especially the weaker strata. 
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The situation of indebtedness to the banks is different (‘rubbish’ 
bonds included) and constitutes another painful issue in their financial 
circumstances. Reorganisation of the debt should at least be obtained: 
repayment periods, reduction in rates, etc. But the contractual power of 
the Authorities is weak also due to the absence of central support from the 
State. As already said, many are the authorities on the point of collapse.  
Expenditure reduction that many municipal authorities are “forced” 
to take into consideration causes deterioration in services and makes 
the economic situation worse (less employed, less consumption, more 
depression). To counter the reduction in expenditure some municipalities 
are adopting an increase in tariffs (for example at nurseries), thus causing 
exclusion of strata of population unable to pay possible increases.
Help for needy families is also being reduced: authentic assistance for 
poor families, rent contributions, “credit” vouchers, home-helps, etc. This 
phenomenon also tends to affect employment, with cuts in a large number 
of “auxiliary” staff, even if temporary (ranging, for example, from traffic 
controllers, refuse collectors, nursery school teachers, etc.).
Moreover, municipalities in difficulty tend to reduce investments in city 
maintenance (public spaces, public buildings, etc.). This non-intervention 
trend not only affects the quality of the city but also employment levels.
Confined between the lack of resources and pressure from citizens 
(electors) and lacking in instruments coded for suitable intervention, the 
scarcity of resources tends to prevail, namely a “cuts” policy. Consequently, 
the hardships caused by the critical situation tend not to be counteracted 
in the work of local government. There is therefore an accumulation of 
negative situations of the crisis upon individual citizens: unemployment, 
reduction in available income, etc., to which cuts in Local Authority 
services are to be added.
Is it possible to follow different paths to meet the needs of the people 
halfway? We would need to reject the “realism” ideology” (this is the 
situation and nothing can be done) to face “reality” (a line that some 
Authorities are trying to follow, albeit with some contradictions). These 
are the paths that should be followed:
• take resources where they are available;
• temporarily suspend the universal nature of collective services; 
• develop and increase democratic mobilisation processes.
The city and its cr ises 119
Territorial Authorities have very limited tax-raising ability (nowadays on 
the increase) and are therefore not able, even if they wished, either to 
follow equalising, forward-looking politics and thus have an influence on 
growing inequality, or to collect enough resources. Various paths could be 
followed in this case.
If, for example, one of the factors causing hardship was the housing 
question (eviction, impossibility of access to the free market, etc.), the 
Authority could lead some initiatives for agreements with property 
owners, fixing lower rents, suspending evictions, etc. or, in the absence of 
collaboration from property owners, proceed to requisition empty houses, 
assigning them to the “homeless” (at agreed rents). The opening up in 
this case of a possible dispute should not be feared, also because it might 
be the opportunity to make it clear that “ownership” does not solve the 
problem of housing and that the reduction of social hardship in this sector 
constitutes a priority element in a responsible society. It would, moreover, 
be a case of an intervention aimed at opposing the unjust inequalities that 
are criticised in words both from the point of view of “civilisation” and 
because of their depressive effects on the economy, but which are actually 
on the increase.
Those measures that momentarily suspend the universal nature of the 
rights of citizenship assured of collective services should move in the same 
equalising direction. The new conception of welfare that is trying to find a 
way into our society envisages that collective services be guaranteed only 
for the “needy”, a decidedly adverse conception of the rights of citizenship 
which violates the principle of universality, uniformity and accessibility to 
those rights. What is proposed does not exclude anyone from the use of 
collective services but should temporarily modulate rates in relation to the 
economic condition of the family and the individual, especially because of 
the crisis. Poor transparency of the distribution of wealth creates doubts 
on the applicability of this principle, but the Local Authority might have 
direct knowledge of the economic situation of each family and try to define 
parameters that will be more accurate than tax statements very often are.
Furthermore, the cost of many municipal concessions, such as, for 
example, stall-renting, could be modulated following an evaluation of the 
differences in profitability such concessions produce.
These and other similar measures may be deployed based on the wide-
ranging group of activities and services provided by the Local Authority. 
In order that these initiatives do not take on overtones of arbitrariness, 
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however, commitment is needed for considerable development in 
democracy, which is not to be assumed just as an instrument of “control” 
over who is governing, but for the positive contributions it can produce in 
terms of reciprocity of solidarity.
By this term we wish to denote something very different from what 
the simple term solidarity refers to, i.e. in this case individual members of 
the community taking on tasks, including management, which guarantee 
everyone collective continuity and quality of, for example, a service, and 
direct support of the action of the population following the paths mentioned 
above.
Mobilisation of the population is meant, aimed at enhancing the 
democratic tone of a given territorial reality by means of specific instruments 
and initiatives. Concrete forms of “direct democracy”, with a deliberative 
capacity, can be linked and related to the traditional forms of “delegated 
democracy”, reviving the latter. Just as forms of direct collaboration in the 
administrative management of services and the different operative functions 
of a territorial board can enable greater levels of efficiency and efficacy.
Nowadays an aversion to delegated democracy, historically given, 
is increasingly manifest; I do not believe we can do without this form 
of democracy but it needs to be revived, linking it with forms of direct 
democracy (decisional and managerial).
Voluntary experiments that have been carried out over time are well-
known, such as the “time bank”, and also the good “council” results 
(think of schools), as long as these had power; just as well-known are the 
chances to save created voluntarily by the “farmers’ markets”, or by the 
autonomous organisation of the GAS (ethical purchasing groups), etc. We 
have no problem with the capacity of single groups to voluntarily organise 
themselves and be operative, but a leap in quality and quantity seems 
necessary, precisely because of the crisis: local Authorities can and must 
help these initiatives with contributions to organisation. It is not a case of 
a route out of the crisis or of outlining different social set-ups, but they do 
undoubtedly contribute and help to alleviate the discomfort.
It is with extended mobilisation engaging the different groups in 
specific actions and functions at the disposal and for the use of everyone 
that what we have called reciprocity of solidarity comes into being.  
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3. concLusions
If people who find themselves in growing numbers in conditions of 
discomfort, on the one hand, hope and request global solutions (national 
and international), they can, on the other, immediately transform their 
discomfort, so to speak, into demands to the Local Authorities (the close 
level of government). Local Authorities, however, have been hit by the 
same fiscal crisis as the State, with a reduction in resources. Growing 
“demands” and lower “resources” constitute the claws that tend to crush 
the Local Authorities’ capacity to operate.
The latter are the stage upon which the devastating effects of the crisis 
are more obviously manifest and where, with just as much evidence, the 
incapacity and impossibility of giving satisfactory answers to the situation 
are shown. Authorities also tend to follow lines of intervention that are 
not only ruinous but tend to worsen the present situation (reduction 
in services, increase in tariffs, exclusion of maintenance, etc.) and the 
following one (alienation of own assets). National governments have 
unloaded the growing social contradictions the crisis was producing onto 
the Local Authorities (politics has an unbearable level of cynicism).
From what has been said, it is clear that the Local Authorities are not 
able either to combat the crisis, or to tackle the hardships generated by 
it. Yet some slight possibility of alleviating the discomfort does exist: by 
rejecting the prevailing pathways, opposing privatisation processes, using 
one’s own property assets appropriately and appealing to the social forces 
on the grounds of a principle of reciprocity of solidarity, administrators can 
mitigate the effects of a crisis, the end of which, despite the predictions, is 
not in view. Some Authorities are trying, but they are few.
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When it rains, it pours 
Urban pover ty in a metropolitan suburb during  
the crisis period 
Alberto Violante 
1. pReMise: cRisis and uRban poveRt y
Urban poverty, and poverty in general are subjects that are regularly 
discussed, so rather than getting lost in such a complex issue, this 
article will concentrate on analysing poverty within the limitations of a 
theoretical study restricted to changes in an urban setting using a real 
case study on Rome’s 13th District. It is an interesting case because it is a 
suburb that has shown demographic growth within a metropolis that has 
witnessed the rapid development of the job market followed by its equally 
rapid post-crisis decline. This report will cover only those aspects that 
deal with the effects of the crisis within the limitations described, but a 
likely hypothesis is that this crisis will have a profound effect on the urban 
scenario. It is precisely why the crisis is a useful testing ground for the 
analyses made. 
The concept of poverty changed during the 90s in particular, following 
the previous slump – and resulting poverty – at the end of the 80s, which 
has already been widely documented and analysed and formed the basis 
for the way local social services were structured in the noughties. It also 
meant that poverty was no longer linked solely to the issue of income 
but also to the effects of being out of work (social exclusion). Later, the 
subjectivity of social risk was emphasised, and poverty, in the true meaning 
of the word (vulnerability) was seen to encompass a much broader public 
altogether. 
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The first question to consider is whether looking at social exclusion and 
vulnerability is enough to get to grips with the true impact of social 
disadvantage in the context of a metropolitan suburb facing crisis. The 
second, dealt with as part of the theoretical discussion, deals with the 
relationship between urban poverty and the social polarization generated 
by the job market, specifically that of a service industry such as Rome’s. 
The third and final point looks at whether social neediness has increased 
in the post-crisis period and how social services have managed such an 
increase. These three issues together make it possible to evaluate the way 
social services work, against the background of what has been recreated in 
the documentation covering the last decade. A brief review of the debate 
on poverty, specifically urban poverty, is also necessary if these questions 
are to be answered. After this, changes in the Roman metropolis, where 
this case study is set, will be analysed and followed by a brief summary of 
the conclusions drawn. 
2. poveRt y: fRoM financiaL poveRt y to sociaL  
 e xcLusion and vuLneR abiLit y
During the 90s, the concept of poverty was juxtaposed with notions 
of social exclusion and vulnerability, two categories born of the debate 
on poverty that can be encapsulated in two theoretical principles: the 
multi-dimensionality of the properties needed to measure deprivation; 
and individualization of the problem of inequality, an issue that initially 
affects one person at a time. These are the factors – according to European 
literature – that bring about the transition from mere poverty to social 
exclusion. The concept of social exclusion as compared to that of poverty 
should, in theory, imply that there is a dichotomous situation amongst 
that part of the population that can be said to be in difficulty, significant 
enough to make it evident (Procacci 1997) that this transition marks an 
abandonment of equality as a category, in favour of paying attention to 
absolute marginality. Indeed, the origins of the category can be traced to 
the levels of unemployment across Europe following the restructuring of 
industry. It is precisely because the concept of social exclusion was born 
of the theoretical assumption that paid work was irreproducible – and its 
importance was therefore diminished – that empirical research in Europe 
has tended to show that social exclusion was not caused exclusively by 
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unemployment (i.e. lack of paid work). Over time, attention shifted to 
other determinants: the instability of the nuclear family, loneliness and 
substance abuse are all factors extraneous to income that can have a 
chronic effect on poverty and prevent the individual from re-entering the 
job market and transform his situation into one of exclusion. In America, 
the debate has focused on how some neighbourhoods might contribute 
to creating this combination of circumstances, particularly with regard to 
minority groups (Mingione, 1996). 
Even though attempts to explain poverty and social pathology were 
part of the European debate (Wacquant 1992), the aspect explored was 
that poverty should be seen as an individual process and what needs to be 
identified is what causes it and the (absence of a) way out. Data – particularly 
from countries with higher rates of per capita income and universal 
welfare, indicated that there are a many more people who experience a 
period of poverty than those who are permanently unemployed (Whelan, 
Layte and Maitre 2003). That, however, involves two paradoxes: The first 
is that during the very same period in which this broad vision of social 
difficulties was predicated, the government was increasingly inclined 
to limit any expansion of the scope of where welfare could and should 
intervene. The second is that although unemployment is not the cause 
of all difficulties, it nevertheless seems to be an extraordinarily credible 
predicator not just of monetary poverty but also of deprivation as measured 
in all its various components, including relationships (Gallie, Paugam 
and Jacobs 2003). This aspect makes it difficult to overcome the centrality 
of the work arena, which was – as set out above – part of the discussion 
that led to the concept of social exclusion.  That said, a causal sequence 
that begins with the absence of work to and progresses to the depletion 
of social capital, which is implicit in any consideration of the greater 
social exclusion experienced by the unemployed, would only hark back 
to an economism that would fly in the face of the initial desire for greater 
complexity. Levitas (2006) even pointed out that it is often the person with 
a job who stands in the way of relational life.
How was the relationship between poverty and personal biography 
investigated? Single episodes of poverty effect many more people than 
“just the poor” in all countries. In southern Europe however, poverty 
tends to attach itself to the same people and the gateway to poverty is 
mostly due to an increase in need rather than a reduction in resources 
(Layte and Whelan 2003). In Italy, these characteristics coalesce with the 
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concentration of indigents in the south. The main feature of poverty in the 
south is not just that larger families continue to suffer from the “quantity” 
of work, but that the “quality” of work available – precarious and underpaid 
– is also an issue, and the only escape would be stable employment. The 
combination of all these characteristics have been described (Morlicchio, 
2012) as the Italian model. Negri and Saraceno (2000, 196) were already 
referring to “low income individuals and families” in the late 90s, and 
they noted that “even the slightest change in their needs and their earning 
capacity plunges them below the poverty line”. Poverty in Italy therefore, 
is more about low income and precarious employment than the absence 
of a family support network and healthcare problems: even age-induced 
poverty is the result of discontinued or interrupted contributions. Some 
studies (Lucchini and Sarti, 2005) show that the factors that affect the 
more extreme aspects of socio-economic difficulties are the same as those 
found in the “Italian model” described above. Studies undertaken by the 
Bank of Italy (Brandolini, 2005) also include social position as a factor on 
the basis that the risk of sinking into poverty is higher in the families of the 
employed (i.e. on a pay roll) and less if the breadwinner is an entrepreneur, 
self-employed or a professional. By virtue of that evidence, Sgritta (2011) 
observes that the issue of distributive justice (beginning with incomes set 
by the job market) must be brought back to the centre of the debate, with 
structural disadvantage as the starting point.
The second characteristic of social exclusion is in fact that it has drawn 
greater attention to the individual relativity of the degree of difficulty. In the 
hypothesis put forward by Sen (1984) an innovative approach to economic 
poverty based on “capability” was based on the idea that poverty is that “the 
adequacy of the economic means cannot be judged independently of the 
actual possibilities of “converting” incomes and resources into capability 
to function. […] Income adequacy to escape poverty vary parametrically 
with personal characteristics and circumstances” (111). One of the original 
academics involved in the debate pointed out that logically, if that thesis 
was turned on its head, it might infer that 
“with regards to the loss of a person’s “inclusion status”, we would have to consider 
not only a person’s individual situation, but also the extent to which he or she was 
responsible for it” (Atkinson 1998, 14). 
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This is fundamentally approaching the concept of vulnerability, which 
has been a key word in the Italian debate on these issues (Ranci, 2002). 
This concept, born of the studies on development, is defined by Ranci 
as a situation in which the capacity of a person for self-determination 
is precluded from liable inclusion in the system of social resources and 
material guarantees. Vulnerability is the impossibility of facing risk 
which Ulrich Beck defines as considering what choices to make rather 
than sitting passively as a bystander by. Concentrating on the condition 
of poverty as an individual was something that had already been done in 
an Italian study (Benassi, 2002). There are two new aspects considering 
vulnerability: The first of which is more widespread at a horizontal level and 
incorporates permanent risk (precarious employment) –which threatens 
an entire lifetime – rather than unpredictable risk – unemployment, 
which only comes about within situations determined by one’s working 
life. The second occurs more on a vertical plane because, as Ranci says, 
“the distribution of risk is certainly influenced by the class one belongs 
to, but not to the extent that one can conclude it is linked to the class 
structure of our society in any way that is coherent” (2008, 168).
In order to understand vulnerability, the problem of precariousness 
in the job market is key, just as unemployment lies at the heart of social 
exclusion. In the mid-90s, a series of reforms1 introduced in Italy 
deregulated the job market by raising the quota of atypical work and 
jobs for women. This process was met with ambivalence and inevitably 
contributed to the transition of the familiar, single income model: 
“The diffusion of precarious jobs (or better still, of contracts) amongst 
adults who are not the head of the household should not be viewed in 
such a cut-and-dried fashion as a signal of job insecurity, let alone one of 
disassociation” (Saraceno 2002, xvii). The distribution of job opportunities 
would therefore be of particular importance to women; even if according 
to Reyneri and Scherer (2008) female inactivity only decreased in the 
North and not amongst the youngest. Job insecurity was seen to be only a 
transitory issue (Cavalca 2010, 383). According to Fullin (2002, 572) 
1 | The OECD index on the deregularization of the job market rose by 1.6 points 
in Italy between 1990 and 2003 (OECD 2004) despite the fact that in reality, 
the reforms simply remodeled the situation regarding job insecurity that already 
existed. 
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“the risks that accompany uncertainty about job continuity [...] are often 
cushioned by the immediate family and do not therefore – or so it would seem – 
aggravate the symptoms of vulnerability”. 
This implies that changes to the job market would help avoid the 
“exclusion trap”, especially as far as women were concerned, although the 
effect would be to make them – and the other “new” kind’s workers – 
more vulnerable. So-called “familialization” – a strategy adopted in Italy to 
protect people from the risks of being vulnerable – does however, raise the 
problem of multiplying inequality, given that family resources shared with 
the vulnerable member of that family vary from one family to the next and 
that makes them unequal. 
3. uRban poveRt y
The discussion about poverty is summarized in the preceding section of 
this chapter, but urban “adjectivization” needs to be further explained. 
Poverty, as a distributive phenomenon is not especially urban in nature 
– in fact rural areas are usually even poorer – but this particularity has 
been associated with two ideas: one institutional, that explores how local 
institutions respond to the ramifications of local poverty and the other 
economic in nature. 
3.1 Urban povert y in an institutional context: local welfare
Urban poverty has been seen as a social process, created at local level by 
the institutions, since the 90s. Paugam (2000), interpreted this point 
of view by highlighting how the welfare system had an indirect effect 
on the social rendering of how a poor person is viewed, drawing a line 
between those who deserve social support and those who do not. This line 
creates national models of social stigmatization, based not only on criteria 
regarding eligibility and / or disqualification, but also by what the poor 
person in question has to provide (information) as part of the process of 
seeking assistance.
Italy was more concerned with a substantive interpretation of this 
decline of urban poverty as an institutional contextualization, so the focus 
was restored on what happens locally. The threshold for accessing help, 
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and the extent and duration of this help, produces a different model for 
the exact same path of poverty experienced in different places. The idea is 
that the process of decentralizing social policies induces local authorities 
to create their own models for social services designed for the specific 
urban situation in which they are provided and that, therefore, contributes 
to the different paths poverty takes in different cities. In this sense, local 
welfare is part of the local community, connecting a combination of 
actors and needs produced in a particular urban context, and it provides 
a more efficient response than could be dispensed on a national basis. 
(Andreotti, Mingione and Polizzi 2012). In Italy, this issue has become 
relevant throughout the last decade and following in 2000 the passing 
of a framework law on social assistance and the creation of Title V of the 
Constitution. The latter delegates the responsibility for this problem to the 
Regions, and leaves the task of planning and providing assistance through 
a local planning instrument to the local areas themselves. Research 
concentrated on creating these instruments, the capacity to coordinate the 
various actors – institutional or otherwise – and to promote participatory 
processes that supported the programming of social services to meet the 
needs expressed throughout their respective local territories. It is not 
by chance that research results are always based on the formalization of 
governance processes rather than the achievement of any objectives. (Paci, 
2008). The degree to which local planning instruments have been able to 
contain levels of local poverty remains to be seen. This is partly necessary, 
because there is a chronic lack of reliable data at council and sub-council 
level and there is no definition of what minimum levels of assistance are 
due. This leads to the provision of services not only extremely variable 
between one city and another (Kazepov and Barberis, 2013), but is also, 
depending on the planning processes that have been activated and the 
availability of resources – reflected in the ever-present difference between 
councils in the north and those in the south – dangerously discretional. 
3.2 Urban povert y as an economic context: social polarization
It has already been mentioned how the economic structure affects poverty 
by conditioning class structure. In the same years that Europe was talking 
about social exclusion, an article appeared in America (Mollenkopf and 
Castells, 1991) saying that advanced services would create one employment 
structure built around a hub of ultra-qualified professions and another, in 
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the tertiary sector, that was low-paid. They believed that a new division of 
social work, particular to urban systems, would increase inequality and 
as a result the number of those susceptible to poverty increased.  Other 
writers have challenged or criticized this view, maintaining that a two-
tiered city hides much greater social differences. Hamnett (1994) argued 
that if London was showing signs of increasing inequality on the issue of 
salaries, there was none indicating professional polarization. Objections 
were raised, arguing that there was no duality in the levels of professionals 
in Europe because on the question of jobs, it was all about who had 
one and who did not (Burgers, 1996). This dichotomy was extremely 
dependent on the conditions of benefits offered by the various welfare 
states and there was no sense, therefore, in imagining that the processes 
of economic restructuring would be univocal (Hamnett, 1996). These 
issues are consistent with the one on social exclusion and have brought 
about the idea that a model European city does exist (Kazepov, 2004) and 
is characterized by the institutional capacity to smooth over any excessive 
inequality. 
In this case, welfare is also central to the conceptualization of urban 
poverty. It is not intended to be seen as a local component, but rather 
an institutional one (at a Nation State level) that is capable of modifying 
the social make-up and acting on the post-industrial division of labor 
(Lehto, 2001). The contextualization of poverty in the urban environment 
is limited to recording poverty’s different processes, without looking at 
the city in which they are produced (Sgritta, 2010). Instead it was debated 
whether or not the post-industrial Italian model resulted in the creation of 
a new service proletariat trapped in low-paid work (Paci, 1995) or if limited 
freedom impeded training (Becchi, 1996). It should be noted that even 
the American empirical research (Appelbaum, Benhardt and Murnane 
2003) demonstrates that it is not necessarily the concentration in third 
sector’s employment markets that brings about a polarization of wages, 
but rather the absence of strong industrial relations and organizational 
improvements within the company that feed this segmentation of the 
employment market. 
In general, we have seen indications that the literature has moved 
on from analyzing poverty by only considering income, to include the 
relationship, which has an economic dimension and the capacity to be 
inserted into the employment market. The welfare policies that favor local 
employability leave the re-insertion of people with multiple problems to 
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Social Services. The problem raised by the polarization of the debate at an 
urban level is that post-industrial employment markets can create social 
polarization, and even this places those in employment in the category 
of at risk of poverty. However, paradoxically this is understandable when 
read from a classic prospective on poverty. 
4. Rese aRching poveRt y in RoMe
The first data source we used for our empirical study derived from the 
“Whip Workshop Revelli”. This is important data because it has been 
gathered through random samples from a wide selection of anonymous 
administrations. Problems relating to non-responses or biases in 
quantifying income were not experienced. Using this data, we decided 
to calculate the classic Gini Index. The index breaks down groups into 
inequality within groups, between groups and a remainder according to 
the Pyatt’s (1976) mathematical methodology. 
The second data source we used was a questionnaire from a survey 
on Social Services conducted by the Social Observatory in April 2009, 
using a representative sample from urban areas (taking into account the 
different social compositions within the country.) Questionnaires were 
sent to 1,846 families with children enrolled in primary schools in the 
area. The survey was composed of a series of questions, some of which 
were identical to ISTAT’s2 multi-scope research and included: the number 
of people considered as friends (to determine levels of exclusion) and 
the quantity of moments of economic difficult as well as their quality 
(to determine the level of vulnerability). A further question was asked 
to quantify monthly expenditure (excluding mortgage and food) with 
response categories ranging from €250. 
Taking into account the fact that the sample did not include nuclear 
families without at least one child of school age, it excluded the older 
and younger parts of the population. Considering the imprecision of 
self-defined expenditure, we preferred to use a poverty threshold of 60% 
of the average expenditure per-capita, and then apply the Carbonaro 
equivalence scale to determine their placement either above or below the 
poverty threshold. This generated a binary variable, which we then used 
2 | Istituto Centrale di Statistica, the Italian national statistical Institute.
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as a dependent variable in a binomial logistic regression model, in which 
the dependent variable Y, characterised by the Bernoulli distribution, 
with a probability p 0 1-p assuming the values of 0 and 1. The linear 
regressions chosen to represent the various dimensions that influence the 
possibility of being in poverty could not be guaranteed to have identical 
linear relationships if the choice of model with a logistic function that 
guarantees probability p remains within admissible values (Pisati, 2003). 
The binomial logistic regression model directly explains the probability 
in which p varies when the regressor varies. Instead of being expressed in 
logit terms, the coefficients are expressed in terms of Odd Ratios. These do 
not explain the direct effect of random factors on the dependent variables, 
but the relative probability. The Odd Ratios (OR) do however have the 
advantage of being able to measure the intensity of the phenomenon in 
terms of percentage probability. Odd Ratios are expressed in the values 
shown in Table 2. These represent the relative risk that a particular 
event has generated vulnerability in a poor family, and the same risk in a 
non-poor family. The OR should be read as a relative probability of (one 
category) experiencing an event. The OR general has also been added with 
the relative intervals of 95% confidence, which are represented in a double 
entry contingency table with the relationships between the possibility that 
an event will occur, or not, for each category i.e. the likelihood the two 
categories will experience the event. 
The third data source is administrative data on those in receipts of 
benefits from the municipal offices. We have selected this service because 
the population that benefits from this does not correspond to the poor 
population, but to those below a particular ISEE (equivalent financial 
situation index): the criteria for supply are, however, objective and enable 
variations within that population to be verified.
5. befoRe the cRisis: the RoMe ModeL (Low incoMe)
The city of Rome is one of the most prominent subjects of Italian social 
scientific enquiry. Classical sociological interpretations merge to form 
a kind of dual city avant-la-lettre, giving rise to two accounts. The first 
is the result of the marginalization and social isolation produced by a 
type of development that is distorted, while the second emphasized the 
antagonism produced by marginalization itself (Berlinguer and Della 
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Seta, 1970). After a brief period out of the limelight, the last ten years 
have marked the capital’s return to center stage, however it’s a return that 
stands in opposition to the experience of the 70s. According to current 
analysis, the labor market has overcome its dependency on the public 
sector and has grown thanks to the development of the advanced tertiary 
sector, in line with other ex- industrial cities (De Muro, Monni and Tridico 
2011). Here, the physical development of the city has followed a polycentric 
direction, capable of restoring balance to the capital (Ferrarotti and 
Macioti, 2009). Nonetheless, these points remain under-acknowledged. In 
Rome, the professionalization of the labor market and the highest-level 
tasks are still connected to the public sector. Available data (Violante, 
2008) shows that the growth of the tertiary sector, that allowed a 
subsequent growth in employment in the 2000s, constitutes a mixture of 
consumption services that offer unqualified jobs and advanced business 
services which (as in the case of ITC), are interconnected to the purchase-
money of the public administration sector. The absolute number of public 
administration employees is destined to decrease as a result of fiscal 
austerity. Nevertheless, what is most important here is the qualitative 
change within public administration which began in the 90s with the 
corporatization of many of its units – a development that had many more 
repercussions on the Roman labor market than the number of public 
employees. Indeed, the kind of management of contracts and hirings 
enacted, has led to a reformulation of the borders between central and 
peripheral segments, similar to the so-called process of marketization of 
the public sector (Doogan, 1997), with a divergence between professionals 
who are able to access the “market” of professional appointments and 
consultancies on the one hand, and the contracted workers affected by 
the compression of costs on the other. In between the two, lie the lower 
levels of public employment. In addition to this first change, there is a 
second and more evident change. In view of the Jubilee, the city center 
underwent a significant urban renewal, which, together with effective 
cultural policies, achieved the goal of stimulating the tourist industry. 
In 1993, numbers using hotel facilities reached around 4,700,000. In 
the latest available data, they appeared to rise collectively, to more than 
8,000,000. These numbers are lower than those in the most prominent 
European capital cities, but are still sufficiently high to affect the nature of 
the composition of labor in Rome. As noted by Judd and Fainstein (1999), 
the productivity model of a tourist city is based on a low productivity 
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sector, and thus, in the absence of a strong system of redistribution, 
entails deep levels of inequality (in line with the profile of urban renewal 
within global cities, that bases its polarization on other sectors). Moreover, 
since the productivity model is based on an exogenous demand, it tends 
to bolster inflation independently of the strength of internal demand. The 
first factor has an effect on relative poverty, the second on absolute poverty.
If, by virtue of these considerations, we examine inequality in Rome 
using available data on salaries for employees of Roman companies from 
1993 to 2004 (Figure 1), we find that salarial inequality increased long 
before the crisis, creating many potential poor workers. 
Source: own elaboration on Whip data
Let us take into consideration the annual salary of salaried workers within 
the private sector, regardless of the number of days worked3. The averages 
for extreme income deciles grow further apart, not due to an increase in 
the last decile, but rather, due to an absolute decrease in the first decile, 
that brings it to an annual average that is equivalent to a monthly salary. It 
is the effect of the incidence of contracts that are shorter than the calendar 
year, which, even on an equivalent salary, are inadequate. By virtue of the 
importance of intermittent work, we have therefore evaluated the level of 
3 | Salarial inequality has to be obviously verified by qualifications and on equal 
duration of service, but we are interested in the subsistence of workers as if 
earned income was their only livelihood. 
Figure 1: Numbers Average income rate for the first and the last distribution 
deciles
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inequality among workers by examining three different groups: stable 
workers, workers who have worked for more than one company during in 
a single year and workers who have worked for the same company for less 
than 230 days. A closer look at the Gini Index (figure 2) broken down into 
individual inequality, as well as into the groups under examination here, 
shows that it is precisely the inequality that exists between groups that 
causes the greatest increase in inequality more generally. Together with 
the inequality quota (overlap) that can be viewed as the overlap of the last 
individuals of the group of stable workers and the first individuals of the 
two groups of precarious workers, in which young people and women are 
the majority. This overlap is one that grows with the increase of inequality 
within groups themselves. 
Figure 2: Gini index of the salaries during a calendar year 
Source: own elaboration of Whip data
Moreover, during the 90s Rome had always had a higher inflation spread 
than the rest of the country. For families, this had resulted in a 19.3% 
decrease in spending power, which subsequently continued to increase, 
causing the progressive expulsion of both Italian and foreign low-income 
families from central/metropolitan areas. Prior to the crisis, there had been 
an increase in low-income job opportunities, sustained by the growth of 
both private and public consumption (which are particularly interconnected 
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in Rome). This model of social polarization differs from the Anglo-Saxon 
one, both due to the function of income integration played by families, 
which allows for rates of inactivity, as well as thanks to the very contained 
increase in the income of workers at the top of the distribution pyramid, 
but certainly not due to the inexistence of a service proletariat. It is to be 
expected that spending cuts and the recruitment freeze within the public 
administration sector will have heavy consequences on this arrangement. 
The primary source of recruitment into stable employment will be blocked 
and the casual employment sector will contract, causing a general decrease 
in income derived from formal work, which, most importantly in the case 
of casual workers, cannot be replaced by the Italian social safety net. 
6. RoMe af teR the cRisis
It is in this context of urban renewal that our case study takes place, in 
contrast to the case of Milan, where the public sector plays a different 
role (Torri, 2007). Fiscal austerity has not (yet) forced employment 
cuts in the public sector, although the sector has not been able to play 
its role of “multiplier of the labor market”. After the first phase of the 
crisis, repercussions were inevitable. In fact, the labor market in Rome 
underwent significant change, with the most affected being young adults 
(up to 29 years-old), whose unemployment rate went from 15.8 in 2007 to 
23.4 in 2011, even if against an increased rate of inactivity, which created 
a very wide area of exclusion from the labor market among this group. 
This group – in the city which has the highest incidence of graduates in 
the country – is likely to be largely made up of individuals waiting to enter 
employment, however, its lower segments are composed of unemployed 
individuals at risk of becoming long-term unemployed and subsequently 
unemployable. Within this context, data on poverty from the ISTAT 
shows that in the region of Lazio there do not appear to be effects on the 
incidence of poverty. 
Further increases in the cost of living – a development that is fiscally 
induced – as well as the lack of income opportunities, will certainly put a 
strain on the ability of stable workers to support the income of other family 
members. It is likely that a proportion of the casual work that increased 
during growth time will be subsumed into the black economy. Besides, 
it had been foreseen (Becchi, 2007) that labor markets based solely on 
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economies of agglomeration were widely instable development models. 
Now that we have shown how unemployment became a central problem 
once again, we will take a look at whether the phenomenon entails 
cumulative problems, as is implicit in the theory of social exclusion. 
7. uRban poveRt y in the xiii boRough of RoMe
The subject of enquiry of this essay will be the 13th Borough, an area on 
the extreme outskirts of Southern Rome and fully located outside of the 
city’s ring road. It has more than 200.000 inhabitants, making it as big 
as any district within the city. The borough is made up of 10 urban areas, 
all quite different from one another. Within the borough, we find the 
range of different types of Roman urban development: From the luxury 
buildings of Casal Palocco (a suburb for more affluent classes, located 
within the city’s borders) to the messy growth of the construction industry 
and accompanying areas of self-construction in Infernetto to the recently 
built areas surrounding the GRA (The Roman ring road) in the Malafede 
area; Ex-working-class suburbs built at the time of Fascism that still lack 
services, such as Acilia and finally, on the coast, we find the urban nucleus 
of Ostia, with its tourist industry during the summer. Ostia is split into 
an Eastern side, that possesses a more working-class character and social 
housing, and a Western side, with a white-collar middle-class workforce. 
A composite area that initially developed during the Fascist era with the 
arrival of immigrants from Northern Italy and with the gentrification of 
the city’s historic center. In the 80s, the working-class area of western 
Ostia underwent a period of stigmatization (Salvati et al. 2012) that is not 
uncommon in areas with social housing, but one that was worsened by 
the visible prominence of drug addiction that brought the state healthcare 
services to open one of the city’s first Drug Addiction centres known as 
SERTs (Servizio Tossicodipendenze, Drug addiction help center) there. 
Recently, it has been subject to deep transformations, partially due to 
the arrival of foreigners in line with broader urban trends4, as well as due 
to the growth of the real estate market, which affected the entire city. The 
4 | The incidence of foreigners registered at the Register Office in this borough 
rose from 5% in 2001 to 10% in 2011, but it is still under the average in Rome, 
which was 6,4% in 2001 and reaches 12% in 2011.
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center of Ostia and all of the residential areas that surround the suburban 
railway line connecting the coast to the center of Rome saw an increase 
in rental income, following the lowering of interest rates at the end of the 
1990s. After this initial phase of the real estate cycle that saw values of 
the 13th borough rise from 25% to 50%, the area surrounding the Roman 
ring road, similarly to other city quadrants, was subject to a significant 
increase in private construction, which increased high-end supply.5 This, 
in turn, attracted new social groups/populations to the area and worsened 
the housing crisis. What are the features of poor communities in a context 
that is undergoing such a significant change? 
The proportion of family units living below the poverty threshold is 
7.4%. This percentage is below the national level (11%) and in line with the 
estimates for the Lazio region. The features of our sample, which, from the 
outset, excludes the lone elderly grouping (among whom poverty levels are 
high); suggest that the poor population of the borough is much higher than 
the regional average. In order to describe the situation, the first indicator that 
must be analyzed is the incidence of poverty in relation to the number of 
family members. This increases exponentially from the fifth family member 
onwards (usually a third dependent child). Thus, there exists a typical 
inverse correlation between the number of children and the level of well-
being, although poverty increases less rapidly than in other contexts as the 
family grows: a 28% increase in the incidence of poverty only occurs with the 
sixth family member. In only 10.7% of cases, the household breadwinner is 
unemployed, giving credit to the notion that even the 13th borough, poverty 
is not dependent upon the quantity of employment6. In light of these facts, 
we can also analyze the intensity of poverty, namely, the other indicator that 
helps characterize the phenomenon under discussion. When expressed as a 
percentage of total consumption, it is on average 26% (the national average 
is 20%). However, if we take into account the number of family members, it 
5 | Data source is the real estate market overview by the Rome Chamber of 
Commerce, which shows from 1998 to 2004 an increase from 1500 €/m2 to 2000 
€/m2 in Ostia and to 3000 €/m2 in upmarket areas of the borough. These values 
do not include the tranche paid in advance before the deed. In 1997 1047 out of 
3517 construction permits (for works done during the 2000s) were for housing in 
the 13th borough of Rome (Source: Rome City Council)
6 | However, the real difference is due to female employment. In families above the 
poverty threshold, there are 11% more housewives and 23% less employed women.
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takes a reversed U-shape and, for the reasons mentioned above, its values are 
much higher than the average, particularly for large family units. 
Source: Survey on Minors and Family 13th Borough 
The intensity of poverty for families with more than two individuals 
is higher than for families with 3-4 people. Here, families with two 
individuals are defined as single parent families and our sample was 
taken exclusively from families with children of school age. However, 
when measured against the entire sample, their consumption per head is 
not the lowest among the different family types. 
Let us now examine, with all the areas highlighted in the available literature 
being equal, whether family types come to bear on the state of being poor. 
We have estimated a model of logistic regression in order to verify the effect 
that certain key factors have on the possibility of being under the poverty 
threshold. We will analyze five dimensions: family type (in order to observe 
the incidence of atypical family units), nationality (in order to observe the 
relative disadvantage experienced by non-Italians, employment status (in 
order to verify the theory of social inclusion), housing status (in order to 
verify the importance of inequality within the scope of housing) and, the 
Figure 3: Percentage distance of consumption from poverty threshold number 
of family members
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number of individuals who might be considered friends, who are living in 
the same building (in order to verify social isolation). 
LR c2 (14)=28.35
Log Likehood= – 398.01166
Prob>c2= 0.0128
  Odd Ratios
Robust 
St. Error z p>z
[95% Confidence 
Interval]
Family type (Marriage)        
Cohabitation .543693 .2419569 -1.37 0.171 .2272731 1.300647
Single parent 1.62971 .6882688 1.16 0.247 .7122389 3.729021
Couple living with 
children from a 
previous relation-
ship 1.04472 .3891443 0.12 0.907 .5034296 2.16801
Citizenship (Italian)
EU .5714982 .3607577 -0.89 0.375 .165842 1.969405
Non EU  .9518561 .4954527 -0.09 0.924 .3431709 2.640171
Occupational status (Employed)
Non standard job 1.251878 .69108 0.41 0.684 .4242964 3.693641
Unemployed **2.250014 .761232 2.40 0.017 1.159322 4.366832
Inactive .9781898 .4408875 -0.05 0.961 .4043631 2.366327
Tenure (rent)      
Usufruct/free .8182038 .319286 -0.51 .3808016 1.758021
Squatted housing 1.83841 1.039168 1.08 .6071525 5.566564
Home ownership **.5448215 .138929 -2.38 .3305207 .8980695
(family units who have friendship relationships with or more than one family)
With only one 
family .726066 .2274622 -1.02 0.307 .3929266 1.341655
With no family 1.042498 .2280839 0.19 0.849 .6789604 1.600686
There are no 
families in the 
building *2.524578 1.157822 2.02 0.043 1.027569 6.202501
Source: Survey on Minors and Family 13th Borough 
Here, there are three statistically significant modes. First and foremost, 
the fact of being unemployed, which is known to be the most solid 
predictor of poverty. Individuals who are unemployed have a 125% higher 
Tab. 1 Model of logistic regression on the features of people in poverty
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chance of being poor. Secondly, all other things remaining equal, home 
ownership provides protection from the risk of poverty7. In light of these 
two dimensions, which, in our case, have also proven to be the strongest, 
nationality does not appear to have a significant effect. Single-parent 
families have a 62% greater chance of being poor, but it must be noted 
that this effect is not statistically significant and does not apply when 
older longer-term residents are taken into account. Thus, there remains 
no connection between exclusion from labor market and social exclusion, 
as the number of people classed as friends in the neighborhood does not 
have an effect, although people who live in single-family households tend 
to be statistically poorer in a more meaningful and widespread way. This 
is a spurious effect, which can be explained by examining the territory’s 
urban development: there continues to exist greater inequality among 
people living in illegal self-built buildings, compared to social housing 
settings. 
Let us now investigate the relationship between deprivation and 
vulnerability. We do not possess a set of precise questions to be able to 
objectively measure vulnerability, however, as an indicator, we will use 
the quantity and type of instances in which families have perceived 
themselves to be under economic hardship. Here, we will continue to 
highlight that our interest here is on the state of significant economic 
hardships and not on indicators of objective states of being. The collation 
between the number of instances of perceived economic hardship and the 
state of indigence illustrates how poor communities are set apart from the 
average population, particularly due to the constant exposure to events 
that make them vulnerable. Only 18% of poor communities (against 27% 
of non-poor individuals) consider themselves to have undergone economic 
difficulties/hardships. It is nevertheless interesting to see that the causes 
of fragility differ markedly, depending on the profile of indigence. Among 
the different economic events, those connected to insufficient levels of 
income and job losses characterize the poor. Among the events that relate 
to self-employed workers it is clearly more likely that a missed start-up of 
a personal business venture will involve a poor family. The risk of eviction 
affects the poor only marginally more than other groups, although this 
group is much more protected against a failed house purchase, than non-
poor groups. Family events only differ when it comes to divorce, which 
7 | The poverty line does not consider imputed rents.
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causes slightly greater difficulties for the poor. These results stand in 
slight contrast to literature on the subject (Whelan and Maintre, 2005), 
and require further in-depth analysis of other local contexts. It is clear that 
the families cover these risks in ways that differ from one another: if we 
examine the social capital employed during these instances of challenge, 
the poor do not differ from other groups for having received less support, 
but are rather set apart by the fact that they have lacked the support that 
comes from strong familial ties (parents and in-laws).
Poor Non Poor General OR [95% Confidence Interval]
        Lower Upper
A period of 
unemployment
1,557 ,958 ,615 ,395 ,958
Insufficient income 1,246 ,981 ,787 ,506 1,223
A disease ,972 1,003 1,032 ,484 2,200
Debt of an 
enterprise
,691 1,028 1,489 ,587 3,775
Bankruptcy of 
an enterprise
1,231 ,980 ,796 ,308 2,059
Start-up of 
an enterprise
1,921 ,921 ,480 ,219 1,052
Debt at too high 
interest rates
1,004 1,000 ,996 ,549 1,807
An Eviction 1,153 ,987 ,855 ,462 1,585
A house purchase ,421 1,059 2,515 1,197 5,287
A divorce 1,171 ,985 ,841 ,495 1,432
The death of a 
family member
,973 1,002 1,031 ,434 2,445
The birth of a child ,901 1,009 1,120 ,618 2,027
Source: Survey on Minors and Family 13th Borough 
After having outlined these essential traits of social need, let us now 
analyze what social inequalities look like post-crisis, through the data 
available from social services in order to ascertain whether the social 
composition of claimants has changed and whether local institutions were 
able to adapt to these new conditions. 
Tab. 2 Risk coefficients for type of discomfort events
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8. sociaL assistance in the 13th distRict since  
 the cRisis
In 2008, the 13th district was affected by the crisis that hit the former 
national airline as its proximity to the town of Fiumicino, the location 
of Rome’s main airport, had made it a popular place for both cabin and 
ground crew to live. Today, the 13th district is a suburb that continues 
to experience various social problems including higher unemployment 
than the average in the city of Rome with those who are unemployed 
experiencing greater segregation and a crime rate perceived to be greater 
than it actually is. There is the prospect of further economic and building 
investments, if the investment project aimed at creating a second tourist 
hub for Rome on its coast proves to be successful, although paradoxically 
such investments – quite apart from being difficult to raise due to a lack 
of capital – are based on a development model that the crisis has already 
shown to create a degree of job vulnerability.
Within that context, this is an effort to analyse the initial effects 
of the crisis at local level and to determine if the changes described at 
market level are causing any repercussions in terms of increased social 
needs. Our source of reference on this occasion is the data provided by the 
Social Services’ administration department. When Rome’s Department 
of Social Services was reformed at the end of the 90s, it was divided 
into sections known as Socio-Educational, Cultural and Sporting Units 
(UOSECS). However, on the eve of the implementation of law no. 328, a 
decision was made to set aside the idea of providing services according to 
the categorization of clients (the disabled, minors, foreigners, etc.) and 
to start by providing primary level services through usual social services 
channels, and secondary level services by means of integrated actions. 
During the crisis, the number of people contacting the administrative 
offices of social services increased steadily and significantly (from 
1,918 people in 2007 to 3,638 in 2011). The change in the type of people 
contacting social services is reflected in that increase as in the final and 
most intense phase of the crisis, the majority, some 21.1% of the total, were 
foreigners, even though they only make up 10% of the local population. 
The particular characteristics of the immigrant population mean that the 
change of client nationality has also had an obvious effect both on the age 
and the family composition of those making contact. The 41-61 age group 
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is the largest, followed by those aged 18 to 40 years while the over 65s are 
in the minority. 
As to the type of family making contact, the number of those with 
at least one dependent minor rose from 21.6% in 2007 to 41.3% in 2011. 
The change in the social background of social service clients is not a 
direct indicator of economic difficulty, as the provision of services by 
local UOSECS is not necessarily connected to lack of income. In Rome, 
resolution no. 154/1997 provides the regulations if and how benefits are 
provided to those that seek it. In the 13th District, such requests are not 
merely considered by the administrative offices but are determined by a 
points system that takes six different factors into account, namely income, 
the ownership of any vehicles, housing conditions, health, the type of 
family unit and enrolment on any educational/vocational courses. Benefits 
are allocated to three categories of person – the elderly, minors and adults 
– each of which is assigned a basic score. That said, the number of people 
assisted ultimately depends on budgetary constraints determined by the 
district’s political bodies. 
As requests received by social services can be tracked by their number 
and according to general socio-demographics, it is possible to analyse and 
draw up a rough guide to financial hardship in the district. Most subsidies 
are likely to be categorized as “special payments” in that they exceed the 
standard €400 provided for. Requests for subsidies have not only increased 
more than general requests for help, those making them also represent 
almost half social services clients during the last two years of the crisis. 
Almost three quarters of those who have contacted social services and are 
eligible for subsidies are women and between 2008 and 2010, the number 
of foreigners applying increased by almost 10% (to 26%), the average age 
of applicants decreased but the overall number of applicants increased 
(figure 4). New applicants are mostly, therefore, adults with dependent 
children and not the elderly. 
The other financial subsidy, as per resolution 163/1998, is a housing 
benefit, which covers a specific share of clients’ rent (with the evicted 
having priority) as long as they can obtain a private rental contract. They 
are therefore those who are at the upper end of the housing emergency in 
Rome and not those forced to move to residential hotels managed directly 
by the mayor’s office and the Central Department for housing policies. 
The distribution of these benefits is regulated not only by the number of 
evictions, but also according to the time social services’ existing clients 
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continue to need help – their tenancy agreements are usually for a four 
year term plus the option to renew for a further four years. The number 
of applicants peaked in 2008 and 2009 at 125 and 92 respectively and 
decreased to 73 in 2010. The number of female applicants has steadily 
increased and now represents 75% of all applicants while the average 
age, at 46, is lower than it was at the time of the 154/1997 resolution cited 
above. The overall number of applicants is almost the same as then, but 
the percentage of foreign applicants has risen significantly from just 4% of 
the total in 2007 to 24% in 2010. Despite such an extraordinary increase 
in the number of adults experiencing difficulties who have sought 
assistance, the district has been able to increase the funds available for 
both types of benefit8 and while in 2008 they paid out a total of €540, 856 
in 2011 that rose to € 758,298.
Source: Social Observatory of the 13th district
There has also been a significant change to the categories of people eligible 
for financial assistance. Initially, by halving what was available for adults, 
more money was set aside for minors and funding for the elderly remained 
the same. That shake-up also affected the numbers of those receiving 
8 | Bearing in mind however that in 2008 that only represented only 2% of the 
council’s total budget (and did slightly increase later). Funds were however 
divided up in a very dif ferent way. In 2011, funds for housing benefits represented 
almost half of what was available to fight poverty compared with the 11% they 
represented in 2008.
Figure 4: Applications for financial subsidies
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benefits, the 684 in 2008 rising to 1,596 in 2010, more than half of which 
were minors. In 2012 however, the number of minors receiving funding 
came to a standstill, as receipt of funding, once awarded, had been limited 
to a two-year period. Well aware that the reality of the situation meant that 
the amount of funding9 allocated by resolution 154/1997, was not nearly 
sufficient to fill the poverty gap, the authorities decided to share what was 
available amongst as many applicants as possible.
Even before the crisis, there had been a significant number of people 
whose “points” kept them high in the rankings of those eligible for 
assistance. No less than 49.7%10 of those eligible in 2007 remained so in 
2008, and even since eligibility has been restricted, the number of those 
who remain eligible remains very high. Comparing 2008 and 2011 for 
example, 34.9% have remained in the ranking despite being divided into 
those whose payments had been suspended for a year and those who had 
not applied for the two preceding years. This proves that it is not at all 
easy for the poor to move out of the ranks of those who need and are 
eligible for assistance. It shows furthermore that there are indeed people 
who are permanently poor (in terms of the “objective” criteria used in the 
ranking system) and who therefore have an on-going right to assistance, 
even though this is not enough to raise them out of poverty.
Given the situation described above, more focus and funding 
was directed towards allocating housing benefits, and the number of 
recipients increased from 27 in 2007 to 42 in 2012 in order to prevent a 
significant number of people finding themselves in a housing emergency 
and consequently falling into extreme poverty. Even so, the effort made is 
certainly not enough to cope with the potential number of people seeking 
assistance because of the increasing number of evictions underway caused 
by the fierce increase in house prices mentioned earlier. If, prior to the 
new millennium, evictions were a phenomenon that mostly involved the 
main city of Rome, in recent years, the number of eviction orders issued 
by the local District 13 section of the Court of Rome has always been in 
9 | In 2011, the average payment was €544 for the elderly, €1004 for adults 
(accounted for by special payments to those with HIV – although a great many 
received much the same as an elderly person) and €1400 for minors.
10 | This number has been calculated following analysis of the relative databases 
dealing with those receiving benefits and could perhaps be higher given that the 
list of benefit recipients for 2007 was incomplete.
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excess of 200. While the figure is lower than in other districts, it is worth 
pointing out that evidence of the seriousness of this particular problem 
in this district is that in contrast to what happens in the rest of the city, 
people here do not leave their homes on receipt of the eviction order, but 
wait for the bailiffs to come and evict them.11 
concLusions
The first aim of this chapter was to define the characteristics of poverty 
in a particular urban context by looking at various categories of people. 
The picture of poverty that emerges from this study is not unlike that 
associated with poverty in southern Italy and provides a somewhat 
ambivalent comparison with concepts held in the 90s. On the one hand, 
looking at the many aspects of neediness confirms, for example, the 
earlier belief that owning one’s own home does provide some protection 
from poverty. 
The housing bubble – houses built before the crisis – has created a new 
kind of housing related poverty that is linked to employment (or lack of it). 
What is more, unemployment is also an extraordinarily powerful portent 
of future poverty. It calls to mind those who have been excluded from 
society even if that is not linked to either particular demographic groups 
(nationality, type of family) even in the suburbs, or to the consequences of 
social isolation in terms of strong relationships. Above all else, suburban 
families seem to be “normally” helpless when it comes to employment, 
with poor support from family networks making them particularly 
vulnerable – especially with regard to job security – and this can lead to a 
downward slide into poverty.
This consideration leads to the second aspect of this study. Although 
without any in-depth research on the conditions faced by families in our 
suburbs, the cross-section of data gathered on income, unemployment 
11 | To be specific, the number of eviction notices issued in 2007 stood at 244 
and at 221 in 2011 of which 195 were due to arrears in the rent and the rest 
because the rental agreement had expired. Repossessions accounted for 77% 
of eviction notices in 2007 (although in Rome in general that figure dropped to 
44%) and for 80% in 2011. (Source: The records office of the external section of 
the Tribunal of Rome). 
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and the increase of requests for help received by social services has to be 
sufficient here to formulate a theory, even if it is somewhat vague. 
The consumer economy of the service sector has created a specific 
type of social polarization within the labour market, involving an 
increase in the number of precarious workers, thereby creating a world 
of opportunities for the poor featured in this report to try and earn some 
sort of income. It would seem that a metropolitan labor market is unable 
to identify a development model that will allow it to replace the precarious 
service sector workers who were responsible for the growth of some cities 
in the noughties.
The crisis has meant that these income opportunities have disappeared, 
to be replaced by unemployment and consequently, an increase in poverty, 
particularly amongst foreign workers who often have more dependent 
family members than the Italians. The increase of applications to Social 
Services concerns, above all, young foreign adults, seen in this study to be 
more at risk even when they are no longer unemployed.
This leads on to the third aspect of this study – how the welfare 
system has dealt with the crisis. Given the impossibility of a systematic 
response to the poverty that exists today and continues to grow as a result 
of the crisis, social services have chosen to concentrate the insufficient 
resources available to them in trying to prevent new cases involving a 
housing emergency as that would only lead to even more families finding 
themselves in extreme difficulty.
It is a strategy of selective assistance that has little in common with the 
selective universalism identified some years ago (Bifulco and Centemeri, 
2007) as it is based on a lack of resources rather than subjectivity. What 
is more, the current pursuit of equality through downsizing will soon be 
hit hard by the latest round of austerity measures. In Rome the palpable 
feeling that the work of the social services department has been ineffective 
in dealing with the consequences of the first years of the crisis seems to be 
because of their inability to dealing with the increase of applications, even 
without having to cope with a cut in resources. This shows their failure 
to resolve some of the inherent features of poverty that are rooted in the 
chronic underfunding of the fight against it, before the crisis even began. 
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Greece

Greek Spatial Planning and the Crisis
Maria Zifou
Greece’s entry into the “Support Mechanism’ in 2010, which signaled 
the ‘official’ beginning of the crisis, entailed the implementation of a 
structural adjustment program for the country with the objective to 
reduce the national deficit and to pay up sovereign debt, which since then, 
the dominant discourse has equated with the public good. Consistent with 
its neo-liberal tenet, state retrenchment and privatization are at the core of 
the restructuring policies ‘imposed’ by this adjustment program within 
which the sale of state owned property acquires primary importance as a 
significant means to pay up the debt. The ‘reform’ of the spatial planning 
system has been a core element of this regulatory restructuring process 
as it has been considered an essential prerequisite for creating ‘favorable 
conditions for economic activity’ and entrepreneurship including 
enhancing of competitiveness. Within this overall framework, and amidst 
the burgeoning problems faced by major Greek cities due to austerity 
policies, a substantial number of new laws have been adopted at a very 
rapid pace transforming in substantive ways the spatial planning system 
and in more general space production process.
This chapter offers a critical review of the country’s regulatory 
restructuring since 2011 and its effect on the land development process. 
The objective is to reveal the continuities, ruptures and turns in Greek 
spatial planning policy.  The research makes an appraisal of the legislation 
that has already been adopted as well as the legislative proposals that have 
undergone public consultation. 
The underlying thesis of this paper is that the debt crisis in Greece 
has served to legitimize neo-liberalism as “the dominant ideological 
rationalization” for the state ‘reform’(Peck and Tickell, 2002) imposed by 
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the successive Memoranda1 as part of the ‘rescue’ program of the country. 
For the purpose of this paper, neoliberalism is conceptualized as “…one 
among several tendencies of regulatory change that have been unleashed 
across the global capitalist system since the 1970s: it prioritizes market 
oriented or market-disciplinary responses to regulatory problems; it strives 
to intensify commodification; and it often mobilizes speculative financial 
instruments to open up new arenas for capitalist profit making” (Peck et 
al 2012:269). In this sense, along with state downsizing, privatization of 
commons and flexible labor relations, the ‘reform’ of the Greek planning 
system constitutes a core element of the new mode of regulation associated 
with post-Fordist economic dynamics (Aglietta, 1979; Amin, 1994) that 
consolidates competition and commodification in all realms of social life 
including space production, while facilitating the opening up of the Greek 
economy to global processes of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005).
1. gReek spatiaL pL anning befoRe the cRisis
The spatial planning system of the country was in a state of transition 
right before the outbreak of the economic crisis as illustrated by the 
effort to implement the spatial planning legislation adopted in the mid-
1990s. The preceding planning Act adopted in 1983 (L. 1337/83) – which 
partially revised the foundational planning law of 1923 – was primarily 
directed towards the reduction of spatial inequalities in Greek cities by 
addressing the significant social, functional and environmental problems 
associated  mainly with uncontrolled post-war development (primarily 
housing construction) and insufficient public investment for service and 
infrastructure provision. The 1983 Act enabled the central government 
to prepare physical plans that controlled development only in the built-
up / urbanized areas of the country, while it permitted the application of 
a unified regulatory development framework in areas lying outside the 
jurisdiction of these plans allowing unplanned and often informal or 
illegal development to sprawl on peri-urban areas and the countryside. 
1 | Refers to the Memoranda of Understanding signed by Greece outlining the 
conditions for the disbursements of financial assistance to the county by the 
European Financial Stability Facility. 
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An essential dimension of the overall Greek planning legislation was its 
embedding of the social relations underlying the country’s post war urban 
development pattern. A pattern that has been described as ‘deviating’ from 
the dominant western European one (Vaiou et al., 2000) and consisting of: 
(1) small-scale-land property (in terms of the size of property holdings) and 
small-scale-construction capital both directly related to land fragmentation 
as well as to the high percentages of home ownership; (2) the increased role 
of the private sector in space production including the provision of housing 
often through informal and/or illegal processes; and (3) the promotion 
of the (small scale) construction sector as the primary vehicle for the 
economic development of the country. In this framework, the ease of access 
to home ownership that the planning system afforded to lower and middle 
class property owners, through formal and informal urban development 
practices, along with the ability to profit from land rent and surplus values 
(Mantouvalou, 1980; Mantouvalou and Mavridou, 1993; Vaiou et al, 2000), 
provided the conditions for a wide social consensus for weak-piecemeal 
planning and/or for the opportunistic implementation of spatial plans. 
Implicitly, in this way, Greek planning culture supported the undeclared 
content of the public interest (Vatavali and Zifou, 2012).
The planning legislation adopted in the mid-1990s (L. 2508/95 and 
L.2742/97) signaled, at least at a symbolic level, a rupture with this wider 
consensus and a turn towards the support for increased state intervention 
in the land development process. This turn was essentially based on 
a growing demand for a plan-based system posed by two different, 
seemingly contradictory, trends2. The first trend was related with the rapid 
restructuring of the construction and real estate sectors, both in terms of 
size and invested capital, a trend directly associated with the development 
of the 2004 Olympic facilities as well as the construction of large scale 
infrastructure projects financed by EU structural funds (Mantouvalou 
and Patrikios, 2008). For these new players, extending the application of 
statutory land use plans over the country’s territory was perceived as a 
necessary condition to secure the legal certainty required for the approval 
and subsequent implementation of their investment decisions. The second 
trend, on the other hand, was directly associated with the need to further 
2 | Of course EE policies and strategies affecting the development of the 
European space, such as the European Spatial Development Framework exercised 
tremendous influence at that time on planning culture and practice in Greece.
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integrate environmental concerns in spatial planning derived not only as 
an obligation to comply with EU environmental policy but also as a claim 
posed by a rapidly rising environmental movement in the country. In this 
context, the 90’s planning legislation provided for the development of 
an integrated planning system, consisting of national, regional and local 
plans, which when fully implemented would extend development control 
throughout the territory with a (declared) direction towards the promotion 
of sustainability principles.
In practice, the planning policy exercised by both the socialist and 
conservative governments that were in power in the 90’s and mid 2000’s 
deviated to a large degree from the aim of the legislation. Firstly, there was 
a gradual introduction of neoliberal policies and practices undermining 
planning which besides the simplification of permitting procedures for 
strategic investments, included the wide use of exceptionality measures 
mainly in conjunction with the construction of the Olympic facilities 
which were approached as mega-projects that would enhance the 
competitive advantage and therefore, the strategic role of Athens at the 
European level. It must be noted though, that the promotion of strategies 
embedded in wider urban development agendas underlying such notions 
as ‘urban entrepreneurship’, the ‘creative city’ and ‘city branding’ was very 
limited and mainly associated with the rhetoric legitimizing the Olympic 
Games projects. This ‘transfer policy delay’ was related not only with 
the then predominant planning culture of the country, but also with the 
traditionally regulative role of planning as well as the limited development 
powers and capacities of local governments.
Secondly, even though the preparation and adoption of national 
spatial plans (in the mid 2000’s) was a significant step towards the 
implementation of the 90’s Planning Act, the integration of the planning 
system never materialized especially in reference to local plans. In fact, it 
became apparent that these plans – as policy frameworks for the spatial 
organization of major economic activities promoted at that time, i.e. 
tourism – were to serve mainly as instruments for overcoming the legal 
obstacles posed by the Greek Council of State regarding the ad hoc location 
of these activities in areas not covered by statutory local land use plans. 
However, the preparation process of national spatial plans contributed 
in a substantive way towards the establishment of planning as the arena 
for the resolution of land use conflicts by allowing the articulation of 
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alternative discourses and the redirection, though marginal, of the pro-
growth policies of these plans.
2. the conditionaLit y of ReguL atoRy RestRuctuRing
The reform of this planning system – strictly oriented towards development 
control – is central to the extensive process of institutional restructuring 
that is taking place in Greece under the state of emergency imposed in 
this time of crisis. Responding to EU crisis policy and debtors’ demands, 
the country has committed to implement an adjustment program which 
mandates the adoption of fiscal consolidation measures as well as deep 
structural, market orientated, reforms that touch upon all dimensions of 
the institutional landscape existing before the crisis: wage-labor relations 
(or growth-enhancing structural reforms as defined in the Memorandum); 
fiscal policies, which besides imposing austerity measures and severe 
budget cuts, include the extensive privatization of state owned property, 
public assets and common goods; monetary and financial regulations; 
and forms of regulation enabling / mediating corporate competition. 
These structural ‘reforms,’ which must be implemented within specified 
timeframes, constitute essential conditionalities for the disbursement 
of the financial assistance to Greece by the European Financial Stability 
Facility.
Among the conditionalities included in the second Memorandum 
signed by the Greek government in 2012, “Memorandum of Understanding 
on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality”, were a series of measures 
calling for the facilitation of spatial planning which included the:
• simplification of town planning processes (including the reduction of 
needed time)
• update and codification of legislation on forests, forests lands and 
parks
• codification of legislation on forests 
• the revision of regional spatial plans in order to make them compatible 
with the sectoral plans on tourism, aquaculture, industry and 
renewable energy, and
• acceleration of the completion of the land registry
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To a large degree, the imposed measures seemed to respond to a pre-existing 
demand for restructuring the planning system to address and ameliorate 
some of its long enduring negative structural characteristics: legislative 
complexity (multiplicity of laws), ambiguous and conflicting regulations 
that greatly increased administrative discretion, lack of coordination, 
centralization of planning powers and very long processes for plan 
preparation, approval and amendment (YPEKA, 2012). However, different 
drafts of the Memorandum, prepared during the negotiation process, reveal 
the existence of alternative proposals calling for deeper reforms leading to 
the redefinition of planning’s scope and direction by calling for:
• the reform of planning, which entailed the review and amendment 
of general planning and land use legislation with a view to ensure 
more flexibility in land development for private investment and the 
simplification and acceleration of land use plans
• the establishment of a One-Stop Shop for the licensing and permitting 
of various activities, and
• the simplification of environmental, building and operating permits.
The divergent mandates do not only reflect underlying differences 
of perspective in reference to the rapidly prevailing political position 
supporting the dominance of market processes. They, moreover, epitomize 
the importance that the regulation of land, as a factor of production, has 
for this neoliberal restructuring strategy in the sense that the facilitation 
of direct investments is considered the main (only) impetus to realize the 
country’s new growth model which is based on real estate-related tourism, 
industrial scale development of alternative energy sources, logistics, 
agriculture, aquaculture, mineral extraction and health services3. 
Although, the process of regulatory restructuring that ensued and was 
legitimated upon the obligation to implement the prescribed conditionalities 
was at first characterized by these underlying contradictions regarding the 
content and scope of the ‘reform’, it has come to be defined by the gradual 
prevalence of the neoliberal dogma. Within this overall framework, the 
3 | The government’s new growth strategy was largely based on the report “Greece 
10 years ahead. Defining Greece’s new growth model and strategy” prepared by 
McKinsey and Company in 2012 and commissioned by the Association of Greek 
Industrialists.
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process has so far involved the production of over 30 pieces of legislation 
directly affecting the use and development of land that have been adopted 
or are in the process of adoption. Characterized by extremely brief public 
consultation and parliamentary review procedures and, oftentimes, 
surpassing the limits of constitutional legality – which in some cases 
has enforced the resubmission of legislation due to its annulment by the 
Council of State – this process has essentially resulted in the ‘dismantling 
of the inherited institutional landscape’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) 
affecting the use and development of land.  
3. de veLopMent Re-ReguL ation
In addition to the piecemeal transformation of the spatial planning 
system which will be described in the following sections, the emergent 
institutional landscape includes an array of new policies and procedures 
affecting the use and development of land. Overall, these are, generally, 
oriented to overcoming the particularities of space production in Greece – 
i.e. small property holdings, land use configurations and  protective status 
of natural capital – that have so far inhibited the construction of the new 
‘urban spaces of neoliberalization’ (ibid) and more particularly, large scale 
urban and real estate development projects.   
Built environment and urban form
With a declared intent to provide ‘solutions’ to the issue of building stock 
renewal and the re-investment of construction capital in built up areas, the 
amended universally applied Building Construction Code (L. 4067/2011) 
focused primarily on the increase of densities and building heights and 
the promotion of land consolidation. More specifically, according to the 
Greek Association of Architects, the new Code “… introduces and adopts 
the logic of real estate in cities. It rewards, by a 25-35% increase in floor 
area ratios, the development of large tracts of land in the already congested 
urban centers of Greek cities. In the attempt to reverse the declining of 
degraded areas, it offers a disproportionate increase of floor area ratios and 
height to the detriment of already built up areas. The logic of devaluing 
the existing building stock, as obsolete, by a land consolidation premium 
that produces buildings that are out of the existing scale and serves special 
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interests, alters the urban environment, the quality of life of the inhabitants 
and the existing social and economic structure” (SADAS, 2012).
Respectively, the recently adopted Land Use Classification Code4, 
moving away from the development of a hierarchical system of land 
use categories, it establishes a zoning system which restricts in a 
substantive way planning’s power to formulate locally specific land use 
configurations5. By further intensifying a pre-existing policy of land use 
mix, the new land use zones provided for the: a) substantial intensification 
of commercial, institutional and office use in residential areas as well as 
the location and/or expansion of, potentially conflicting uses, i.e. parking 
lots for freight trucks and hospitals, that are anticipated to exacerbate in 
these areas the negative neighborhood effects characterizing Greek cities, 
that is, noise, traffic congestion and increased levels of air pollution, b) 
the formation of a multitude of mixed use districts  directed towards the 
attraction of real estate related productive and entrepreneurial activities, 
i.e, trade zones, enterprise zones, logistics, tourism, technopoles, and c) 
the commercialization of public and open space in urbanized areas. 
Streamlining of permitting procedures
In the name of combatting corruption, the new policies (Laws 4024/2011 
and 4030/2011) deregulate and privatize the permitting process by 
greatly reducing state control powers and transferring responsibilities to 
architects / designers, supervising engineers and private controllers. As a 
result, the ensuing autocratic system grounded on the superiority of the 
moral ethic of the private sector, proclaims its distrust to the citizens and 
public servants, thereby failing to empower the inherited system through 
the promotion of transparency and accountability in public services. 
Furthermore, the updated fast-track procedures proclaiming the ‘speeding 
4 | After several drafts which were substantially dif ferentiated in terms of content, 
the Land Use Code was adopted by Law in the same Bill as the reformed planning 
system instead of a Presidential Decree and was, thus, not subjected to a review 
by the Council of State. 
5 | For example, in the residential use category, the Law promotes strip 
development of  commercial and office use along the, mostly over-capacity, 
main road network by mandating the designation of roadside properties as urban 
activity centres while  restricting residential use. 
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up and transparency in the implementation of strategic investments’ are 
solely directed towards bypassing local resistances, i.e. by substantively 
limiting pre-existing public consultation timeframes and procedures 
thereby restricting the ability/power of competent public authorities to 
even express advisory opinions. 
Consolidation of propert y rights
With the sole intent to increase state revenues, an extensive program 
formalizing illegal construction is still underway. Grounded on the 
particularities of the Greek property and real estate system, this policy, 
fundamentally fiscal in nature, detached the entire ‘legalization’ process 
from spatial development and planning policies while rendering acceptable 
the consequent degradation of both the natural and built environment. 
The invalidation of the first Law (L 4014/11) by the Council of State led to its 
subsequent amendment (L.4178/13) based on a distorted use of land bank 
and transfer of development rights concepts which essentially provide for 
an extensive re-allocation of development rights throughout the country. 
Environmental deregulation
The initial focus of the, then, socialist government in the promotion of 
green economy in cities and the integration of European environmental 
directives into Greek Law6, was soon re-directed towards the simplification 
of procedures for Environmental Impact Studies (L. 4014/2011 and) and 
lately, on the severe limitation and /or annulment of the protective status 
of primarily forests and other natural and environmentally sensitive 
areas by permitting the location of various economic activities such as 
tourism, industry, livestock farming and mining (Laws.4264/14 and 
4258/14). The potential damage inflicted upon the core of the country’s 
natural capital by two recent legislative proposals7, one providing for new 
6 | These included primarily the Laws for: Landscape Conservation (L. 
3827/2010); Protection of Biodiversity (L. 3739/211); Management of the Marine 
environment (L. 3983/2011). 
7 | Both of these proposals were openly supported by the Troika and the European 
Commission on the grounds that they constituted a Memorandum conditionality 
(Kathimerini, 2013)).
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classification categories for forested areas and the other for the intensive 
development of the seashore, were repealed by the government, at least 
temporarily, because of issues of constitutionality and immense public 
opposition. In particular, the legislative proposal regarding the seashore 
– prepared and submitted for adoption by the Ministry of Finance instead 
of the competent Ministry of the Environment – provided not only for the 
intense development and commercialization of the sea, seashore, and the 
beach, but also for the abolition of their public use character8.
Planning reform 1: “Deregulating” panning 
The dismantling of the planning system was first achieved through the 
adoption of the regulatory framework providing for the privatization of 
state-owned property articulated in the seminal law entitled Emergency 
Measures for the Implementation of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 
Framework 2012-2015 (L. 3986/11). By giving highest priority to the 
successful implementation of the entire privatization program, the law 
has been a core element of the new institutional landscape both in terms 
of its impact on spatial planning as well as on the consolidation of new 
forms of urban governance.
A fundamental provision of this law was the consolidation of a new 
“regulatory regime” that annulled statutory planning by functioning in 
parallel with it (Zifou, 2012). Having as a core objective to safeguard the sale 
or concession of public lands under investors’ terms, the new regulatory 
regime has exclusive power over the processes of planning, permitting 
and selling of property. Summarized below are the constitutive features of 
this regime which denote essential aspects of the wider transformations 
of spatial planning policy that are taking place in the conjuncture of the 
crisis in Greece. 
8 | Described as “the proposal that sacrifices everything on the investors’ altar” 
,it is the only piece of legislation that has mobilized immense public opposition 
and contestation reflecting the fact that the seashore and the beach have been 
established in  peoples’ consciousness as public goods that everyone should have 
free access to, a right also provided by the Greek constitution. 
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New decision making and permitting structures: The Hellenic Republic 
Asset Development Fund, S.A. (TAIPED), modeled after Treuhand9, is 
established as the agency responsible for implementing the privatization 
program of the country. In accordance with the law, the Ministry of 
Finance has to transfer full ownership, possession and occupation of all 
public assets that are to be privatized to the Fund which is to be supported 
by a council of advisors, some members of which are appointed by EU 
member states, as well as technical, financial and legal, mostly foreign, 
experts. The Fund has the absolute control over the use as well as the 
management of the sale of the sites and functions, along with any other 
SA that it may establish to manage individual properties, as a ‘one-stop-
shop’ agency responsible for the issuance of all the required planning 
and building permits. So far, a total of 412 properties located all over 
Greece and covering a land area of approximately 110 mil m2 and 516.000 
m2 of building surface have been put up for sale – a great number of 
which includes environmentally sensitive areas (i.e. Natura 2000 sites), 
beachfront areas and/or archeological sites (Picture 1). As indicated by the 
present functioning of the Fund, apart from the lack of transparency and 
public accountability, this take-over of state control has not only established 
a type of neocolonial regime influencing urban dynamics and promoting 
land grabbing, it is also facilitating the opening up of the Greek land and 
real estate markets to global processes of capital accumulation10.
9 | It is the agency responsible for the implementation of the privatization 
program of the former German Democratic Republic.
10 | The intricate ways by which this new regulatory regime allows the transfer of 
policies and the rearrangement of relations between national and supranational 
institutions is exemplified by the recent announcement of the Fund to hire 
Deutsche Bank, BNP and UBS to act as is consultants in order to comply with 
Troika’s request for the speeding up of the formulation and adoption of the legal 
framework providing for the securitization of real property in Greece.
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Picture 1: An interactive map showing 195 of state owned properties that are 
currently on sale by TAIPED whose privatization is estimated to have direct 
impacts on the physical environment.
Source: Hellenic Ornithological Society (2014)
Establishment of new planning tools11: in order to provide the necessary 
certainty to investors and turn the properties into viable that is, profitable 
economic ventures, this regulatory framework introduces: a) proposed 
land use designations applied only to state owned properties consisting of 
mixed use zones oriented primarily to tourism and consumption, and b) a 
new planning instrument, the ‘Special Development Plan’, that specifies 
permitted land-use and development regulations for each property. The 
11 | A similar regulatory framework has also been established for the development 
of public and private strategic investments (L 3894/2010).
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plan is prepared by the Fund and adopted by ministerial decree12 with 
the intent to determine each property’s ‘investment identity’ in order to 
initiate the bidding process for its subsequent sale or concession. These 
plans are empowered to by-pass and amend statutory local land use 
plans and environmental regulations and to specify terms for the use 
and development of the seashore and the beach, which are conceded to 
the buyer / investor, thereby, annulling their public use character which 
is (was) a constitutionally vested right. This planning process has been 
widely contested not only for its total lack of transparency and public 
accountability but also for its reliance upon the ‘logic of the market’ that 
disregards any concerns for the integration of prospective developments 
into local environments and therefore their particular needs and socio-
economic dynamics. A case in point, is the privatization of the 620 ha 
property of the former airport of Ellinikon in Athens (Picture 2), where 
contrary to the original designation of the site as a Metropolitan Park and 
despite the immense opposition expressed at the local level (Picture 3), the 
Special Plan provided for a mix of land uses – covering a total area of 1,7 
mi m2– that compose a mixed use enclave (picture 4) with an emphasis 
in consumption and catered to mainly upper income foreign buyers while 
excluding Athenians from the sea front of the city (Vatavali and Zifou, 
2012; Castro et al., 2013).
12 | Only the non-obligatory opinion of the Regional Authority, submitted 
during the Strategic Environmental Assessment approval process, is taken into 
consideration for the issuance of the ministerial decree.
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Picture 4: A conceptual master plan submitted 
for the development of the site
Picture 2: The site of the former Airport of 
Ellinikon in its urban setting
Picture 3: Protest against the privatization of 
the property
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Securing the profitability of the investment: a significant provision of this 
Law is that the state is obliged to: a) provide the infrastructure needed 
to service the site, i.e., road network, and utilities, the construction of 
which must be given first priority despite the extensive budget cuts due 
to austerity policies, and b) pay the moving cost for all the activities, i.e. 
public services, public administration etc, that might be located on site. 
At the same time, the (neoliberal in origin) policy of exacting community 
benefits as a compensation for the impacts of the development on local 
communities is converted into an opportunity for the investors since it is 
connected with an increase of the permitted densities. 
Planning reform 2: Consolidation of flexibilit y
After almost two years of elaboration, a new Planning Act was adopted 
amidst wide opposition – by parties of the Left and professional associations 
– regarding its content and ostensible consultation procedures13.Based on the
widely held assertion dominating the public discourse since the inception of 
the crisis that land use planning constituted an obstacle to investments and, 
therefore, to economic growth (Kathimerini, 2012; Reporter, 2013, Mckinsey 
and Company, 2012), the new Act provides for the full scale restructuring 
of the spatial planning system. So, contrary to the original demand – and 
apparently to the conditionality as officially stated in the Memorandum 
– for the amendment of the 1990’s planning legislation with a direction
towards the update and simplification of planning processes (i.e. local plan 
preparation could take up to 7 years on the average), the reform is focused on 
dismantling the inherited planning system with an all defining objective: 
to embed flexibility, ‘the watchword of the neo-liberal state’ (Harvey, 2005), 
into planning. Flexibility which is achieved not by deregulation but through 
the construction of a new centrally-controlled planning system designed 
to accommodate the new economic, and political, landscape under terms 
that allow the unconditional (and subsidized in the case of public lands) 
materialization of all large scale investments. The emergent planning 
system is constructed upon the following fundamental elements:
13 | The new Planning Law was submitted for adoption in late June (2014), under 
a process of ‘extreme urgency’, in the Recess Section of the Greek parliament, 
which is composed of only one third of all MPs and allows the construction of 
parliamentary majorities and was immediately adopted after only a day’s 
discussion in the competent parliamentary committee.
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Economic determinism
A dominant feature of the emerging planning policy is that the economy 
is considered the only determining factor for the formulation of spatial 
strategies and subsequently, of plan content. This policy directive 
emanates directly from the Act which specifies that future strategies and 
plans, particularly the ones developed at the national and regional level 
constituting the guidance framework for local planning, must be informed 
by the National Economic Strategy, the Medium Term Framework for the 
Fiscal Strategy14 (that is, the country’s adjustment program) and the Public 
Investment Program without making any reference to other spheres of 
activity. The prevalence of this economic rationality denotes that the new 
‘paradigm’ views planning as the mere spatial expression of the country’s 
economic program as it is defined by the political economic context of the 
crisis. Although this direction may be considered a prominent planning 
trend under the regulatory conditions of neoliberalism (Allmendinger, 
2001; Taylor, 1998) the absence of any reference to social and environmental 
goals and policy guidelines including relevant provisions of the Greek 
constitution illustrates a total lack of concern for achieving, or even 
striving for, environmental and social justice. 
This proposition is verified, as far as environmental protection is 
concerned, in the following case involving the recent update of the (National) 
Spatial Plan for Tourism (L. 3155/2013), the objective of which is to provide 
guidelines for the spatial organization of tourism, considered to be a flagship 
sector of the economy. The update of the preceding Plan – adopted in 2009 
right before the outbreak of the crisis – was presented as necessary in order 
to accommodate / comply with the government’s new strategy for tourism 
prepared by the competent Ministry of Tourism. Reflecting to a large 
degree the proposals made by the McKinsey report, which estimated that 
the country’s future tourist model may, potentially, include the construction 
of 30-35 new marinas and 25 integrated tourist resorts15 (Pictures 5 and 6) 
with a total area of 4,5 million m2 the Ministry’s strategy provided for the 
14 | A provision which clearly illustrates the ‘temporal fixity’ () of the measures 
adopted under the ‘state of emergency’. 
15 | New legislation is being prepared allowing the drawing of sale or lease 
contracts before the construction of vacation homes in order to enable the 
materialization of these developments. 
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immense growth of the sector with a focus on real estate related tourism16, 
while it also defined relevant development regulations. 
Pictures 5 and 6: Conceptual plans of 
integrated tourist developments on a Greek 
island
In turn, in conformance with the sectoral plan’s guidelines, the 
Spatial Plan without any consideration for issues such as the capacity 
of environmental-technical-social infrastructure, natural resource 
depletion, or climate change, allows the indiscriminate location of tourist 
activities and tourist integrated resorts (Maps 1 and 2) all over the country, 
irrespective of local conditions and dynamics reflected in the plan area-
categories (i.e. overdeveloped, urban, insular, mountainous, Natura 2000 
16 | This post-colonial tourist development model associated with  large 
multinational corporations, precarious employment and limited dispersal of 
tourism-related activity to local communities is greatly dif ferentiated from the 
so far prevalent model in the country characterized by its integration into local 
economies and the small/medium scale invested (mostly Greek) capital.
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sites) and in direct contrast to the provisions of the previous Plan which 
were, already, widely contested for their pro-growth direction.
Map 1: Designated guidelines for the spatial 
organization of Tourism*
Map 2: Organization of the tourist port 
network**
 Source: Ministry of the Environment, Climate Change and Energy
* Colors and patterns denote spatial categories 
** Includes marinas (red circles), hotel ports (purple) and anchorages (green)
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Centrally determined policies
A second defining characteristic of the new planning system is the 
introduction of increased state control over plan content with the aim to 
ensure that land use regulation is firmly embedded in central government 
strategies to attract capital. This is primarily instituted through the 
establishment of a top-down hierarchical planning system17 with no 
substantive feedback provisions, the main features of which include:
• the reduction of the “National (General) Spatial Plan” – originally
intended to provide ‘priorities and strategic guidelines for the
integrated spatial development and sustainable organization of the
national space’ (L. 2742/99) – to  a National Spatial Policy outlining the 
government’s basic priorities and medium term goals for the spatial
development of the country18
• the strengthening of the regulative function of sector-specific spatial
plans prepared at the national level, in continuance of the pre-crisis
planning policy and despite the Law’s intent for these plans to take
on a more strategic character. This provision greatly increases their
command over the policy content of regional and local plans whose
role is essentially reduced to qualify / specify the guidelines of national 
plans.
• the reduction to the absolute minimum of public deliberation
procedures which, in the new planning culture, are viewed as the
major factor for plan preparation delays.
The most controversial issue, however, relates to the power assigned to the 
Minister of the Environment, Climate Change and Energy (the competent 
ministry for spatial planning) to amend plans, including local plans, on 
the basis that the proposed amendments are, as they are vaguely referred 
to in the Law, “localized and non-essential”.  
17 | With the exception of the abolishment of metropolitan strategic plans, the 
basic structure of the system remains the same.
18 | Whereas the previous plan was adopted by Law, and therefore subjected to 
parliamentary review, under the new Law,  the National Spatial Policy is approved by 
the Cabinet and its notification to the Parliament for discussion is not mandatory.
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The prevalence of master planning
Apart from the exercise of central government’s control over the content 
of local land use policies, the ‘reformed’ Act introduces two other features 
that in total result in the weakening, and in essence abolishing, the role 
of local planning (and in turn of local communities’ capacity) in guiding 
development. 
Firstly, despite the implementation of the local government re-
structuring program in 2010 involving power decentralization as well as 
extensive local unit consolidation resulting in a decrease in the number of 
municipalities by almost 1/3, central government retains its power over the 
preparation and approval of local plans which are, now, drawn for only a 
section of the municipality corresponding to the area of the old municipal 
units. Moreover, municipalities are given one month to express their opinion 
on local plan content after which the plan approval process proceeds by the 
competent Minister without regard on whether such an opinion has been 
submitted. Secondly, the Act embodies into the planning system, as a new 
type of local plan, the master plans which were recently introduced, as an 
exceptionality, for the development of state-owned properties and strategic 
investments. These plans, which  may now be prepared for any type of large 
scale development, i.e. tourism, housing, enterprise districts etc., not only 
do not have to comply with the provisions of  (municipal) local plans, as 
they are considered to be on the same hierarchical level, but they may also 
amend them. 
The dominance of this fragmented, project-led approach constitutes a 
major retreat from the ‘90s planning policy aim to ground development 
control on a unitary land use plan, thereby severely limiting the earlier 
intention to provide a programmatic and guidance framework for local 
community development19 while, at the same time, reinforcing urbanization 
trends that exacerbate urban sprawl.
19 | The development and programmatic framework for each municipality, i.e. 
population projections, development perspective/ vision, spatial organization 
etc., is now defined by the corresponding regional plan which is prepared and 
approved by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and Climate Change.
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4. concLusion
The structural adjustment program imposed in this time of crisis in 
Greece, in the name of reducing public deficit and paying up the sovereign 
debt has placed land, and more generally space, at the center of the ongoing 
regulatory restructuring process, while it is facilitating the entry of global 
financial capital and its companion, international / globalized real estate 
in the Greek property market (thus, changing rapidly the so far dominant 
social and economic relations within the country). In this process of 
neoliberalization, the imposed market driven regulatory restructuring is 
forcing the dismantling of an already market supportive planning system 
which, however, by embodying the political view of ‘social democracy’, 
was oriented to a middle-class society and to the fulfillment of social 
cohesion goals. In its place, a new planning paradigm is established based 
on a different conception of interests, power and outcomes. Oriented solely 
towards promoting entrepreneurship and corporate competition, the new 
planning system is considered an instrument to combating the crisis, 
i.e. sovereign debt, unemployment, and capital accumulation, through 
urbanization and the exploitation of common goods and public assets.
The new regulatory landscape is institutionalizing two major 
changes which constitute both a long departure from addressing the long 
lasting structural problems of Greek cities and more generally of spatial 
organization, i.e. deficient public space, conflicting land uses, urban 
sprawl, as well as a substantive rupture with the so far dominant planning 
policy. The first change rises from the further concentration of planning 
power to central government and the emergent regulatory regimes, a 
policy that fosters the transfer of the debate and negotiations regarding 
space production from the public sphere to ministers’ offices, elite power 
centers and teams of specialists and foreign experts. The adaptation of 
the former system of clientelism to the new political economy context is 
associated with the total restriction of public access to decision making 
and/or the absolute minimization of public consultation processes, and 
thereby raises serious concerns regarding the lack of transparency and 
democratic control. And while the inherited system could not claim much 
relation to communicative rationality – especially in terms of including 
notions of the ‘other’ – it nevertheless promoted planning as the arena 
for knowledge generation and the resolution of conflicts regarding spatial 
development. On the contrary, the new model dismisses any alternative 
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development discourse while denying/ignoring any form of contestation 
and severely limiting the right of local communities to influence local 
trajectories, and even less, formulate locally-contingent strategies. 
Secondly, the emergent development and spatial organization patterns 
emphasizing large-scale, mixed use planned developments, are based 
on the transfer of ‘recipes’ that have been implemented in developing 
or post-socialist countries thereby ignoring local particularities which 
are embedded in the, until now, dominant social relations. The aesthetic 
convergence and adoption of post-modern lifestyles highlighted by tourist-
entertainment resorts, shopping malls and thematic parks raise serious 
questions regarding not only the future morphology of Greek cities, the 
countryside and the islands but also the effects of this new configuration 
towards the formation of divisions and spaces of exclusion uncharacteristic 
of Greek cities. Additionally, one has to wonder about the degree to which 
the development of these ‘spaces of neoliberalization’ are associated with 
the suppression of the role of middle class, small construction companies/ 
entrepreneurial capital and small size land ownership in space production 
processes, thus creating new socio-spatial inequalities.
Moreover, the absolute domination of economic rationality as a 
defining element of the emerging planning policy has so far been equated 
with the unconditional use and selling off / transfer of the country’s 
natural assets and public lands. Thus, in the name of creating a favorable 
business environment, as a fundamental mission of the neoliberal 
state, a tremendous pressure is put upon the country’s pristine natural 
environment, coastal areas and beaches undermining their quality, 
their value and as it seems, their public use character. At the same time, 
the equation of the public good with the fulfillment of fiscal objectives, 
economic entrepreneurship and competitiveness inhibits the so far 
redistributive role of planning while it legitimizes the socialization of 
costs and the privatization of profit. So, even though the consequences 
of the debt crisis and its associated policies are already evident in the new 
urban landscape and in peoples’ everyday lives, i.e. poverty, vacancies, 
diminishing public services, homelessness and increasing housing 
foreclosures, the emergent planning policy is leading towards the re-
creation of a speculative growth model which has been directly associated 
with the recent global economic crisis. In this conjuncture, when austerity 
politics have created conditions of humanitarian crisis in Greek cities, the 
new planning policy seems to not only defy objectives for social cohesion, 
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and more generally social and environmental justice, but also to foster the 
division of land solely for profit instead of meeting human needs. 
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“The right to the city” in Athens during a 
crisis era  
Between inversion, assimilation and going beyond
Vaso Makrygianni and Charalampos Tsavdaroglou
Ever since the book of Henri Lefebvre “The right to the city” was 
published in 1968 it served as a great inspiration for several scholars, 
researchers, academics and activists. Being the point of departure 
for various urban movements, it contributed to a wave of resistance 
and destabilization of sovereignty in many parts of the western world 
during the turbulent decades of the 60s and 70s. While it has become 
extremely popular or even fashionable, it often appears detached from 
its original meaning. Various forms of sovereignty used its revolutionary 
and innovative rhetoric in an attempt to grand radical contexts in their 
political agendas. Forty five years after the first publication of Lefebvre’s 
book, the Athenian metropolis, a city in the (epi)center of the crisis 
turmoil, is governed by a municipal authority party that goes under 
the name of “Right to the City”. The party adopted much of Lefebvre’s 
revolutionary rhetoric, such as “the city as oeuvre”, in order to form 
its political agenda and win the municipal elections of 2010 and 2014. 
Ever since, a political program is applied based on a rather distorted 
interpretation of “the right to the city”.
In this chapter two approaches of “The right to the city” (‘TRTTC’ from 
now on) will be confronted. On the one hand the Lefebvrian notion of the 
1960s and on the other hand Kaminis’ (the Athens mayoral candidate) 
appropriation of 2010 and 2014. The first approach is considered as an 
effort to introduce the Marxian thought in spatial thinking in order to 
contribute to the emerging emancipatory movements, and the second 
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as a fine example of distortion of contexts in favor of gaining power and 
promoting neoliberal policies. 
In this direction, we unfold the political program of Kaminis and 
examine its applications versus its title and theoretical context. By 
examining urban policies and tactics that are applied under the cloak of 
“TRTTC” and form the everyday life in Athens we intend to demonstrate 
that divisions between form and content can often lead to the complete 
inversion of primal meanings. By lifting the veil of propaganda it becomes 
visible that the assimilation of radical contexts on behalf of municipal 
authority does not lead to emancipatory urban policies but aims to cover 
up sovereignty.
Bringing to surface neo-interpretations of Lefebvre’s analysis, though, 
does not only enlighten the subversion of the original notions or highlight 
them as stolen contexts from sovereignty. In fact, not only is it a great 
opportunity to explore once again and rethink what Lefebvre was teaching 
and writing during the 60s but also a motive to question, think beyond 
and challenge it in the contemporary contexts of urban uprisings and 
revolts. Inspired by the work of several radical scholars like Harvey, de 
Souza or Pasquinelli we make an argument on the perspectives beyond 
the Lefebvrian notion and an attempt to approach Athens as an emerging 
rebel city. During the crisis years various struggles and acts of solidarity 
have been taking place in the city area, thus several spaces of resistance 
and commoning have emerged. In this regard, we deal with the transition 
from demanding the city to occupying the city as a contemporary space of 
resistance.
1. “the Right to the cit y”: t wo contR adictoRy  
 appRoaches and a subveRsive pR actice
1.1 “The Right to the Cit y” and the Lefebvrian approach
In the late 60’s Henri Lefebvre wrote his famous book the “The Right 
To The City”. The publication of the book in 1968 coincided with the 
100th anniversary of the publication of Marx’s Capital, and came just 
before the revolutionary outbreaks in Paris, Prague, the rest of Europe and 
the US. “TRTTC” was influential for several radical scholars and urban 
movements like DIY urbanism in Sydney, Australia or the Right to the 
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City Alliance in NY,USA , to name but a few. One of the basic thesis and 
point of departure of Lefebvre (1996: 109) was that 
“the city [is] a projection of society on the ground that is, not only on the actual 
site, but at a specific level, perceived and conceived by thought , […] the city [is] 
the place of confrontations and of (conflictual) relations (…), the city [is] the ‘site 
of desire’ (…) and site of revolutions”. 
In the previous quote Lefebvre demonstrated the trialectical character 
of space as conceived, perceived and lived, which he farther analyzed in 
his later work “The Production of Space” (Lefebvre 1974). By verbalizing 
imaginary spaces which are crucial to every process of space alteration he 
widened not only the notion of space but also the possibilities to imagine 
and produce different spatialities. By introducing social relations as a 
mean of space production he questioned vividly both the hierarchical 
perception of city space in terms of production (according to which space 
was formed by the expertised authorities) and the perception of space as 
two dimensional or box container of life. Moreover, according to several 
scholars (Collinge, 2008; Soja, 1989; Shields, 1999) Lefebvre’s analysis 
constituted a break to the former aspatial dialectic of historical materialism 
of orthodox Marxism. Lefebvre thematised space and suggested that the 
dialectic can be “raised up” from a temporal to a spatial medium. For our 
purpose, one of the most significant contributions of Lefebvre’s point of 
view is that he identified the space and the city as a result of social class 
antagonisms.
In this regard, Lefebvres’ concept of “TRTTC” challenged the notion 
of citizen. By bringing to surface people as protagonists of the production 
of city space and introducing a dialectical schema of space -production 
he gave a new meaning to citizenship. In his thought, citizenship is not 
defined by membership in the nation-state but is based on membership 
in inhabitance, thus on the everyday production of city space. As Purcell 
(2003: 577) notes “Everyday life (…) is the central pivot of the TRTTC: those 
who go about their daily routines in the city, both living in and creating 
space, are those who possess a legitimate right to the city (Lefebvre 1991a)”. 
Though he didn’t manage to escape from the notion of the white west 
man as the absolute subject he contributed vividly to the proclamation of 
emancipator strategies.
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Furthermore, Lefebvre (1996: 158) clarified that “TRTTC” is not a 
typical right to nature and the countryside but “in the face of this pseudo-
right, the right to the city is like a cry and a demand” and he (1996: 173-
174) continued “right to freedom, to individualization in socialization, to 
habitat and to inhabit, (…) to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation 
(clearly distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the 
city”. 
In his work, like so many other scholars of the decade of the 60s, he 
aimed not only to reach the analytical tools in order to understand the 
city but also to encounter all those forces able to change it. In his words 
the right to the city meant “a radical restructuring of social, politic and 
economic relations, both in the city and beyond” (Lefebvre 1996:34). As 
Marcuse (2010: 88) points out the right to the city is far more than the 
individual liberty to access urban resources and as Harvey (2008:26) 
adheres “it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city”. Stavrides 
(2007:8) felicity described it :“Lefebvre, encountered in the city not only 
horror but also hope, not only orderliness but also disorder, not only the 
reproduction of the sovereign principles but also challenge, not only the 
normalization of routine but also the liberation feast.” 
1.2 “The Right to the Cit y” and the sovereignt y approach:  
 a short discourse analysis
In 2010 the new party “RTTC”, under the leadership of George Kaminis, 
a former ombudsman, participated in the municipal elections. In the first 
round of the November 2010 elections Kaminis’ party came in second 
but managed to win the second round, gaining 52% of the popular vote 
against the conservative party of the former mayor, Nikitas Kaklamanis, 
mainly due to the support of the centre-left. Kaminis governed the city for 
the period 2000-2014 and in May 25th 2014 won the second round of the 
elections that assured him another 5 years of service. It is noteworthy that, 
for the first time, in 2010 a Nazi political party entered the town council, 
while in 2014 it came third with about 120.000 votes.
The manifesto of the party “TRTTC” focused on citizens, public 
space (mainly in terms of cleanness and security), private property, social 
services, green development and innovative entrepreneurship. Within 
this optic, Kaminis (2010a:5) considered the city as a “collective oeuvre 
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created by the inhabitants, the visitors and everyone that lives and works 
in the city and creates its actual wealth”. Moreover, he (2010b) adhered:
“I am referring to our common perception that life in the city essentially means 
an aggregation of rights. Rights that are nowadays under massive attack; from 
the right to mobility in public space without spatial and temporal limitations, to 
the right to work, to private property, to the freedom of creation. For all of us, 
‘demanding the city’ means demanding our right to the city; all the rights for all 
human beings. We want and demand a civilized city, open to its citizens and open 
to the world.”  
Reading, however, in depth Kaminis manifesto we come across to several 
contradictions. First and foremost, the inclusion of as many as possible in 
“the collective oeuvre” that forms the city is indicative of the gap between 
form and content in Kaminis rhetoric. Obviously this invocation was made 
in order to target potential voters and to reinforce the pluralistic profile of 
the party. Kaminis himself was presented as “a citizen for the citizens” 
(Kaminis, 2010a: 2). Still, the way he conceived the notion of citizen 
involved several inconsistencies and contradictions. Though he referred 
to citizens, inhabitants, workers and students in general, he posed a clear 
distinction between indigenous and newcomer population. Likewise, in 
his political manifesto appears an underlying bias for young couples or 
students that should inhabit the city center and change its character, not 
only due to their economic status (the crisis hadn’t completely unraveled 
when the manifesto was formed in 2010) but mainly because they are 
regarded as members of the city’s “creative class”. Kaminis adopted much 
of the government’s rhetoric for “preferable citizens”, a creative class that 
would inhabit the freshly gentrified areas of the city center. 
However following Lefebvre (1991b:2342, translated in Kofman and 
Lebas, 1996: 34) the right to the city, complemented by the right to 
difference and the right to information, should modify, concretize and 
make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) 
and user of multiple services.; it would also cover the right to the use 
of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck 
into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the 
‘privilege’).  
In total discrepancy, Kaminis endorses the analysis of the ghettoization 
of the city center and introduces security, urban development and 
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entrepreneurship as a response. He is in accordance with gentrification 
processes, as we will show later on, that are promoted as the salvation of 
the so-called “city’s decay” and brings forth cultural capital as the leading 
force behind real estate, while appears eager to attract both investments 
and highly skilled workers. 
But the emersion of this “chimera”, as Pasquinelli (2010) would 
describe the above strategy, determines also the relation between the 
city and the rest of the world. This relation with the “outside” is filtered 
thoroughly through the tourist industry. Athens is considered as the “face 
of the country” and therefore a highly important touristic destination. 
Though the rhetoric of the Olympic Games (2004) for a competitive city 
full of large-scale projects has faded, Kaminis brings forth once again 
the importance of the city image as a link to the outside. He unfolds a 
strategic of city-lifting, including small scale and neighborhood projects 
and targets to promote the city like a product ready for consumption. 
The Kaminis’ city-commodity reflects the absolute subversion of the 
Lefebvrian city. The key words of the manifesto under the title “urban 
development” are: entrepreneurship, city identity and tourism (Kaminis 
2010a:7). This constitutes an explicit contradiction to Lefebvre’s critique 
for deification of the city image and its transformation to a commodity. 
Lefebvre’s internationalism is surpassed by a universal industry of cities. 
Athens is praised by Kaminis as a tourist destination taking no account of 
Lefebvre’s (1996: 70) criticism (of the 60s) while he wrote for the Athenian 
metropolis: “The monuments and sights (Agora, Acropolis) which enable 
to locate ancient Greece are only places of tourist consumption and 
aesthetic pilgrimage.”
The 2010 right to the development of the city, in other words the 
right to a touristic city, is directly linked to entrepreneurship and for this 
reason Kaminis announced measures against excessive bureaucracy. In 
the memorandum context though, the overcome of any possible delays in 
order to facilitate investments or entrepreneurship is directly connected to 
new investment law the so-called “fast track” 1, a governmental tool that 
1 | “Acceleration and Transparency of Implementation of Strategic Investments” or 
Fast Track Law (3894/2010) aims to abolish critical obstacles that have inhibited 
major investment in Greece. (…)This law streamlines the licensing procedure for 
Strategic Investments, making the process easier, smoother and more attractive. 
(http://www.investingreece.gov.gr/default.asp?pid=167andla=1)
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was invented in order to skate over any legal difficulties or oppositions 
concerning private investments.Thus, Kaminis’ “TRTTC” paves the wave 
for the “right” to fast track policies.
On the side, the selection of the name “TRTTC” by George Kaminis 
and his partners is neither incidental nor coincidental, but maintains direct 
links and references to Lefebvre’s oeuvre. This assumption is strengthened 
by the fact that at least twelve candidates of his party (Kaminis 2010b) are 
architects or involved in space and art sciences. Unsurprisingly, Kaminis 
promotes the aestheticization of the “TRTTC” by cutting off quotes and 
propound them as romantic thoughts of his political manifesto. In this 
way, he identifies himself and his party by using the terminology of an 
ideology he has very little in common. 
The adoption of radical raisons and contents has been diachronically 
the strategic for numerous power mechanisms. The lack of a critical 
engagement with Lefebvre’s rhetoric has often led to an overstretching of 
the concept. On deconstructing Kaminis’ manifesto, the ostensibly radical 
intentions are ultimately weathered. The patchwork of rights, from private 
property to public space, along with strong indications of neoliberal 
policies and governance, leave no doubt that there is no common space 
between Kaminis’ «Δικαίωμα στην Πόλη» and Lefebvrian “Droit à la ville“. 
1.3  “The Right to the Cit y” and the sovereignt y practice
Following Lefebvre’s analysis we consider space as a product of social 
relations, therefore, we examine the production of the Athenian space 
in relation to its inhabitants and visitors. In order to perceive the politics 
applied to the Athenian metropolis over the past four years we examine 
the way these policies ‘position’ the subjects- citizens in the city. With 
‘position’ we are not implying that any authority is truly capable of 
positioning, thereby determining, the subjects, since they are self-
determined and therefore position themselves in space according to their 
social relations. Mostly we refer to the intentions and practices of the 
authorities to act in the name of the inhabitants. In this direction, we use 
the dialectic schema of inclusion-exclusion, which help us understand the 
municipality’s policies and the consequent urban space that is produced 
by them. 
The municipality’s declarations of population reclassifications, by 
bringing “the young and the restless” Greeks to the city center, directing 
Vaso Makr ygianni and Charalampos Tsavdaroglou186
migrants to ethnic markets and displacing “the decadents” to the outskirts 
are indicative of their intentions. Subsequently, not all the inhabitants are 
considered as equal citizens, some of them are not considered citizens 
at all, and not all of them have the same rights to the city. The Kaminis’ 
“right to the city” is connected with race and class prerequisites and this 
constitutes one of the primary distortions of the Lefebvrian notion. 
Kaminis (2010c) noted in one of his interviews: “Greece is a country 
in which-because of economic traditions-you cannot just make a sudden 
move, gather 5.000 people and take them to three concentration camps. 
This is not practically possible and does not comply with the fundamental 
coexistence principles of a coordinated community.” However, since 2010 
hundreds of police operations have taken place in Athens. According to 
statistics of Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection within seven 
months (8/2012-2/2013) 77.526 migrants were prosecuted, that means 
in most cases beaten, deported, arrested or abused. Since the operations 
was decided in the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection (with 
the active support of the municipal police, though) Kaminis attributed 
the issue to the Prime Minister’s office. Migratory populations are often 
thought to come from an outer sphere; therefore they are considered to 
have no actual connection, references or rights to the city they inhabit. 
Kaminis by transferring the migrant issue in another hyper spatial 
structure or even in a supranational level, he practically dislocates them 
out of the city. At the same time several concentration camps, the so-called 
“hospitality centers” by the authorities, have been created in Greece, one 
of them in the wider district of Athens. At the moment (May 2014), there 
is an open discussion for the transformation of a former hospital (“Agia 
Varvara”) in west Athens (closed due to cuts in health that followed the 
advent of IMF in 2010) to a detention center. 
The political formation of Kaminis explicitly targeted immigrants from 
the very beginning of his administration. In his (Kaminis 2011) words: 
“our policy concerning migration should aim to the social incorporation, 
to manage illegal migration and all illegal migrants that already inhabit 
our country. This population should come out to light and be recorded. 
All the illegal migrants should return to their home countries.”Using the 
“illegal trade” as a pretext Kaminis separated the indigenous populations 
from the newcomers. The latter became the scapegoat of the recent crisis 
accused for the collapse of the commercial sector (Kaminis 2010c, 2011). 
As formulated by Kaminis (2011a) “the city center decays because of two 
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things: illegal trade and manifestations.” Significantly, the attitude of the 
municipal authorities, in 2011, towards one of the biggest hunger strikes 
that have taken place in Greece (300 migrants hunger strikers claimed 
legislation for migrants in Greece) was indicative. Kaminis washed his 
hands of migrants’ demands by refusing to provide them accommodation 
during the strike and transposed any responsibility once again to the 
government.
The municipal authority has been making a furious attack against 
migrants indicating their expulsion from the public space of the city 
since they are considered as non-citizens. This massive pogrom in which 
Nazis, racists, state police and municipal police take part has had several 
victims, like Cheikh Ndiaye, an African street vender who died falling on 
the train rails in February 2013 while hunted by municipal policemen. 
Such politics express certain spatialities. The expulsion from public 
sphere means inevitably the alteration of city public space. For instance, 
since 2009 members of the Nazi party Golden Down have banned access 
to a public playground in a central migrant neighborhood, targeting in 
this way migrant’s children. The playground remained locked until April 
2014, a month before the elections. 
Moreover, in December 2011 took place a vicious pogrom in the city 
center. Several sex workers, many of them were migrant women, were 
arrested and imprisoned for over a year. They were slandered of being 
HIV positive and accused of “transmitting diseases to the Greek family” 
(Loverdos 2012) by the Minister of Health. As the Minister (Loverdos 2012) 
distinctively declared “it is necessary to deport HIV positive prostitutes in 
order to stop being a threat to the Greek family (…), it is a problem of the 
Greek family as the disease is transmitted from the illegal migrant women, 
to the Greek client, to the Greek family.” Kaminis disclaimed again any 
responsibility but he supported the minister indirectly. A few days later he 
signed a protocol of cooperation with the minister concerning “measures 
for the improvement of citizen’s everyday life and the reassurance of a 
better living condition”. The contemporary ‘vagabonds’ such as drug 
addicts or homeless that have been increasing rapidly the last few years 
live in a blurred routine. On the one hand the municipality created 
spaces to provide them food and sometimes shelter and on the other, a 
constant battle takes place in order to keep them out of tourists’ sight. 
Numerous times they are exiled with police buses from the city center 
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either to detention centers or abandoned in the national highway, in order 
to achieve a “clean and clear” urban environment. 
Since 2010 (the year of the advent of the IMF), several groups and 
individuals have expressed openly a strict negation to the “Memorandum”. 
Their spaces of reference have been targeted constantly from the various 
aspects of sovereignty, including the municipality. During the last two 
years several evictions of squats, occupied buildings and social centers 
have taken place in Athens. The eviction of the anarchist social centers-
squats Villa Amalias and Skaramaga showed the stigma of zero tolerance 
to the voices of resistance. Though the municipal authorities once again 
renounced any responsibility by declaring that this was an issue held by 
the state police, they willingly decided to reclaim the buildings once they 
were evicted. In the case of Villa Amalia (a building squatted for the last 
22 years in the center of the city that functioned also as a space of fight 
back to numerous fascist attacks to migrants) the municipality started 
renovation works a few days before the 2014 elections. Still, in the case of 
the municipal market of Kupseli, an abandoned local market occupied by 
citizens in a central neighborhood of Athens and transformed into a social 
center, the eviction came from a direct command of the municipality. 
Indeed, the eviction of such spaces and the dislocation and exclusion of 
certain people and ideas from the city equates with the production of a 
sterilized city environment friendly to Nazis and the police. 
But the pinnacle of municipal policies that distorted ultimately the 
meaning of TRTTC was the eviction of Syntagma Square2 occupation by 
the ‘Indignados’ and various other people. The 29th of June 2011 a big riot 
took place in Syntagma square. The next days the mayor (Kaminis 2011b) 
stated:
“The municipality does not oppose to the Indignados. The right to gather in public 
spaces and manifestate is supported by the Greek constitution. The Municipality 
respects, as it should, the right to peaceful protests. Still, there is a distinction 
between the right to manifestate, that could be on a daily basis in the same spot 
on special occasions (like the Indignados did) and the ‘right’ to camp in public 
spaces with all the consequent effects concerning the malfunction of the city.” 
2 | ‘Syntagma’ means ‘Constitution’. Syntagma Square is the square in front of 
the Greek parliament.
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And he (Kaminis 2011b) continued arguing that
“It is inconceivable that those who name themselves Indignados think that they 
can occupy the central or any other square of Athens. The square should be clean, 
open and available to all citizens and inhabitants of the city with no exceptions or 
discriminations. This applies for all the squares of the city and especially for the 
first one.”  
In mayor’s speech we distinguish once again the thrasos of sovereignty 
to determine the rules, the topography, the means of fight and behavior 
of the revolted (Makrygianni and Tsavdaroglou 2010: 52). What Kaminis 
described was the breaking of the former “spatial contract” of Syntagma 
square. The permanent occupation of a square constituted a break to the 
former temporary demonstrations. Until June 2011 there were two main 
tactics in the repertoire of protestors: occupations of public buildings 
and demonstrations. Both of them express the spatial contract, i.e. the 
“democratic” right to interrupt the urban normality and protest for 
a limited time in public space or in a public (State) building. Square 
occupations combine the two previous tactics and constitute a new spatial 
grammar in the syntax of struggles. In the words of Antonis Vradis: “the 
occupation of Syntagma Square (…) was a first attempt to break the spatial 
contract or to cancel it definitively” (Vradis, 2011:215).
Confronting the above with Lefebvre’s rhetoric it seems rather ironic 
that while the later, inspired by the Paris Commune of 1871 flared the events 
of May ‘68, Kaminis’ rhetoric contributed actively to the suppression of the 
Indignados movement and the wave of resistance that followed in Greece.
Nonetheless the policies of exclusion go hand in hand with certain 
inclusive practices. The rhetoric of the municipality reflects the dominion 
of the capital over city space and promotes a specific and restricted topology 
of rights. The production of the desired space derives from the exclusion 
of the “flagitious” and the concomitant inclusion of the “desired” through 
the promotion of certain plans. 
In 2011 an architectural competition for the renewal of a central 
Athenian named “Rethink Athens” street took place. The competition 
was held on behalf of the private institution-foundation “Alexandros 
Onassis” and urged us to rethink the Greek capital in ‘better’ terms. 
The competition that was embraced warmly by the authorities and the 
municipality interpreted the city followed close Kaminis’ scenario. The 
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“creative class” should inhabit Athens, give her new breath and character 
along with an ethnic essence created on multicultural markets (that is 
one of the few places where migrants are welcomed). Thereafter, in April 
2013 a new plan for Athens, “Re-launching Athens” with time horizon the 
year 2020 was presented by the mayor. This ambitious concept concerns 
large-scale gentrification projects in the city center like the construction 
of commercial and habitat infrastructures, the renewal of abandoned 
building, the pedestrianization of central streets etc. The plan’s funding 
is based on the EU and private investors (it also entails the Jessica program 
and NSRF3).It is crucial here to notice the terms in which the municipality 
and certain spatial politics are related to the EU. “TRTTC” is linked to 
huge infrastructures which will alter the urban environment in favor of 
the capital and will inevitably abort the redundant population. In a similar 
spirit the “Re-activate Athens” initiative, that was presented a few months 
ago by various researchers, enjoyed the warm acceptance of the mayor.
Indeed what Lefebvre (1968: 84-85) was writing in 1968 for the 
planning developers seems rather insightful 
“They conceive and realize, without hiding it, for the market, with profit in mind 
(…) they are no longer selling houses or buildings but planning. With, or without 
ideology planning becomes an exchange value...They will build not only commercial 
centers, but also centres of privileged consumption: the renewed city.” 
The production of the city space following Kaminis “rights” and 
guidelines come to direct opposition with the thought of the French 
philosopher. In Kaminis’ ratio the city and especially the city image 
turns into commodity, a suggestion that is directly opposed to Lefebvre’s 
principles. In Kaminis case the collective oeuvre of the inhabitants refers 
to the creation of pleasant scenery to host tourists. In this context they 
create new spatialities taking as guiding principles not only major projects 
but also small scale interventions in the daily life. The contemporary 
manufacturers familiarize with tools like “the everyday life”, introduced 
from Lefebvre (1991a), but use them in order to include the city into the 
market and turn it to an antagonistic tourist spot on the map.
3 | National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) is the programming of 
European Union Funds at national level.
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2. “the Right to the cit y”:  
 contR adictions cRossings and cR acks
2.1 Contradictions of the Lefebvrian ‘Right to the cit y’ 
The more we unfold Kaminis project in theory and practice, the less 
commons it appears to share with Lefebvre’s rhetoric. Nevertheless, these 
contradictions open spaces of controversies and urge us not only to read 
again “TRTTC” but also to think critically and go beyond. To do so, we first 
have to dive in deep waters of Lefebvre’s theory and then emerge in the 
contemporary crisis’ everyday life struggles.
One of the basic notions that Lefebvre used in order to evolve his 
thought is the perception of the city as “oeuvre”. Lefebvre sought to define 
the “oeuvre” and the city, which are articulated in “TRTTC” through 
the Marx’s categories of value: use value and exchange value. Lefebvre 
(1996: 124) argues that “if one wants to go beyond the market, the law 
of exchange value, money and profit, it is necessary to define the place of 
this possibility: urban society, the city as use value”, and he (1996: 126) 
states later that the city “did not have, it has no meaning but as an oeuvre, 
as an end, as place of free enjoyment, as domain of use value”. In the 
previous quotes Lefebvre seeks the characteristics of urban society and he 
is opposed to the categories of exchange value, money and profit. However 
we argue that he misinterprets the Marxian category of use value. Lefebvre 
tends to separate the two forms of value, use value and exchange value, 
and he attributes an ontological positive status in use value, thus the social 
antagonisms in their historical context, that he previously mentions, 
are lost. But as Marx conceptualizes the categories of value and labour 
(exchange value and use value as well as concrete-useful and abstract 
labour) Lefebvre’s misinterpretation becomes clearer.
Marx in the beginning of the first volume of Capital presents the 
two factors of commodity: the use value and the exchange value and he 
argues that in the capital mode of production “in the form of society to 
be considered here they [use-values] are also the material bearers of … 
exchange-value” (Marx, 1976: 126). According to Marx the use value is 
directly linked to the useful-concrete labour and “the usefulness of a thing 
makes it a use-value” (Marx, 1976: 126). Different useful labours differ 
from each other qualitatively and not quantitatively.
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Following Marx’s analysis (Marx, 1976: 128, 132-133) the qualitatively 
different useful labours produce use values, which are the bearers of 
exchange value. Furthermore exchange value, as opposed to use value, 
concerns the quantitative relations of commodities: “exchange value 
appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which 
use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind. This 
relation changes constantly with time and place.” (Marx, 1976: 126) The 
discovery of this double character of commodities, as use values as well 
as exchange values, as qualities as well as quantities, runs throughout the 
entire work of Marx’s Capital. Illustrative is the following quote from the 
subchapter “Value-Form or Exchange-Value”: 
“commodities come into the world in the form of use-values or material goods, 
such as iron, linen, corn, etc. This is their plain, homely, natural form. However, 
they are only commodities because they have a dual nature, because they are at 
the same time objects of utility and bearers of value. Therefore they only appear as 
commodities, or have the form of commodities, in so far as they possess a double 
form, i.e. natural form and value form.” (Marx, 1976: 138) 
Marx claimed that use value comes from useful labor and later on explained 
where exchange value comes from. To do so, he analyzes the dialectical 
dual character of labor as concrete-useful labor and abstract labor. Marx 
shows that concrete labor produces use value and the abstraction of 
concrete labor that means abstract labor produces exchange value. In his 
words (1976: 129) “a use-value, or useful article, (…) has value only because 
abstract human labor is objectified or materialized in it.” Marx (1976: 310-
1) makes clear that while it is necessary for the commodities to have a 
concrete use value, however it is totally indifferent which exactly this use 
value will be. This finding is based on Marx’s conception of abstraction 
“the exchange relation of commodities is characterized precisely by its 
abstraction from their use-values(…)If we make abstraction from its use-value, 
we abstract also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use 
value. It is no longer a table, a house, (…) or any other useful thing. All its sensuous 
characteristics are extinguished. (…) With the disappearance of the useful 
character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour 
embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the 
dif ferent concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are 
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all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.” 
(Marx, 1976: 127-8) 
Consequently, the capital mode of production is based on use value, which 
is abstracted, and aims in value (exchange value) and ultimately in surplus 
value. The outcome of Marx’s analysis is that the conceptualization of 
commodity as something dual, is based on the dual character of labour, as 
concrete-useful labour as well as abstract labour; and “this point is crucial 
to an understanding of political economy” (Marx, 1976: 132)
Once we recognize this dual character, it becomes easier to understand 
the missteps of the Lefebvrian “TRTTC”. Indicatively are the following 
quotes, in which Lefebvre separates use value and exchange value and 
then he unhistorically prettifies the use value and consequently the city 
itself: 
“City and urban reality are related to use value. Exchange value and the 
generalization of commodities by industrialization tend to destroy it by 
subordinating the city and urban reality which are refuges of use value, the origin 
of a vir tual predominance and revalorization of use” (Lefebvre, 1996: 67) 
and 
“The most eminent urban creations, the most ‘beautiful’ oeuvres of urban life (we 
say ‘beautiful’, because they are oeuvres rather than products) date from epochs 
previous to that of industrialization” (Lefebvre, 1996: 65)
Lefebvre follows a ‘dangerous’ path: First, he disconnects the use value 
from exchange value and he argues that the only form of commodity is the 
exchange value. Then, he unhistorically illustrates use value as a positive 
substance, which existed before industrialization, and creates only 
“beautiful” oeuvres. And finally, he connects the city only with use value, 
hence attributes the city with the same unhistorical positivity. As a result 
of this way of thinking, Lefebvre contradicts himself with his original 
thesis, that the city is a projection of society on the ground. While this thesis 
suggests that the use values and exchange values are determined at each 
historical time by the social class antagonism, Lefebvre’s outcome is 
different.
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He repeats the same argument several times in his book and constantly 
seeks for the moments that “the use (use value) of places, monuments, 
differences, escapes the demands of exchange, of exchange value” 
(Lefebvre, 1996: 129). Since he has disconnected use value from exchange 
value, then he seeks the lost ontological primacy of use value, “use value, 
subordinated for centuries to exchange value, can now come first again. 
How?”  Although his thought it was extremely visionary on the concepts 
of city and space, he is however trapped in the supposed confrontation 
between use value and exchange value. 
Ultimately, he builds his theoretical framework “TRTTC” on the 
postulation of use values and defines as the revolutionary subject for this 
purpose the working class. In the words of Lefebvre: 
“the right to the city (…) the proclamation and realization of urban life as the rule 
of use (of exchange and encounter disengaged from exchange value) insist on 
the mastery of the economic (of exchange value, the market, and commodities) 
and consequently is inscribed within the perspectives of the revolution under the 
hegemony of the working class” (Lefebvre, 1996: 179).
2.2 From “the right to the cit y” to the occupation of the cit y
Lefebvre’s analysis in “TRTTC” has been adopted by numerous urban 
and environmental movements, NGO’s, also often co-opted by state 
institutions with respect to housing and mortgage regulation (Brenner 
et al., 2009; Leontidou, 2010; Mayer, 2009). Their common feature is the 
postulation of urban use values i.e. affordable housing, free spaces, open-
green areas, parks, bicycle lanes and generally public goods (education, 
health, energy etc.). The movements and agencies for the right to the city 
criticize the neoliberalism or the capital relationship only in the form of 
exchange value, and they ignore how the commodity value is produced 
as a unity,. The result of this tactic is that the produced or claimed use 
values, at the same time when they are defined and claimed they are 
transformed and abstracted to exchange values, hence serving as a like a 
necessary fuel for the circulation of commodities, as an inseparable unity 
of use value and exchange value. According to de Souza (2010:316-317) for 
these agencies the political-philosophical and social-theoretical premises 
could be resumed as follows: “As much social justice and environmental 
protection as possible, of course; but please let us be realistic, the time of 
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utopia has passed”. As he (2010:316) felicitously points out, the right to the 
city has the meaning that
“neoliberalism obviously is refused, but not capitalism as such (i.e. (…) [it] should, 
in the best of all cases, be replaced by a sort of “lef t-Keynesianism”, which could 
in turn be supplemented by alternative, “solidarity”-oriented economic [micro]
circuits)(…) a “participative democracy” must be achieved, and this usually means 
the following: representative democracy must be supplemented and “corrected” 
by “participation” (that is, representative “democracy”(…) .”
In contrast with the traditional movements for the right to the city, the last 
years we are witnessing a rising tide of urban revolts and mobilizations. 
In the ‘Reclaim The Streets’ movement of the late 90’s, in the uprising of 
Parisian banlieue in 2005, in Oaxaca 2006, in Athens 2008, in London 
2011 and in the recently occupied squares of Cairo, Madrid, Athens, US, 
we recognize that the rebels do not claim and do not postulate the city 
from the sovereign power but rather they occupy it and tend to transform 
it. 
What was typical of the last years’ urban conflicts in the Athenian 
metropolis was not a defensive stance against State violence but a constant 
offensive against all that resembled the presence of sovereign power. The 
struggles and revolts brought to light the rebel space and gave birth to 
a plethora of spaces and practices in the perceived-conceived-lived space. 
Furthermore they left dynamic spatial legacies that are used and enriched 
in every new moment of resistance. Several initiatives and movements 
focused to answer the crucial question of social reproduction. In Athens, 
more than fifty local decentralized neighborhood assemblies were created, 
while in all over Greece more than one hundred started organizing 
communal gardens, collective kitchens, give-away bazaars, barter 
structures, self-studying and social tutoring. Furthermore, autonomous 
labor grassroots base unions emerged, as well as unemployed networks, 
immigrant networks, agro-collectives and social structures as social 
self-organized health centers, social kindergartens and social groceries. 
The recent uprisings were accused of having no demands and no 
representatives to negotiate concrete claims, or better concrete use values. 
We claim that the passage from the famous slogan of the 60’s “be realistic, 
demand the impossible” to the slogan of the recent Occupy movement in 
US “occupy everything, demand nothing” (see Deseriis and Dean, 2012) 
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formulates a different culture of struggles and signifies a new era for the 
emancipator movements. 
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State repression, social resistance and 
the politicization of public space in Greece 
under fiscal adjustment
Maria Markantonatou
The article discusses the politicization of public space in Greece since 
the outbreak of the crisis and under the program of fiscal adjustment. 
In particular, it discusses the ways in which public space became a 
fundamental field of political action for different social forces; on the one 
hand for the governments that imposed the austerity policies since 2010 
and on the other for those who resisted such measures with protests, rallies, 
solidarity initiatives etc. In the first case, austerity and fiscal discipline 
were combined with policies of law and order and symbolic policies 
of “cleaning” the urban space of people considered as “threatening” 
(immigrants, HIV positive women, drug users). In the second case, 
several forms of resistance to austerity emerged which utilized public 
space as a field of social struggle with the state and those political forces 
that imposed austerity within a post-democratic framework of political 
decision making. As it is argued, this twofold instrumentalization of public 
space is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement”, 
illustrating a – more intense in times of crisis – conflict between the needs 
of the economy and those of the society.  
1. the sociaL iMpact of the austeRit y agReeMents
The main priorities of the agreements (“Memoranda of Understanding”) 
signed between the Greek governments and Troika (ECB, EC, IMF) since 
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the outbreak of the crisis in 2009 have been the reduction of public 
deficit, the shrinking of the public sector, plans for the privatization of the 
remaining publicly owned enterprises and state assets as well as a series of 
closures of public organizations and mergers, for instance through the so-
called “Kallikratis plan”, which dictated the merger of local communities 
in order to form larger administrative units. But, most importantly, the 
austerity policies aimed at the deregulation of labour through the “internal 
devaluation” strategy. Within four years such a strategy instituted rapid 
reductions in wages, pensions and benefits from 20% up to 50%, a barrage 
of emergency taxes and the reduction of the personnel at the public sector, 
for instance through the measure of “labour reserve” (a form of dismissal 
of employees) or the “one to ten” law, dictating that, in the public sector, 
only one person can be hired for ten retirements.
The austerity measures have put the Greek economy in a recession 
spiral and caused severe blows to labour and labour rights. Regarding 
collective agreements, it has been decided that enterprise-wide agreements 
will override sectoral and national collective agreements. This has set 
the basis for regulations favoring individual bargaining. Also, the notice 
period for dismissal and the amount of severance pay were reduced, the 
mass layoff limit was increased and the regulations concerning “unfair 
dismissal” were loosened. These measures widened the reach of labour 
flexibilization and precarization, as it is shown, for instance, by the rise (in 
the first two years of the crisis) in uninsured labour from 22.6% to 30.4% 
of the labour force in the private sector, an increase even more intense 
among immigrant workers (SEPE 2012).
Under these conditions, unemployment has skyrocketed, reaching 
28% in November 2013 (Eurostat 2014), with long term and very long term 
unemployment, as well as female and youth unemployment reaching 
shocking highs. The pauperization of the population was rapid. In only 
one year (2010-2011), the median income and poverty threshold fell by 
8% but, despite this, the population under that threshold increased still 
further, from 19 to 21% (Eurostat 2013). A series of small and medium 
enterprises, which have traditionally constituted the core of the Greek 
economy could not stand recession, lack of liquidity and increased taxes. 
As a result, more than 65.000 of such enterprises have closed down only 
in the first months of the crisis (Mylonas 2011: 8) and this number has 
since been multiplied.
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Although the austerity measures have spatially disparate effects on 
incomes, affecting the least developed regions most (Monastiriotis 2011: 
330), a general image prevails. It is that of cities and urban centers being 
strongly hit by the crisis due to the dramatic cuts and staff reductions 
in local government that have severely undermined urban and municipal 
infrastructure and caused the degradation of living standards for local 
communities and populations. In addition, emergency taxes have had 
indirect effects for the urban environment, as in Memorandum I it 
was decided that the price of heating oil should be equal to the price of 
diesel fuel. This meant a 40% increase in prices for consumers and a 
drop in consumption of heating oil by 75% in winter 2012 (Dabilis, 2013). 
Consumers turned massively to the use of electrical heating appliances 
and wood for their fireplaces and stoves. This led to a dramatic increase of 
smog and suspended particles by 200% in urban areas (ibid.), with such 
effects as allergies and respiratory problems, as well as, in some cases, 
fatal accidents. 
At the same time, familialistic strategies of home provision to younger 
members, which traditionally constituted a fundamental means of social 
reproduction supplementing poor social protection and a weak welfare 
state in Greece, are now shaken, as more and more jobs are lost, wages no 
longer suffice for hundreds of people to repay their loans, and pensions 
are drastically reduced. In such a setting, houses are abandoned or lose 
the value they had some years ago, while homelessness has increased 
dramatically (Alamanou et. al., 2011). Next to the “traditional” homeless, 
mainly consisting of poor, socially marginalized unemployed, and the 
“hidden” immigrant homelessness, now stands a new generation of 
“neohomeless”, including persons with a middle or higher educational 
background, with a former satisfactory standard of living and previously, 
of a medium social level.
Overall, the crisis and the austerity program have caused a serious 
social deregulation in the country with the number of people committing 
suicide increasing (Kentikelenis et. al., 2011), households being strongly 
hit by pauperization, the youth being unable to enter the labour market, 
thousands of people migrating to other countries, and the majority of the 
population suffering income decreases and a rapid degradation of living 
standards, within a post-democratic, technocratic governance based on 
the attempt to set market needs and priorities above the societal ones. 
Unsurprisingly, these austerity policies and the shock-therapy since 
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2010 have caused a wave of different forms of social resistance not only 
by official trade unions that reacted by means of hundreds of strikes1, 
but also by various, heterogeneous social groups that participated with 
massive numbers in a series of demonstrations and rallies. Some of the 
most characteristic forms of resistance, manifested at the urban public 
space, are summarized in the following section2. 
2. Resisting the austeRit y pRogR aM
For the manifestations of social resistance, public space did not simply 
serve purposes of visibility and representation, but became the arena of 
“radical politics” (Kallianos 2013: 549). Streets did not merely operate as 
spaces for the self-awareness and the political socialization of citizens, but 
as spaces of confrontation with the state, where “the hegemonic Other” 
was contested and “where most of the battles were fought” (ibid.: 554-555). 
One of the most important moments of social resistance to austerity was 
what became known as the “movement of the squares” that made its debut 
at the end of May 2011, in front of the Parliament building at Syntagma 
square. Within a few days, protests, popular assemblies and sit-ins spread 
to other districts of the capital and other cities with the explicit aim to deter 
the vote of the Midterm Fiscal Strategy (a package of austerity measures to 
cope with unmet fiscal targets of the previous year). 
During a general strike on June 15, 2011, the protesters managed 
to retain control of Syntagma square, despite heavy police repression 
sufficiently severe to be criticized by Amnesty International (2011a). This 
kind of resistance strengthened the dynamics of the protest. However, 
the next general strike of June 28-29, 2011, and the encirclement of the 
Parliament called for by the Greek “Indignants” did not prevent the 
approval of the Midterm Fiscal Strategy and the protesters, once again, 
1 | For instance, only in 2011, there have been 91 strikes in the public sector 
and 240 in the private sector – mostly within firms but also across professional 
categories or whole sectors or branches of the economy (Katsoridas/Lampousaki 
2012).
2 | For instance, the rally that took place in Athens during the general strike 
on 19.-20.10.2011 has been estimated to be the largest in the last for ty years 
(Katsoridas/Lampousaki 2012). 
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faced violent repression and clashed with the police (see Amnesty 
International 2011b). The movement faded a month later, but open popular 
assemblies continued to operate in other districts of Athens and other 
cities across the country until at least the next year (Pantazidou 2012: 12). 
At the same time, several other practices were set in motion, such as 
the occupation of social spaces (e.g. the continuation of the public national 
TV broadcaster by its staff, and transmission via the internet, after the 
government announced its closure and the dismissal of hundreds of 
employees, leading to continuous protests outside the broadcaster’s central 
premises for many weeks; the occupation of the local general hospital at 
the district of Kilkis and its re-opening on the basis of self-management 
and free health care); grassroots initiatives and informal citizen networks to 
provide relief from some of the effects of the crisis (e.g. social kitchens for the 
cooking and distribution of free food to unemployed, homeless, immigrants 
etc., social clinics and social pharmacies established by doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists as a response to the dramatic degradation of the public health 
system due to spending cuts, closures or merger of health units, services of 
free tutoring etc.), and local exchange networks (e.g. exchange of services 
or products, either mediated by new virtual currencies or directly in a 
barter-like fashion or in the form of give away, free of charge initiatives) 
(for an overview of the new initiatives, movements etc. see Filopoulou 2012, 
Wainwright 2013, Malkoutzis 2013, Oikonomides 2013).
Notably, since the outbreak of the crisis, the tendency to present 
various problems, economic or social, as problems of “security” against a 
series of heterogeneous “threats” has intensified. For the Eurozone elites, 
the Greek “disease” had to be cured by the program of fiscal discipline, 
in order to avoid “contagion” of the “virus”. For the justification of the 
treatment, several narratives were used, e.g. about Greece as a rent-seeking 
society living beyond its means (Markantonatou, 2013). But the politics 
of stigmatization were equally implemented at the domestic level, with 
public space serving as a field of state repression. As specific social groups 
and individuals such as migrants, HIV positive women and drug users 
were defined in different contexts as “threats” to society, the arguments 
about the need for fiscal adjustment were combined with strategies of law 
and order and securitization, for which the rhetoric of scapegoating and 
social stigmatization were used. Some of the ways in which the program 
of fiscal adjustment and austerity was combined with politics of law and 
order are described in the following section.
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3. goveRning pubLic space by scapegoating
Since December 2008, when three weeks of protests and unrest spread 
throughout the country after a 15-year-old high school student was shot 
dead by a policeman, policies were implemented to empower the police 
forces, by increasing their number and establishing new units. By 2010, 
a new special corps was formed, often consisting of former military staff 
with a nationalist orientation. This explains to a certain degree the political 
preferences for the neo-Nazi group ‘Golden Dawn’ within the police force 
(To Vima 2012a), as well as the tolerance towards actions of racist activism 
of several so called “residents’ committees” in certain areas of Athens (e.g. 
closing down a playground visited by migrants, anti-migrant patrol groups, 
attacks towards offices of ethnic communities etc.) (see Kandylis and 
Kavoulakos 2011: 158-159). Since the outbreak of the crisis, this tolerance 
became compatible with the hardening of the official migratory policy, as 
shown, for instance, by the construction of a 12,5 kilometer fence along 
Greece’s North borders in order to prevent migrants entering the country, 
or by the increase of the percentage of foreign prisoners in Greek prisons, 
rising from 48% in 2008 to 63% in 2012 (Ministry of Justice 2014). 
In the conjuncture of the economic crisis, in which the government’s 
power to decide on the most important dimensions of economic policy 
shrunk drastically, the rhetoric of national sovereignty and internal 
security was revived, as shown, for example, by the central role that 
migration politics had in the 2012 pre-electoral campaign. This was, 
actually, the case not only for the neo-Nazi political group ‘Golden Dawn’ 
with their slogan “to clean the filth [the migrants] from the city”, but also 
for the social democratic party PASOK which, for instance, linked the risk 
of robberies to the poor living conditions of immigrants and the supposed 
threat posed by the latter to public health (Xenakis and Cheliotis 2013: 
301). Similarly, the right-wing’s Nea Demokratia pre-electoral campaign 
was based on the demand, as the party’s president, A. Samaras (see Vima 
2012b) put it, to “take our cities back from migrants”. His campaign 
was also based on two promises; the first was to “deport immediately all 
illegal migrants”, and the second, to renegotiate the Memoranda austerity 
agreements. While the latter was hardly realized or even discussed after 
the elections, several measures were taken for the former. 
Indeed, some months after the election of Nea Demokratia as a 
leading governmental party, the so called “Operation Xenios Zeus”, 
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ironically named after the ancient Greek God of hospitality, was carried 
out in several Greek cities. Within one year, more than 80.000 migrants 
were detained and transferred to empty factories, military camps and 
police stations for paper checks and interrogations. After being subjected 
to several processes of identification and control, migrants were released, 
until the next unannounced “stop and search” check. Notably, Human 
Rights Watch (2013) criticized the Xenios Zeus operation for police 
brutality and stressed that finally only 6% of those inspected were illegal 
immigrants, despite the government’s polemic language against “illegal 
migration”. 
As Agamben (2005: 14) has described in detail, the tendency towards 
the generalization of the security paradigm as a technique of governance 
is characteristic of today’s societies. In the case of Greece, the new 
emphasis on social control, law and order and policing has been part of 
the broader agenda of the “state of emergency” that has been more or less 
implicitly declared during the crisis by the different governments that 
imposed the austerity policies. In specific cases, the state of emergency 
mobilized the exercise of a biopolitical power for heterogeneous aims and 
combined for instance medical care for public health with a need to “clean 
the city” from people defined as threatening or morbid. According to the 
government’s narrative, this kind of “cleaning” would benefit tourism and 
entrepreneurial activity and, supposedly, the Greek economy. The basic 
function, however, of the state of emergency was social disciplination and 
the making of social order in times of unrest.
Characteristically, during the May 2012 pre-electoral campaign and 
amidst one of the most serious financial crises of the last decades, there 
was a wave of arrests of HIV positive sex workers, broadcasted live on 
television. While authorities had hardly been interested in the issue for 
many years, there was suddenly an intense campaign of demonization of 
the HIV positive women held in custody who were described in several 
mass media as “dirty”, “sick” and “dangerous” and were further blamed 
for the image of decadence of the Athens city center. According to A. 
Loverdos, Minister of Health at that time, these prostitutes “had to be 
deported immediately”, because “they harmed the institution of family”. 
Some days before the crucial 2012 elections, he stated that “the virus is 
transferred from the illegal woman directly to the Greek family” (see 
PICUM, 2012). Photos, names, age, land of origin and details about the 
womens’ and their parents’ life histories were shown in newspapers and 
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on television, while a series of police press releases warned about this new 
“state of emergency”.
The method of penalization of HIV positive women was soon extended 
to other groups of people that were considered as threatening. “Operation 
Thetis”, a joint action between the Greek police and the Hellenic Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention of the Ministry of Health conducted 
in 2013 and named after the Greek goddess of Justice, targeted drug users 
in a spirit similar to that of “Operation Xenios Zeus”. Drug users were 
treated as a kind of urban virus to be cured by the police in cooperation 
with several agents of public health. Aim of the operation was “to gather 
drug addicts who wandered in the city center and transfer them to police’s 
concentration infrastructure in order to conduct a census”, as well as 
to “clear” the city center from people who were “using drugs in public” 
(see OKANA, 2013). In this frame, hundreds of drug users were arrested 
and taken to distant detention centers where they were obliged to take a 
medical examination, and then were released (see Exiles in Balkans, 2013).
One more strategy of the governments that imposed the austerity 
measures, especially of the conservative Nea Demokratia, was to present 
several leftist forms of protest as equally “extreme” and “dangerous” 
for the political system and democracy as those tactics of the neo-Nazi 
group Golden Dawn. This “theory of the two extremes”, as the term was 
established in the Greek mass media discussion, suggested that both 
leftist and neo-fascist political forces attempted to challenge the state’s 
authority and put the country in a course of political destabilization. As 
racist physical violence exerted on migrants by neo-fascists was equated 
with leftist protests against austerity , the government attempted to appear 
as the sole guarantor of the country’s constitutional order and political 
stability. 
This is also how the police operations against squats were justified. 
The Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection, N. Dendias, required 
the police to “reoccupy squats” and stressed that “law and order is neither 
a governmental agenda, nor a political slogan, but it is a constitutional 
obligation and right of every Greek citizen” (see Ta Nea, 2013). In this 
period, from late 2012 to the end of September 2013, police raided and 
closed down various squats in the cities of Athens, Thessaloniki, Patra 
and Ioannina. Dozens of people were detained and many of them arrested. 
Since then, the government of Nea Demokratia has been using this “theory 
of the two extremes” not only as an argument against the major leftwing 
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opposition, but also as a means of social disciplination against protesters, 
squatters and others who were presented in the public discourse as people 
in conflict with the law, causing anomie and challenging the constitutional 
order, similar to the actions of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn.
4. concLuding ReMaRks
Karl Polanyi used the term “double movement” to describe a conflictual 
interplay or tension between economy and society that he understood 
as inherent in market liberalism. He defined the “double movement” 
as “the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them 
setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite 
social forces and using its own distinctive methods” (Polanyi 2001: 138). 
The first organizing principle, economic liberalism, was supported by 
entrepreneurial classes and aimed at the establishment of a self-regulating 
market. The second principle concerned social protection for all those 
disadvantaged by the market and aimed at the conservation of man, 
nature and society. Polanyi set the double movement in the historical 
context of 19th century’s liberalism when a “Great Transformation”, as he 
called it in his homonymous book, took place. This transformation started 
with a marketization process that followed the abolition, in 1834, of the 
Speenhamland system that had managed to keep wages low by means 
of allowances proportional to the price of wheat. With the abolition of 
Speenhamland and the Poor Law reform, the poor were entitled to an 
allowance, only if committed to the workhouses, which in the meantime, 
had become places of social coercion and immiseration. These measures, 
which led to an unprecedented pauperization, aimed at the establishment 
of a competitive labour market no longer at a local level, but at a national 
one and set the basis for the expansion of capitalism. According to 
Polanyi (ibid: 3), this ‘great transformation’ ended with the “collapse of 
the nineteenth century civilization”, as he put it, during the 1930s crisis.
However, the gradual deregulation of the welfare state and the attack 
on labour rights since the mid-1970s disproves Polanyi’s view that the 
vision of a self-regulating market was over with the 1930s crash. Four 
decades of neoliberalization have shown that the vision of self-regulating 
markets has not been exhausted. This is observable also in the frame of the 
Eurozone, having a neoliberal orientation already since its establishment. 
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Especially since 2010, when measures were deployed, ranging from the 
socialisation of bank losses to the imposition of austerity packages and 
fiscal discipline in several countries of the Eurozone and more intensively 
in Greece, this neoliberal orientation broadened. The Eurozone’s elites did 
not challenge the doctrine of the self-regulating market, the consequences 
of which have been described by Polanyi. On the contrary, these elites 
rushed to deepen its institutional setting as shown, for instance, by the 
Six Pact in October 2011 or the Fiscal Compact in December 2011, which 
dictate automatic sanctions in case of non-compliance with the Eurozone’s 
rules of fiscal discipline. 
If Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” is understood as an 
ideal-type, it can then be set in the historical conjuncture of the crisis 
in Greece, in which it acquires a clear spatial dimension. For market 
supporters and political forces imposing fiscal discipline, public space 
served as a strategic means to promote an unprecedented neoliberal 
shock-therapy through strategies of social disciplination. For those social 
groups hit by the crisis and those dependent on the remaining welfare 
state and with no other option than to resist the austerity measures, public 
space became an arena of conflict and struggle with the state as well as a 
field for social solidarity. The forms of social resistance in Greece, though 
heterogeneous or fragmented as they often have been, express in their 
complexity, mutatis mutandis, what Polanyi described as the “realistic 
self-protection of society” and are to be added to the overall history of the 
“universal ‘collectivist’ reaction against the expansion of market economy 
(…)” (Polanyi 2001: 157).
How a “double movement” develops further in the Greek context, 
as the crisis in unfolding, or how such a counter-movement is to be 
interpreted are open questions. Whether forces struggling for more 
market liberalization, labour flexibilization and welfare deregulation will 
prevail, and under what conditions, over those fighting for social rights 
and democracy depends on social struggle and pressure put on the state. 
As an outcome of the crisis, public space is being politicized, although 
this does not mean it did not have a political dimension before the crisis. 
On the contrary, public space has always been political. In the conjuncture 
of the crisis, however, public space has become one of the most crucial 
and urgent stakes for conflicting social actors, a site where the demands 
of those resisting are articulated in order to emerge as the fundamental 
responses to the crisis and neoliberal austerity.
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Portugal

Planning and governance in the Portuguese 
cities in times of European crisis
João Seixas and José Carlos Mota
This chapter aims at analysing the impacts of the European crisis and 
its main responses in Portuguese city-regions; and to examine the 
correspondent development of spatial planning instruments and public 
policies for urban development. There are proposed several insights to an 
already widely open discussion. Particularly on how territorial dimensions 
– and namely the urban realms – show to be relevant to the interpretation 
of the European crisis and its consequences; over its vast and differentiated 
spatial impacts as well on the conflicts resulting from the intersection 
of the reactions of the different political stances (Hadjimichalis, 2011; 
Werner, 2013).
These are being particularly painful times for Southern European 
territories and societies; due to the conjunction of the financial crisis 
that perceivably started in 2008, and the following European and several 
nation-states political responses. The main political reaction was to put 
in place austerity measures that deeply disrupted social, economic and 
territorial tissues; driving attention towards if the crisis is not anymore – if 
it ever was – mainly due to public and financial reasons – having instead 
multidimensional and structural sociopolitical bases.
To analyse the territorial performances and responses here under 
subject, two political and administrative levels were considered: a 
functional regional one, where the focus was on the Metropolitan Area 
of  Lisbon and the Intermunicipal Community of the Region of Aveiro; 
and a municipal one, where the focus was on its correspondent inner 
cities, Lisbon and Aveiro. These two regions represent two somewhat 
similar and differentiated realities. Both cities have relevant scientific and 
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technological system units and high foreign exposure (economic, social 
and cultural internationalization) and can be seen as interesting examples 
of innovative approaches towards crisis impacts. 
In analysing the impact of the European crisis, key indicators 
were considered: unemployment, poverty, social deprivation, political 
instability, cuts, public debt of local authorities and the central state; this 
being sought to realize the extent of the crisis impacts as well as resilience 
and responsive factors.
For analysing the instruments, main public policies for development 
and spatial planning were considered at the regional level (in particular 
the guidelines for European funding periods 2007/2013 and 2014/2020) 
as well as the municipal level (urban regeneration or socio-economic 
programs). Furthermore, focusing was made on the integration of different 
local actors and the way they were mobilised to tackle the crisis. Finally, 
urban planning instruments and its changes were also under analysis. 
1. poRtuguese cities and uRban de veLopMent in tiMes  
 of euRope an cRisis 
1.1 CONTE X TS1
The 2008 financial crisis marked the beginning of a profound change in 
Portuguese society and politics. Portugal was already suffering through 
the first decade of the century, major shocks that had a profound impact 
in its ability to compete internationally: for adopting a strong currency, 
the Euro; for suffering the impacts of global liberalisation and on Chinese 
exports on traditional Portuguese export markets; for receiving the oil and 
energy shocks since mid-2000. All this lead to the so-called “lost decade” 
(as it was commonly termed by media) for Portuguese economy; none 
withstanding several focuses of innovation and neo-modernity in the 
country. From 2000 to 2010, Portuguese GDP grew at an annual average 
1 | This section, as well as the sections that analyze Lisbon region in its 
geographical and sociopolitical developments since 2008, owns much to the 
data collection and correspondent analytical work made by Simone Tulumello, 
Susana Corvelo and Ana Drago. The authors wish to strongly thank their work and 
permission in this use.
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rate of only 1%; and the country seems to have been answering to these 
shocks through a progressive shift towards an economic model grounded 
on low wages – and growing inequality – rather than investments in 
sectors with high added value (Reis and Rodrigues, 2011).
The Troika’s (the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank) 
therapy consisted mainly on a supposedly neo-classical or neo-liberal 
agenda for the country. It included the obligation towards drastic cuts 
in public spending and public investment as well as in restructuring 
and liberalisation policies. State administration, public services and 
public salaries were to be strongly reduced, as well as public spending in 
fundamental areas as health, education, poverty and inequality reduction 
and unemployment benefits. A mix of tax increase was imposed over 
work and pensions revenues as well on consumption. A vast privatization 
program was implemented in strategic economic sectors as transport, 
energy and communications, postal services, airports.
The main social and economic effects of the “adjustment program” 
carried out from the bailout in 2011 cannot be understated: since then, 
Portuguese GDP felt 5,9% and is expected to fall again in 2014. In 
2013, private consumption has returned to the levels of 2000, public 
consumption has fallen to the figures of 2002. As far as (both public 
and private) investment rates are concerned, there is no memory (i.e. no 
statistical data) of such a collapse. In the first trimester of 2013, the net 
investment in Portuguese economy was 20% lower than in 1995 (Abreu et 
al., 2013). From 2011 to 2013 national available income dropped 4%, whereas 
work income suffered a significant reduction of 9,7%2. These figures can 
be interpreted as a lowering-wage pressure typical of a recessive economy, 
but were certainly induced both by government continuous wage cuts in 
public sector since 2010, and the effects of massive unemployment.
1.2 The crisis in the Lisbon region
The focus is here given to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) recent 
performances on economic, territorial and social dimensions, and on 
interpreting the effects of the Eurozone crisis and its political reactions, 
through correspondent data analyses. First of all, evidence will confirm that 
exist a strong relationship between the performance of the metropolitan 
2 | Elaboration of authors on data Pordata (www.pordata.pt/).
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region and the national context. But further on: it will be proposed that 
within this correlation, there were developed two markedly different 
impact periods; and maybe a third one, recently starting.
As relevant concentrational territory, it is no surprise that LMA recent 
evolution has been strongly affected by the economic crisis and subsequent 
austerity measures, both by European and national politics. Nonetheless, 
this happens in apparently contradictory ways. When taking into account 
the years prior to and after the beginning of the implementation of austerity 
measures (since mid-end of 2010), the Regional Development Composite 
Index, on its competitiveness component, shows a slight improvement 
pattern, clearly contradicted by cohesion and environmental quality 
effects, which affect the overall index, with clear downward consequences. 
A more careful analysis helps to understand this apparent competitiveness 
recovery. All variables – per capita GDP, qualified personnel, exports 
growth, RandD intensity or the prevalence of knowledge intensive 
activities – in LMA outperform country’s average, are less reactive taking 
into account the LMA specialization profile3, where an internal market 
dependence is markedly balanced by the exports profile; thus giving a 
sense of growth while the behaviour of macroeconomic variables is not 
so positive.
During what here is called the first phase of the economic crisis (2007/8-
2009/10), a moderate growth occurred in the LMA, as economy started to 
contract. The predominance of service sectors and tourism activities in 
the region seemed to contribute to balance economic depressors which 
started to become evident after 2008. But during a second phase, just 
after 2010, performance differences showed to be quite evident, with both 
cohesion and environmental components starting to lower and the overall 
regional index being mostly affected.
3 | According to its GVA, the Lisbon Region specializes in services, transport and 
logistics, energy and environment, tourism, chemical, electronic and mechanical 
industries.
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Table 1 – Regional Development Composite Index
RDCI Competitiveness Cohesion
Environmental 
Quality
Portugal 100 100 100 100
Lisbon Metropolitan 
Area (LMA)
2011 105,33 113,26 103,99 98,01
2010 106,48 113,93 104,64 100,20
2008 106,79 113,18 106,57 100,00
2006 107,21 113,01 107,78 100,27
Portugal: 100.  Data from INE
The analysis of further economic performance variables helps to 
understand the real effects of the economic crisis and then of the austerity 
measures: major private and (especially) public investment drops, while 
the austerity discourses grew together with cuts in public spending to 
supposedly restore competitiveness. In these senses, the numbers are 
quite expressive: Gross Fixed Capital Formation drops by almost 20% 
from 2008 to 2011. Around 65.000 companies (17, 6%) have disappeared 
between 2008 and 2012, shifting the survival rate under national average.
The LMA is today a densely urbanized system, however considerably 
fragmented and with difficult capacity to a clear multipolar capacity; this 
being the result of several decades of urbanisation economies prevalence. 
This is quite noticeable on the levels of growth in terms of inhabitants 
and dwelling stock. According to the last census, between 2001 and 2011, 
a 6% population growth was reflected into a growth of the built area of 
around 14, 2%. Being the real estate and construction sector one of the 
first to suffer with the crashes and the crisis anticipation movements, 
as can be clearly seen on the significant drop on building sale contracts. 
After a sustained growth in the early 2000s, construction works dropped 
by half in a few years (2007 to 2012) in the Lisbon area and Setúbal 
peninsula (southern part of the metropolitan region). It is to be said that 
the 2007/8 financial breakdown intervened in processes already ongoing: 
building sale contracts stop growing in 2006, because of the burst of the 
construction bubble and growing effectiveness of planning regulations.
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Figure 1 – Construction and real estate in LMA
Data from INE
At the same time, mortgage insolvencies were rising by 49,5% from 2009 to 
2013. The political discourse of recent years, both at European level and by the 
Portuguese government since 2011, underpinning the blame of Portuguese 
economic and fiscal crisis on families for their excessive indebtedness, can 
largely be explained by the lack of an overall public housing policy for decades. 
In 2010 housing loans accounted for 80% of family indebtedness, and 
homeownership was encouraged by tax benefits and a state-subsidized credit 
system for house purchase that lasted for more than 30 years until 2010. This 
pervasive system created a specific articulation, linking state policies, family 
investments/indebtedness, and credit-financial institutions (Santos, 2013).
LMA is a highly qualified region in European average terms, 
concentrating the biggest university poles in the country, the highest number 
of RandD centres and a considerable number of innovative companies. With 
a 16,8% of inhabitants having high education degrees (against 11,8% national 
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average), and a slight increase in young people population, it is nonetheless 
an ageing region with birth rates dropping and where over the last ten years, 
the elderly (65 years old and more) rose from a 15,4%, to a 18,2% weight 
in the overall population, already considering the balance of a fairly young 
immigrant population. These trends are just as significant as we look at 
labour market figures and their aggravated behaviour throughout the crisis 
development. In fact, the effects of the crisis and political responses are 
deeply clear here, with a reduction of ~180.000 employees between 2008 
and 2013. Even though the region accompanies the country’s trends, the 
aggravated effect in LMA is evident when taking in consideration the 
unemployment figures. The unemployment rate in the LMA more than 
doubled in the 2008-2013 period (from 7,9% to 17,3%), a growth than became 
steeper since the 2011 bailout, confirming the depressing effects of austerity 
politics in macroeconomic variables. Particularly, youth unemployment rate 
grew from 16,9% in 2007 to 22,7% in 2010; then booming to 42,4% in 2013. 
The numbers of registered unemployment at public employment services 
figures, which gives a monthly picture and allows capturing trends more 
quickly, is also consistent with these findings: registered unemployment in 
LMA started to rise at a low pace just after 2008, growing drastically after 
2010/11, when cut off measures by central government started.
Figure 2 – Unemployment rate and beneficiaries of Social Integration 
Income (SII) (No.)
Data from INE; II/MSESS (http://www4.seg-social.pt/estatisticas)
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Other relevant analysis concerns income inequalities and poverty rates. 
Poverty risk rapidly grew since 2009, rapidly inverting a slightly positive 
trend traced since the beginning of the decade by steady social policies. 
According to the 2013 EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
survey on 2012 income data for Portugal (no regional poverty data are 
available), 18,7% of the population was at risk of poverty after social 
transfers, against 17,9% in 2009. The growth is much more significant 
using a time-anchored rate4. The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate for the unemployed 
population in the country was of 40,2% in 2012, a rise of almost 4 points 
when compared to 2009. Under the austerity agenda, a renewed rise of 
asymmetry in income distribution since 2010 has reverted the trends of 
the last decade. Considering the beneficiaries of the Social Integration 
Income (social security benefit for poorer families) in LMA, there has 
been a strong increase (approximately 66%) in the first phase of crisis. 
Since 2010 onwards, however, the austerity measures5 produced a drastic 
reduction in these figures, in paradoxical contrast with the contextual rise 
in unemployment.
The austerity measures and the lowering of wages and family income 
also strongly affected one of the most important dimensions of urban life: 
mobility. The urban mobility and transportation effects of the crisis are 
particularly serious in a quite unstructured urbanised region like LMA 
is. Lisbon metropolis is characterised by huge daily commuting and semi-
polycentric travels; with for instance its main core, Lisbon-city (with a 
population of circa 600.000 residents) having normally a daily duplication 
of its inhabitants. Between 2008 and 2010, the numbers of urban and 
suburban travels in LMA public transports have been considerably stable; 
but then a 23% drop was to be experienced for the 2010-2012 period. This 
sharp reduction of travellers happens when the purchasing power loss 
4 | At-Risk-of-Poverty rate is statistically dependent on a percentage of the 
national average income. When national average income is reduced, as it has 
happened in the present context, the at-risk-rate income is reduced as well. To 
avoid this misleading effect, some experts have experimented a “time-anchoring” 
analysis, using 2009 national average income as benchmark (see Rede Europeia 
anti-pobreza, Portugal, http://www.eapn.pt/documentos_visualizar.php?ID=322).
5 | The measure, called “condição de recursos” and imposed by the first national 
austerity package (known as PEC 1) in response to the EU demands, imposed cuts 
on beneficiaries with property ownership evidence, through fiscal analysis.
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effect is aggravated with cutbacks in public metropolitan transport offer; 
paralleled by significant fare increases (~24%, 2010-2012) decided not by 
local but by central government.
Table 2 – Poverty and Deprivation Indicators (EU-SILC 2010-2013)
2009 2010 2011
2012 (esti-
mated)
At Risk of Poverty Rate before Social Trans-
fers (%)
43,4 42,5 45,4 46,9
At Risk of Poverty Rate after Social Transfers 
(%)
17,9 18,0 17.9 18,7
Time-anchored At Risk of Poverty Rate (refer-
ence income=2009) (%)
17,9 19,6 21,3 24,7
Severe Material Deprivation (%) 9,0 8,3 8,6 10,9
At Risk Of Poverty Population (%) 25,3 24,4 25,3 27,4
Gini Coefficient 33,7 34,2 34,5 34,2
Inequality on Income Distribution (S80/
S20)
5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0
Inequality on Income Distribution (S90/S10) 9,2 9,4 10,0 10,7
Data from INE/Eurostat. Po: estimated value
Finally, migration flows were also analysed; as mirror for socioeconomic 
capabilities of the territory under question. From 2010 onwards, there is 
a complete inversion of migration trends in the LMA: immigration flows 
fall drastically – the values of 2012 being half of those in 2009 – whilst 
emigration – especially among young people – rises abruptly in only 3 
years. In 2012, it was three times higher than in 2009, forming a negative 
demographic balance for the first time in the decade.
Having analysed in this section the impact of economic crisis in 
LMA through a set of socioeconomic and urban indicators; some relevant 
conclusions can be made. Regional and local data evidences on the Lisbon 
Region, suggests that rather than a simplistic ‘crisis approach’, a series of 
differentiated causes and consequences have followed the global financial 
breakdown. Two main temporal phases are to be highlighted. In the first 
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phase the long-wave of the structural financial and ecological crisis affects 
strongly the economic areas mostly dependent on urbanisation and space 
production. In this phase, and as main urban and diversified hub for the 
country, the LMA seems to show some resilience; albeit increasing internal 
polarization. The second phase, marked by the implementation of national 
austerity policies, and then with renewed vigour with the 2011 bailout; 
configures the widening of the impacts over vaster areas of the social and 
urban and metropolitan fabric. The effects are now particularly strong 
over middle-classes, public employees, as well as increasing pressures on 
poverty-risk and elderly populations. The correlation between the austerity 
measures and the social impacts of the crisis are evident; and here more 
in-depth analyses will be necessary in order to accurately discern the main 
drivers and its effects.
However, a third phase now seems to be showing. The recent 
migration trends, boosting drainage of not only poor as well as younger 
and skilled people, prefigures a potential third crisis-effect to come, in the 
form of a skills and demographic depression. Nonetheless, the statistical 
data available is not still complete for a clear picture of the complexity of 
localised trends.
1.3 The crisis in the Aveiro region
Starting from the general framework of the region of Aveiro, an effort 
was made to understand the consequences of the crisis and the austerity 
policies of recent years (2008-2013) for the social, economic and urban 
dynamics and to identify the most worrying signs. Looking at the region 
of Aveiro in the national context, it can be noted that this is the sixth most 
populous Intermunicipal community (which roughly corresponds to 
a NUTS III and therefore is an intermediate level between the regional 
administration and the municipalities), with about 380,000 inhabitants. 
It is followed by the Ave, Cávado, Tâmega, Setúbal Peninsula and the 
Algarve, excluding the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto.
This territory has a pattern of scattered land use, developed around 
the lagoon area of the Ria de Aveiro. It is served by a good road, rail 
and port infrastructure, connecting it to the main urban centres (Porto 
and Lisbon), Europe (A25) and the world, which enables a good overall 
economic performance and exporting capacity (Dispersed City Project, 
UA/DGOTDU, 2009).
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Figure 3 – Populational Density by NUTS III in Portugal 
Source: INE, Censos 2011
Analysing the period between 2001 and 2011, the amount of built houses 
has increased 19%, which is higher when compared to the national average 
(which was 17%) or the increase witnessed in Greater Lisbon region (15%). 
Much of this trend in the region is a consequence of the construction of 
single family housing in single-storey buildings, which occurred mainly 
in suburban parishes with above average construction rates between 2001 
and 2011 (EDT 2014-2020, CIRA, 2013). The amount of vacant housing 
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between 2001 and 2011 has increased 50% in Aveiro region (12% of the 
total housing), which is well above the average in Lisbon region (26% 
increase, 13% of the total housing) and Portugal (35% increase, 13% of the 
total housing).  
The mobility pattern in the region is characterized by a predominance 
of trips done by personal transport (53%), which is similar to National 
and European average values. The motorisation rate is 502 vehicles/1000 
inhabitants and has increased 42% (2003-2012), at a much higher rate 
than the national average (26%). The fact that 40% of these trips lasted 
up to 5 minutes suggest that there is a significant margin for developing 
alternative modes (PIMTRA, 2012).
Regarding mobility patterns, Baixo Vouga (the NUTS III which 
approximately corresponds to the Intermunicipal Region of Aveiro) has a 
relevant particularity, is the Portuguese sub-region where most people use 
bike regularly – this value is eight times higher than the national average 
– 3.9% vs 0.5% (Census 2011). In the Murtosa municipality, which is part 
of this sub-region, this figure is even higher (17%) and comes closer to 
Danish than to Portuguese average values. Further, the importance of 
bike use in this territory can be assessed by the bike industry located in 
Águeda (another municipality of the region) and the public bike system 
of Aveiro (BUGA), which was the first to be implemented in Portugal and 
one of the first in Europe (in 2000). Furthermore, more than half of the 
population has a bike at home (535 bicycles per thousand inhabitants), 
which is higher than the average rate of motorization of the region’s 
municipalities. Although this propensity for bike usage is not directly 
linked to the crisis, it provides conditions for developing other measures 
of urban policy.
In the region, 80% of the total population lives within 250 meters 
of a road served by collective transport. Still, it has a modal split for the 
collective transport of about 4.7%, well below the national average of 
22%, but close to that found in regions with similar pattern of settlement. 
Nevertheless, in the main urban centre (Aveiro) the values  are lower 
than expected. The ones using public transport (road) are mainly women 
(60%), young people (46%) and seniors (20%) (PIMTRA 2012).
In the case of municipal public road transport, in the period from 
2005 to 2010 there was a decrease in the number of passengers. In 2011 
there was a very sharp drop in all public transport availability indicators, 
with fewer vehicles/km and places/km, reflecting the troubled finances 
Planning and governance in the Por tuguese cit ies 227
of the municipality and the transportation company (Municipal Mobility 
Plan of Aveiro, CMA, 2011).
Figure 4
Source: UA, PTD 2014-2020
Focusing the analysis on productive fabric, it can be concluded that the 
region’s companies are mostly micro, small and medium sized, represent 
about 6.7% of the national companies (INE, 2009), and are strongly 
export oriented, particularly in industries such as footwear, automobile 
components, habitat, ceramics, bikes, agro-food, moulds, electronics 
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and telecommunications with two distinct sectors: one more connected 
to primary products (focusing on early segments of the value chain) or 
unqualified labour (such as furniture or wood); and one based on greater 
product differentiation and that has a significant export potential and 
dynamism (metallurgy or ceramics) (Augusto Mateus, 2005). 
This pattern explains its national relevance, representing 15% of the 
national GVA (Gross Value Added), the third region of the country, after 
Porto and Lisbon, and one of the major exporting regions of the country, 
representing 13% of the total national exports and amounting to EUR 4.7 
billion, with a rate of coverage of imports by exports of 81.6%, while in the 
country this figure reaches almost 140%.
Figure 5
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Source: PORDATA (http://www.pordata.pt/Municipios/
Ambiente+de+Consulta/Gr%C3%A1fico)
The good performance of the region’s companies may be related to their 
innovative capacity, measured by the fact that 10% of the total national 
companies certified to ISO 9001 and 14000 belong to the region of Aveiro 
(AIDA Yearbook, 2013).
Despite the crisis and the high number of dissolved companies (273 
companies), which peaked in 2009 and was particularly high in the 
commercial sector but also in accommodation, catering, transport, storage 
and repair of vehicles, the number of companies created was even higher, 
with a positive balance of 41, which far outweighs the national balance. 
The sectors that have a better balance (between those created or dissolved) 
are related to health and social support, finance and insurance activities 
and consulting, scientific and technical activities (EDT 2014-2020 CIRA, 
2013).  According to the Aveiro Region Territorial Development Strategy 
2014-2020 (CIRA, 2013) there is currently a “reconfiguration of the 
productive fabric of the region with a significant number of bankruptcies 
in traditionally important sectors, particularly manufacturing, and the 
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emergence of firms in sectors with more embedded knowledge, such as 
scientific and technical consulting”.
Despite this generally positive economic environment, the significant 
increase in unemployment in the region, between 2001 and 2011 the 
unemployment rate in the region increased considerably above the 
national average (there are about 20,500 unemployed people), makes it 
possible to infer that “the businesses that are being established are far 
from creating the same amount of jobs than those who have disappeared” 
(EDT 2014-2020 CIRA, 2013).
Recent data shows that unemployment in the region rose from 6.8% 
to 8.2% (2008-2012), compared with 7.0% and 9.6% at the national level 
in the same years. It peaked at 17.6% (in January 2013) and is currently 
at 14.6% (April 2014). Another serious problem is youth unemployment 
which currently reaches 37.7% nationally (February 2014), with the 
highest values in the mainland in the Lisboa e Vale do Tejo region (45.5%) 
and the lowest values in the mainland in the Centre region (31%).
One of the main investments of the region has been the qualification 
of its human resources. It hosts important units related to RandD and 
the Scientific and Technological System of national and international 
relevance, in particular the University of Aveiro, one of the most country’s 
most renowned universities, ranked as the “66th best university in 
the world with less than 50 years and the best English” (Times Higher 
Education Ranking 2013), PT Innovation (the national research centre of 
Portugal Telecom, which is being merged with the Oi group in Brazil) 
and the headquarters of the ICT cluster (62 member companies, which 
represent an aggregated turnover of 365 million Euros, employ around 
3617 employees, most of which have a higher education degree (over 70%) 
(INOVARIA Auditors Report, 2012). Although the effort and the overall 
training levels have increased substantially in recent years, “the regional 
labour market has not been able to absorb this labour-force at the same 
rate, generating qualified unemployment ”(EDT 2014-2020 CIRA, 2013).
In response to the difficulty of integrating this labour force, there has 
been an increased emigration, especially of young active population. With 
no data on migration in the region, it is estimated that since 2008 about 
500.000 Portuguese nationals have left the country, which is similar 
to the migrations levels of the 60, and exceeds the amount of births. A 
recent study by the Centre for Emigration, based on national censuses 
of 2001 and 2011, from the Eurostat, notes that the migration to the 
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UK has quadrupled in this century (Centre for Emigration, 2014). This 
phenomenon, beyond the problems related to the loss of skilled working-
age population, also has a serious impact on the birth rates, since it is also 
the most fertile population that migrates the most.
In parallel to the above mentioned problems, the region has also been 
witnessing an increase in the number of RSI (Social Security) beneficiaries. 
Between 2007 and 2010 this value rose from 6,860 to 10,117 (an increase 
in 47,5%), reaching a share of 29.66 RSI beneficiaries per 1000 working 
aged population in 2010 (or 2.73% of the resident population), while 
the national average increased 42.6% increase in the same time-span, 
reaching 58.45 beneficiaries per 1,000 working aged population in 2010 
(or 4.99% of the resident population) (EDT 2014-2020, CIRA, 2013).
These results show that the region of Aveiro revealed considerable 
resilience to the impacts of the economic crisis, due to its emphasis in 
innovation, exportation and training of human resources.
2. uRban poLitics, pL anning and goveRnance  
 in poRtugaL 
2.1 URBAN POLITICS, PL ANNING and GOVERNANCE  
 IN PORTUGAL 
2.1.1 Planning Context
Although spatial planning at the municipal level has been practiced 
since the seventies of the last century (the first legal act which created 
the Municipal Master Plans dates from 1977), the institutionalization of 
planning in Portugal is still relatively new – the Law for Spatial Planning 
and Urbanism (1998) completed recently fifteen years.
The building of planning instruments at the national, regional and 
local levels embodying the Territorial Management System is not yet 
finalized: the National Program of the  Spatial Planning Policy (PNPOT) 
was completed (approved by the Cabinet Council, discussed in the 1st 
quarter of 2007 in the National Parliament), the Regional Programs of 
Territorial Planning (PROT) is at an advanced stage of preparation but not 
yet concluded and the third generation of the Municipal Master Plans is 
still in preparation (awaiting the completion of PROTs review).
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Despite the political and technical effort made in the last decades in 
matters of planning, the outcomes are mainly reflected in a planning 
praxis that is very focused on the development of spatial land use plans; 
a limited financial and organizational capacity of local governments to 
implement the planned actions; a relationship of distrust between the 
central government, local authorities and various social and economic 
agents that are active at the municipal level; and a contradictory and even 
conflicting guidelines given to the municipal spatial planning, without 
intermediate structures for consultation (at the regional level).
The practice of preparing plans in the last years has been characterized 
by a fragile and minimalist agenda focused on controlling urban growth 
through a statutory and normative approach, without considering issues 
such as competitiveness, sustainability or social cohesion. The prevalent 
methodology followed a rigid and bureaucratic procedure, which is very 
time consuming and lacks institutional and stakeholder debate and 
the outcomes showed a weak operative capacity, worried with the legal 
procedures which underlay the administrative approval of private projects, 
but lacking financial support for public proposals. As a consequence, there 
emerged an inefficient and rigid planning system characterized by plans 
with limited social, economic and spatial impacts.
The practice of spatial planning revealed itself inadequate regarding 
the growing needs of municipalities and struggled with a diverse set 
of overlapping and, often, contradicting problems. While completing 
basic infrastructure, local authorities must be able to manage the social, 
cultural, sports and educational facilities and initiate tasks related to the 
promotion of economic development but frequently failed to accomplish 
this. 
The emergence of spatial strategic plans in Portugal in the mid-
nineties allowed answering some of the new needs of municipalities, with 
some methodological innovations – including the creation of Strategic City 
Planning Offices, which encouraged participation, the discussion of the 
goals to pursue, the necessary measures to achieve them and mechanism 
to monitors their implementation. Unfortunately, the various generations 
of strategic plans showed a tendency for justifying projects with no real 
“urban strategy”, but specific, targeted actions, without consistent links 
between them (Pereira, 2000).
A growing disenchantment of citizens and public and private 
stakeholders emerged from this planning practice. This disenchantment 
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was related, on the one hand, to an increased difficulty in accessing 
the ‘public sphere’ to discuss planning proposals and to find «common 
causes», which induced an individualistic climate, and, on the other hand, 
to a low capacity of municipalities to implement the proposed plans.
The National Strategic Reference Framework (QREN) 2007/2013 
launched a new set of instruments for spatial planning which was not 
provided by the fundamental law of territory management (LBOT) – 
the “Policy for the Cities”. One of these instruments developed – “the 
Partnerships for Urban Regeneration” (PRU) – aimed to support actions to 
revitalize intra-urban spaces, supported by a structure of Local extended 
partnerships (DGOTDU, 2008). This instrument was particularly 
innovative in its formulation, both because of the diversity and relevance of 
its concepts and of the philosophy that it advocates – building partnerships 
and, specially, being demanding regarding design and implementation. 
Recently collected data allows us to understand the true scale of the 
challenge. There are, at this time, about 182 approved partnerships, most 
of which are located in the North (50%) and Central (30%) regions, which 
account for a total investment of one billion euros (with ERDF contribution 
of about 60%). Thirty per cent of the initiatives (about 56 cities) have an 
investment of over than EUR 8 million (Total EUR 600 million).
Even though it has a very significant budget and expected impact, a 
systematic evaluation of the program’s merits has not yet been made. The 
case analysed in this chapter shows relevant evidence pf the difficulties 
to clarify the goals and to translate them in concrete, coherent and useful 
proposals.
The start of a new cycle of spatial planning is thus dependent on 
the new financial support program 2014-2020 to introduce a new set 
of challenges highlighting the articulation of territorial dimensions 
(“territorial qualification”) and strategic dimensions (“competitiveness 
and innovation” ).
The challenges faced today by spatial planning are related to the 
operationalization of concepts and principles, a result of an increasing gap 
between theory and practice, between expectations and results.
2.1.2 Urban Politics and Governance 
The practice of urban politics, planning and governance at the municipal 
level has shown some of the most innovative answers to the crisis. 
Unfortunately, municipalities are facing a severe financial problem, as a 
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consequence of general public indebtedness. Nevertheless, they have one 
of the smallest budgets in the EU countries, spending less than 10% of the 
total public investment.
As part of the TROIKA memorandum, the Government was invited 
to develop “a consolidation plan to reorganize and significantly reduce the 
number of these entities”: 
“3.43. Reorganise local government administration. There are currently around 
308 municipalities and 4,259 parishes. By July 2012, the government will develop 
a consolidation plan to reorganize and significantly reduce the number of such 
entities. The Government will implement these plans based on agreement with EC 
and IMF staff. These changes, which will come into effect by the beginning of the 
next local election cycle, will enhance service delivery, improve efficiency, and 
reduce costs. 
3.44. Carry out a study to identify potential duplication of activities and other 
inefficiencies between the central administration, local administration and 
locally-based central administration services. [Q4-2011] Based on this analysis, 
reform the existing framework to eliminate the identified inefficiencies. [Q2-2012]
Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding  on specific economic policy 
conditionality” (3 May 2011)
In addition to reducing the number of parishes, less municipal enterprises 
and less managerial positions in local authorities, saving 9.2 million 
€/ year, TROIKA has failed to impose any kind real reform in Local 
Government.
2.1.3 New Urban Policy Instruments
Another instrument created at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, 
still under the previous government, shows a concern of the central 
government with the need to stimulate a set of new ways of thinking about 
the performance of local government – Policy for the Cities – Polis XXI, 
previously referred.
The Partnerships for Urban Regeneration (PRU) was one the 
instruments of the Polis XXI aiming to “respond to increasingly complex 
challenges faced by cities, overcome the weaknesses of the national urban 
system and transform our cities into effective engines of development of 
the regions and the country”.
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The design of this instrument posed several challenges to the way 
public policies concerning cities are generated. These challenges have 
been systematized by the former Secretary of State of the Cities, João 
Ferrão. The first challenge relates to the fact that “public policy in general 
must address the needs of citizens, helping to strengthen the collective 
ability to adapt to structural changes (especially in times of crisis) and 
create opportunities (development) not only to companies, but for people, 
organizations and territories.” The second states that “the relevance of a 
PRU or a town policy only exists if it can bring added value to the local 
sectorial policies” This implies that it “has to produce a (new) territorial 
intelligence that perceives the relationship between different systems 
and promotes an integrated vision among some of the local policies (eg, 
mobility, culture, environment and health)”. The third states that the 
“quality of the instrument depends on the quality of the overall vision for 
the city, where it falls, and the quality of the partners and the relationships 
that is established between them.” The fourth states that “citizens’ 
participation in this instrument should not be just a mere bureaucratic 
requirement that is fulfilled at the end of the process” and should have 
“mechanisms for public scrutiny to how the PRU’s processes are being 
conducted.” It was also said that “for participation to occur, it is important 
to create moments and take appropriate methodologies” with “courage and 
boldness” in this matter. The last challenge suggests that “municipalities 
must realize that times have changed and that the methodologies for 
carrying these instruments also have to change,” making it critical to 
“create (regular) opportunities to discuss collectively and produce ideas 
for the future of the city (creation of collective learning processes)”.
2.2 Sociopolitical changes in the Lisbon region 
Between European and national austerity pressures; and multiple 
local and civic differentiated responses, Lisbon region clearly shows a 
complexity – when not a contradictory – political landscape; both within 
and beyond the crisis contexts. The section is set out around three themes: 
local government capacitation and national reforms; local government 
responses; new civic profiles of socio-political empowerment.
The first picture to expose considering Portugal’s territorial politics is 
the secular limitation of sub-national territorial powers – or what it might 
be called a secular ‘austerity localism’, driven by central politics. The 
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country remains one of the most politically centralised societies of Europe 
– being the second non-micro EU country (after Greece) with the lowest 
proportion of sub-national public expenditure decisional competence 
(i.e. regional and local public expenditure) –, which accounts for around 
15% of public expenditure, well below EU27 average (~25%) (Dexia and 
CCRE, 2012). Moreover, the regions themselves (accounting for around 
4,5% of public expenditure) have no politically autonomous governments, 
rather deconcentrated bodies of the national government (Nanetti et 
al., 2004). This severely centralized pattern is the main scenario for a 
constant weaknesses of local administrations, coupled with chronic issues 
regarding fiscal and financial support of its own existence (Seixas and 
Albet, 2012). Furthermore, the weak resourceful capacities are now being 
even more curtailed by the fiscal stress induced by not only the economic 
crisis but above all by the reduction of national transfers promoted since 
2010. As a result, municipal budgets within the AML have seen, with few 
exceptions, steep reductions since 2009/2010 – in the order of 20-30% in 
three/four years.
In addition to local budget cuts, the national government has been 
carrying on fiscal and administrative reforms of local powers in the 
frame of austerity policies. Firstly, a strong suppression of municipal 
economic and real estate taxes is to be envisaged for 2018. Secondly, the 
Law 22/2012 about administrative reorganization of municipalities is 
targeted to expenditure cuts through the elimination of 27% of parishes. 
Seemingly on other hand, there was envisaged a decentralisation process, 
through the transference of public competences from central Estate to 
municipalities, and from these to the parishes – but this movement not 
being accompanied by a minimum reinforcement of resources.
The administrative reorganization of the parishes throughout the whole 
country, decreed by the central government in 2013, is a clear demonstration 
of the very specific austerity strategies followed on the territorial political 
spaces, developed by very closed central political communities and lacking 
a minimum of democratic and governance capacity. Municipal assemblies 
were asked to elaborate in 90 days a proposal for internal reorganization in 
respect of the parameters established by the law. The national association 
of parishes has contested the reform, advocating that the reorganization 
should have been grounded on voluntary aggregations rather than semi-
automatic demographic parameters (ANAFRE, 2012). Several civic 
protests arose throughout the country. Of the 18 municipalities in LMA, 14 
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deliberated against the administrative reorganization and two (Sesimbra 
and Sintra) did not submit any proposal within the given terms. As a 
result, the working group established at the national parliament imposed 
administrative restructuring to 14 municipalities (in two cases the former 
parishes have been kept). The sole municipalities of Lisbon (the main centre 
of the metropolitan region) and Amadora elaborated alternative proposals. 
The municipality of Lisbon was working since 2009 on an administrative 
reform and could thus previously forestall the national law – with its 
pressing temporal terms. The Lisbon-city reform has been grounded on 
a study developed by a multi-disciplinary scientific team (Mateus et al., 
2010) and the reduction of parishes (from 53 to 24) is being implemented as 
one of the elements for the all-round enhancement of governance quality, 
where crucial is the transference to the parishes of several competences: 
management and maintenance of public spaces; permissions and licences; 
project and management of proximity services; promotion of cultural and 
social programmes. This municipal reform has undergone a consultative 
process which received more than 7.000 contributions. Overall, paralleling 
its own objectives of urban politico-administrative qualification, the Lisbon-
city administrative reform as also placed itself as a ‘protestant reform’, 
against the centralised and austerity-driven national territorial reforms. 
The Law 75/2013 was a further centralised step towards attentive reforms 
of local power, with four aims: decentralization, strengthening of municipal 
power, backing of voluntary associations of municipalities, promotion of 
territorial cohesion and competitiveness. Metropolitan boards – Lisbon and 
Porto, instituted in 2003 – and municipal associations (instituted in 2008) 
are nonetheless kept as coordination bodies without actual competences 
and elected boards (Crespo and Cabral, 2010). This law envisages the 
delegation of competences from the national towards the local and inter-
municipal level; however the only transferences actually prescribed are 
those from municipalities towards parishes. The creation of regional bodies 
with actual competences remains outside the horizon, the discourses about 
“decentralization” not resulting at all in any evident measures.
Beyond the reactions to politico-administrative reforms, the 
implementation of participatory instruments can also give a good 
exemplification of the complex patterns of institutional local responses 
towards contemporary urban governance challenges in LMA. Most 
common instruments are Agendas 21 (implemented in 5 municipalities 
of the metropolis) and participatory budgeting (see below), plus a 
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number of other consultative tools such as public debates (Almada, 
Setúbal, Barreiro), digital tools for citizen/government communication 
(Lisbon, Cascais). Deliberative participatory tools are nowadays active in 
5 municipalities – Amadora, Cascais, Lisbon, Oeiras, Vila Franca de Xira. 
Participatory budgeting is the most diffused tool (9 municipalities out 
of 18 have been implementing it) although with some lack of consistency 
in its application. Some municipalities had to cut budgets in recent years 
(Lisbon and Cascais); other have not been constant through the years 
(Odivelas, Oeiras, Sesimbra); in further cases, the so-called “participatory 
budgeting” have been consultative tools only (Alcochete, Palmela). In 
sum, the AML mirrors the recent Portuguese history of participatory 
budgeting, characterised by a lot of experimentation with some inherent 
“instability” (Alves and Allegretti, 2012).
The analysis of Lisbon sociopolitical recent tendencies concludes by 
focusing on changes in the profiles of civic participation and citizenship 
practices. As far as political-electoral patterns are concerned, the last three 
rounds of municipal polls (2005, 2009 and 2013) show a consistent trend of 
growing disaffection to politics, especially in 2013 where the number of voters 
dropped by more than 7% in comparison to 2009 elections. Contextually, 
blank and spoilt votes have showed a boom in 2013, reaching 8% of total. 
Moreover, a significant growth of independent parties is to be highlighted 
a phenomenon almost non-existent until 2009. Overall, the traditional 
parties lose significant portions of their constituencies in the reference 
period: the centre-right coalition experienced an out-and-out breakdown 
in 2013 – in correlation with the national discontent for austerity policies 
implemented by national government – but the votes did not move towards 
other classical political forces. The only exception was the centre-left Partido 
Socialista in Lisbon-city, driven by the boom of consensus for the strategies 
of Mayor António Costa and his team – whose party received the absolute 
majority in the municipal board and in the municipal assembly; as well as 
in the boards of 17 out of 24 parishes. Meanwhile, the May 2014 polls for 
European Parliament have confirmed the trends for reduced participation 
and fragmentation of constituencies in LMA.
The growing disaffection to politics seems to be mirrored by an 
emergence of new profiles of civic participation and protest. In 2006, the 
landscape of civic dynamics in Lisbon – formal grass-root organization and 
further forms of mobilization and intervention – was considerably small, 
although in expansion (Seixas, 2008). An enquiry conducted in 2009 
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(main results in Mateus et al., 2010) highlights the emergence of new socio-
political cultures, mainly amongst most educated and younger classes but 
widening in denser urban areas. In times of crisis and austerity politics, some 
signs of a renewed civic participation are evident on two grounds. On one 
hand, protests against austerity measures promoted since 2011 by non-party 
organizations – such as Que se Lixe a Troika!6–, although not comparable 
with the protest energies of similar Spanish and Greek movements, have 
been the biggest mass protests in history of democratic Portugal. On other 
hand, a number of alternative urban movements were born. To mention just 
a couple as exemplary of the growing civic dynamism: Habita7 is the first 
network to offer advice and support to dwellers against evictions-without-
rehousing on shanty towns and against rent’s rising in council housing; 
Plataforma Gueto8 promotes immigration inclusion and analysis of laws 
and policies, provides assistance to families victims of police violence and 
agoraphobia trends in several peripheral areas of Lisbon.
2.3 Sociopolitical changes in the Aveiro region
We tried to identify the nature of local and regional policies developed 
in recent years – covering a timespan which starts at the end of the last 
European support framework (2007-2013) and the start of the new period 
(2014-2020) – and how they tried to answer or mitigate some of the 
previously identified social, economic and spatial impacts.
The Intermunicipal Community of the Region of Aveiro (CIRA) is 
an association of municipalities roughly corresponding to the NUTS III 
of the Baixo-Vouga and was created under the Law 45/2008, of the 27th 
August. It succeeded the Association of Municipalities of the Ria (AMRIA) 
and the Greater Metropolitan Area of Aveiro (GAMA) as an association of 
municipalities for general purposes. The quality of the work developed and 
the way local actors have been involved, probably led to it being selected as 
a case study within a PILOT STUDY Intermunicipal communities (CIM) 
produced by the Government in 2012 that led to the definition of the 
statute that created the new legal concept of Intermunicipal communities 
(Decree n 75/2014 of the 13th of May).
6 | See http://queselixeatroika15setembro.blogspot.pt/.
7 | See http://www.habita.info/.
8 | See http://plataformagueto.wordpress.com/.
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Focusing the attention on the last seven years, since 2008, we 
identified two cycles of financial support for the CIRA’s activity: 2007-2013 
and 2014-2020. The 2007-2013 cycle was conceived even before the onset 
of the crisis and therefore could not anticipate some of the encountered 
problems. However, some concerns as to how the region should think 
about the future – facing potential problems or challenges – were present 
in the design of planning tools.
The first milestone was the establishment of a protocol between 
the CIRA and the University of Aveiro in the design of a collaborative 
strategy for the development of the region (2007-2013) that aimed to 
support contractual agreements for the management of European funds 
with the government. Coordinated by a Pro-Dean of the UA for regional 
development, the document aims to establish a commitment for the 
future of the region, deepening institutional cooperation to face a new 
and complex socio-economic and political context.
The design of the Territorial Development Plan – PTD 2007-2013 – was 
developed with the intention to incorporate new concerns and guidelines 
for Regional Policy and Cohesion, the «rational use of EU funds in order 
to promote innovation based competitiveness and regional growth and 
to create more and better jobs» combined with the response to three 
challenges: take advantage of the opportunities of the new agenda for 
the region; increase and measure the impact of region’s programs; create 
new mechanisms for the management and ‘agency’ of local and regional 
policies (PTD 2007-2013).
Figure 6 – Strategies PTD Baixo-Vouga 2007-2013
Source: PTD BAIXO VOGA 2007-2013
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With this strategy, it was intended to manage funds of over € 100 million 
for projects in the various municipalities on a contractual base established 
by the Central Government.
An assessment of the implementation of the financial period concluded 
that, at the level of the Central Region, the Baixo-Vouga sub region (NUTS 
III) is among those with the highest volume of investment, and also has a 
fairly high per capita investment. Most of the investment is concentrated 
in the public sector (92%), 70% of the investment is made  in equipment 
and 23% in infrastructure, and the immaterial investment is quite limited 
(EDT 2014-2020 CIRA, 2013).
Silva et al (2013) remember the innovative nature of this university’s 
approach in its involvement with local authorities in the region, stating that 
it “entails a peculiarity in that this collaborative relationship represented 
a significant departure from a confined perspective of academic-industry 
relationship based only on consulting and was focused on a wider scope 
for technology and knowledge transfer” (Pires et al. ,2012 ), thus being an 
“innovative partnership: joint ownership of the Territorial Development 
Plan (UA and CIRA)” where the “University becomes a partner in the 
design of regional development policy”.
The difficulties of the case were attributed to “local governments’ 
weaknesses in understanding the “new language” and requirements of 
the (new) European regional policy approach (Lisbon and Gothenburg 
Agendas)”, “local governments’ difficulty in sharing the leadership of 
this process”, “(assumed) unawareness regarding the work developed by 
the University of Aveiro”, “difficulties related to the co-definition of the 
agenda” (Silva et al, 2013).
Beyond the PTD, several initiatives were developed for deepening the 
collaboration between universities and municipalities of the region. One 
of those was an application to the national programme Urban Networks 
for Competitiveness and Innovation (RUCI) aimed “to build, consolidate 
and/or enable collective dynamics of urban development of the network 
of cities and major settlements in the region of Aveiro”.  The proposal 
suggested three new agendas: a cultural agenda, promoting a cultural 
programming network, which articulates all municipalities of the region; a 
sustainability agenda, responding to the challenges of climate change and 
operationalized through an agency for sustainability and competitiveness, 
which is active in the areas of water and energy efficiency applied to 
buildings and public spaces and intended to replicate its results in the 
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lives of citizens and communities; an entrepreneurship agenda, that aims 
to create a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship, with an emphasis 
on social entrepreneurship.
Figure 7 – RUCI 
Source: 2010
It turns out that the approval of the program (2012) and the beginning 
of its implementation (2014) took a few years, so many of the projects 
and programs have not had the desired impact. An analysis of similar 
programs in other regions identified some problems, including the difficult 
articulation between actors at the sub-regional level, lack of regional 
orientation and a devaluation of immaterial over physical initiatives.
Recognising the problems and the emergence of new challenges for 
the programming period 2014-2020, a new Strategic Plan for Territorial 
Development 2014-2020 is under development, in liaison with the 
regional strategy at the NUTS II (CCDRC) level. 
According to Teles and Santinha (2013) the new strategy for the 
region is based on the “common belief in the advantages of cooperation; 
the capacity for a co-agenda setting, supported by peer and inter-
institutional trust; a new approach to knowledge co-production to foster 
a coherent territorial identity” and a focus on “regional specialization” 
maximizing the impacts of EU funding. The programme will present 
five core domains: Innovation and entrepreneurial context, natural and 
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endogenous resources, community capacitation and inclusion, territorial 
identity and governance and public services. 
Figure 8 – PTD 2014-2020
Source: CIRA
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Santinha and Teles (2013) draw attention to the risks of starting the 
process with little information and uncertainty about its development, but 
remember the challenges of enabling regions to define their way to design 
a strategy for growth and innovation.
3. uRban poLitics, pL anning and goveRnance –  
 Lessons fRoM the cities of Lisbon and aveiRo 
3.1 Lisbon cit y anti-crisis and local reform proposals 
Quite different local governments – including in its partisan and 
ideological components – in LMA have been trying to develop reinforced 
policies and new governance and institutional practices in order to respond 
to main crisis urban problematic. Amongst those, the municipality of 
Lisbon-city has been a political space where a large scale and strategic 
response has been developed since long. This has been happening thanks 
to a considerably stable political community since 2007, guaranteed by a 
centre-left government. The efforts towards sustained reform and political 
empowerment have been shaped around keywords such as “innovation” 
and “participation”. In addition to the aforementioned administrative 
reform and participatory tools, the analysis of four policy areas is able to 
show the approaches of local power. Firstly, participatory budgeting and 
Agenda 21 are a piece of a wider attention to grass-root planning and social 
innovation, complemented by some rent support schemes and BIP/ZIP 
programme about priority intervention neighbourhoods9. The BIP/ZIP 
promotes micro-actions for urban regeneration through neighbourhood 
participative budgets funded with yearly competitive processes: although 
an innovative scheme is designed, the still scarce allocated funds (1 M€ 
a year, around 0,25% of municipal budget) cannot fully impact on the 
regeneration of deprived areas.
Secondly, Lisbon municipality’s strategies to foster economic activity 
and employment were also developed. Several urban entrepreneurship 
support schemes have been launched, namely for business incubators, 
incentives to new businesses, support of retail initiatives. It is worth 
mentioning how important have been the EU cohesion policies within 
9 | See http://bipzip.cm-lisboa.pt/.
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this frame, and particularly the urban regeneration programmes funded 
through the Portuguese 2007-2013 framework for Structural Funds. 
The strategy of designing urban policies to attract international flows of 
tourism, although not new and growing in its contradictions between the 
priorities towards local life has been also at the core of the efforts of the 
municipal government. Globally, there can be seen that in the first phase 
Lisbon-city has suffered the impact of global tourism recession; emerging 
as an important tourist destination among Europe’s cities in the following 
years. Town councillor for planning has recently launched the proposal 
for a non-tax area for hotels in the city downtown and a major investment 
is programmed for upgrading Lisbon Cruise Terminal in order to be able 
to respond to bigger fluxes of arrivals. Commerce, new services (bus, bike 
rental, tuc-tuc) tourist shops and restaurants are popping up in the centre 
and historical areas – and the local press has announced proudly the 2013’s 
“tourism Oscar” awarded to the Portuguese capital for “City Break On a 
Budget” (Amadeus and WTM Travel Experience Award). 
Thirdly, a new emphasis on building rehabilitation and urban 
regeneration has been envisaged as a cornerstone planning policy 
around investor-friendly actions, fiscal and edification incentives. As a 
result of thirty years of demographic contraction, a significant volume 
of vacant dwellings (around 50 thousands) is found in Lisbon-city, most 
particularly in its historical centre. Political discourses have since the 
1990’s emphasized the need for a public policy that would encourage 
building’s rehabilitation, but for a long time that was not visible at all. 
With the crisis major and initial impact in the construction sector, and 
namely in the sprawl continuity, rehabilitation of derelict buildings has 
become a more tangible activity, both for public and private strategies. 
Just recently, central Government has introduced new regulation to lower 
technical requirements and to reduce rehabilitation costs in over 30%. 
In addition to stimulus to requalification of private dwellings, Lisbon 
municipality has elaborated a strategic plan for the requalification and 
management of council housing – around 30.000 flats – with the final 
aim to alienate the stock in few decades (UrbanGuru, 2011). However, and 
given the credit crunch which has been affecting middle-class families 
and their housing strategies, political critiques have addressed the risk 
that real estate investors only will be able to respond to the challenge, and 
that gentrification trends are to be expected in the next future in Lisbon 
centre – also as a consequence of tourism friendly policies.
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The drivers of sociopolitical change here debated show a complex socio-
political framework made of responsive, contradictory and clashing trends. 
Two main trends show to be restructuring urban politics in Lisbon. By one 
side the central state policies, most particularly when sustained by the 
2011 Troika bailout and the support of EU main cupules. And by other side 
the local – or maybe better said, the urban – political actions and reactions, 
these founding some support on inner structures of the EU itself (like the 
cohesion policies), as well as on fast growing components of the society 
and its stakeholders (like universities, sociocultural institutions, and even 
corporate associations). As far as institutional processes are concerned, 
a clash between the harsh top-down austerity curtails; and the bottom-
up urban evolution dynamics; is clearly ongoing and developing, through 
a complex frame of multi-scalar intersections. The historical and now 
renewed pressures for austerity localism in Portugal are colliding with 
local empowerment and resistances, shifting urban regimes towards 
a still unknown future. Furthermore, a steady evolution of grass-root 
activism and civic participation adds further pressure both on top-down 
and bottom-up institutional drivers.
3.2 Aveiro local urban policies
On another level, the average size of municipalities have sought to respond 
to the new challenges of contemporary economic and social development 
with some innovative measures, in some cases with good results, others 
not so much. The municipality of Aveiro, the capital of NUTIII Baixo-
Vouga, has sought to develop an effort to promote economic development 
with very encouraging results. Leveraging the experience of involvement 
in the European Network FIN-URB-ACT and after two years of working 
together with local and regional around fostering entrepreneurship and 
support SME actors, drew up a plan for local action, designated “Aveiro 
Entrepreneur” (http://www.aveiro-empreendedor.pt/). 
This project went through creating a strategy for promoting an 
innovative, entrepreneurial environment in the municipality of Aveiro with 
action in five priority areas: support for small and medium enterprises; 
entrepreneurship in higher education; promotion of entrepreneurship in 
schools; promoting an entrepreneurial culture and communication. 
The program led to about 490 different actions, involving more than 
100 thousand people, drove the launch of different technological platforms 
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(sea, materials, smart communities, bicycle and mobility) and innovative 
measures to promote entrepreneurship. 
The main results achieved where centered in creating agile channels 
for dialogue and joint working between local authority, university 
and economic agents, which resulted in the facilitation the design of 
collaborative projects. Furthermore, the realization of events (incubation 
programs, training and capacity building initiatives, talks – like TEDx 
Aveiro) and the proximity of the funding partners (public and private) 
and expeditors process led to the creation of an environment conducive 
to generating ideas and business climate, either in technology or in more 
traditional domains, with an impact that overflowed the boundaries of the 
region. Finally, working with schools in education for entrepreneurship, 
with the involvement of teachers and students, allows foreseeing the 
creation of a new culture of entrepreneurship. 
Despite these relevant results, some difficulties and limitations where 
identified, particularly in networking, as a result of different interests and 
stakes and also the lack of time to assume a long-term involvement; in 
the territorial scale, that has shown to be limited for the nature of issues 
involved; and finally, in the lack of information for an adequate perception 
of the real needs of enterprises complicates the design of actions.
Beyond this effort to support economic activity, the municipality was 
involved in a major urban regeneration project – The Sustainability Park 
(PDS) funded by the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF 
2007-2013). 
The project was assumed as a Partnerships for Urban Regeneration 
(a program of the National Policy for the Cities), approved in early 2009, 
involving 15 local and national partners and a budget of nearly 14 million 
euros, subdivided by 17 subprojects. The project aims at establishing a 
greenway crossing a significant part of the city centre (199.106 m2), 
articulating a set of facilities and promoting an innovative environment 
for residents and tourists under the umbrella of the sustainable 
development concept. Intended to «affirm the city as a place of innovation, 
competitiveness» through a spatial intervention with renewed interest to 
residents and visitors. 
The idea behind the project was the qualification of an entire green 
space surrounding several old neighbourhoods of Aveiro and the creation 
of a space of contact with nature and good environmental practices, 
somewhat in line with the concept of “Design for Sustainability” (FIG.7). 
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It was understood that two elements were needed to strengthen the 
application. First, a motto – sustainability – implying that it was not a 
mere physical rehabilitation project of a green space or a set of green 
spaces. Second, content that gives consistency to the concept, where the 
involvement of the University of Aveiro (UA) as a key partner was crucial. 
The initiative intended to be more than just «another sustainable 
project» but one that «would serve as a model to be replicated in other 
areas of the city». The promoters also state that «the redevelopment 
and revitalization of the defined area, which is integrated in the largest 
continuous green area of the city, would be key to promoting urban 
sustainability and attractiveness», which proves crucial to sustain the 
policy of promoting a quality environment in the city and the welfare of 
its citizens.
The Local Authority considered that each of the projects within the 
scope of the Action Programme «assumed importance and relevance to 
achieve the objective of creating a multifunctional space and is followed 
a complementary and integrated rationale». Thus, the project was 
intended to function as an educational experience that “communicates 
and disseminate knowledge” through the promotion of seminars and 
publications. According to the project’s promoters, a document will be 
produced (‘Aveiro 2020 – a sustainable strategy’) which will bring together 
“all learning resulting from this process and facilitate the replication of 
results in other areas of the city of Aveiro”.
In face of such a complex initiative, some problems arose. First, the 
green corridor concept proved to have questionable planning options – a 
pedestrian bridge over the central channel of the city, renewal of an old 
garden – without a spatial planning framework and clear understanding of 
the key issues to be addressed. Second, the proposals had no mechanisms 
for public scrutiny and participation was seen as a mere bureaucratic 
requirement. Finally, there were several difficulties to put the new 
sustainability agenda in practice (traditional projects with “green label”).
The PDS thus proved a project with a good and relevant theme – 
promoting sustainability in the context of urban regeneration – but 
having physical proposals, which were not coherent with the objectives. 
The adoption of the term in this context – the program for regeneration 
partnerships, funded under the NSRF – demanded a more careful 
identification of the object, the selection of places and themes that should 
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be comprehended, as well as a more rigorous definition of the overall 
objectives, as well the objectives of its individual components.
The complexity of the exercise, which was basically understood as 
another public financial transaction, was neglected when the context was 
more demanding failing short of the need, stated by João Ferrão (2011), for 
more assertive and clearly identified problems and a more coherent set of 
local public policies, in this case linking mobility, energy, environment 
and culture.
Several of the proposals were defined on the basis of rhetoric and not 
supported by evidence and planning studies. For example, the need for 
a very visual impact pedestrian bridge was justified by “a long felt need” 
and it was expected to serve many users with great savings of time, while 
none of these statements were sustained by any facts or concrete data. 
On the contrary, there was some empirical evidence that contradicted the 
assumptions. Other proposals – the destruction of an old neighbourhood 
garden and a proposal to build a road in the middle – where defended 
with the argument of the need for public space betterment. In both cases, 
a strong public participation social movement occurred contesting the 
proposals and suggesting alternatives but where successively ignored.
Since this was a project concerned with sustainability, with ambitions 
to become exemplary and that could count on partners with extensive 
experience in the field, one would expect that the interpretation of the 
concept and its implementation would be particularly careful, in its social, 
economic, environmental and spatial dimensions. What happened was 
the opposite. There are several examples of dubious interpretation of the 
concept, both in what regards the social dimension of the concept – the 
lack of respect for history and memory of old neighbourhoods and the 
central channel – or the environmental dimension – total destruction of 
the existing tree structure in an old garden.
Civic reaction to various interpretations of the concept had a significant 
educational effect on the importance that the community was giving to 
the “memory, identity and respect for the place (no fundamentalist or 
conservative stance)”, the “importance of an overview of the proposal’s 
(studied and planned) risks and opportunities” and the fact that the 
intervention on (sensitive) places are to “earn extra caution (debate, and 
consensus requirements) and not be at the mercy of any ‘enlightened 
technocrat’”.
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The information for the implementation of an ambitious project like 
this was not enough, lacking specific evidence on the subject (territory 
and the demands of the proposal – sustainability concept), and therefore 
did not lead to a properly informed planning exercise, leaving the 
designer the freedom to find answers to unasked questions. Two of the 
most problematic proposals have earned such a broad disapproval from 
those who would most benefit from them that it became clear that care 
was not taken to previously hear them on their problems and needs. In 
a way, this shows the perverse effect of funding programs that require 
a high level of precision in the definition of concepts and projects and 
establish a minimum level of review and control or flexibility, leading to 
a precipitation in the definition of objects and reasoning of the planning 
exercise in the project.
Still, even on these issues there were relevant achievements motivated 
by civic action, in particular the relevance of the value of sensible use of 
public resources, a critical attitude towards cheap money from Brussels 
and the consequences of becoming hostage to ‘opportunism’. In particular, 
the weak mechanisms for assessing coherence become worrying from 
the point of view of the effectiveness of public policy, undermining the 
successful conduct of these operations. In fact, they allow incomprehensible 
acts of mismanagement of public funds and an inability to take advantage 
of existing potential for the production of innovative and exemplary public 
policy, particularly for Aveiro and for issues related to sustainability.
Both projects fall under two different postures of stakeholder 
involvement towards building transformative agendas, whether 
environmental or economic. The most successful practices show the 
importance of dialogue to identify shared understanding, to create a 
climate of trust between partners which allow a change of mind-set and 
create opportunities for social, economic transformation, essential during 
a crisis agenda.
4. chaLLenges foR spatiaL pL anning in tiMes of cRisis 
The previous analyses, considering the impact of the crisis in both Lisbon 
region and Aveiro region, reveal in a first stance two different institutional 
realities – high and medium-density with distinct economic and socio-
political contexts and institutional responses – in the first case strongly 
Planning and governance in the Por tuguese cit ies 251
dependent from the center (Lisbon) in the second (Aveiro) a more multi-
municipal approach. These instances illustrate the multiplicity of public 
policy approaches to respond to crisis: organizing politic-administrative 
reform (in Lisbon), planning new agendas for the future (Aveiro Region 
2014-2020), promoting entrepreneurship (Lisbon and Aveiro) and 
developing urban regeneration projects (PDS).
But in a second stance, the analyses permit the inference of most 
relevant findings and correspondent critical analysis. The urban scenarios 
are primordial places where social, economic and cultural dynamics are 
driving towards deep restructuring of sociopolitical patterns. The analysis 
of both geographical and sociopolitical trends in Lisbon and Aveiro during 
the course of the European crisis and its mainstream political austerity 
measures, as well of its more localized – or should we say glocalized – 
urban responses; show not only that there are different phases and crisis 
effects and drivers; but also that a clear geopolitical knowledge and 
planning conflict seems to be widening.
The evolution of main indicators in Lisbon and Aveiro Regions show 
that there have been developing three considerably different crisis-impact 
phases. The first phase impacted strongly on the urbanisation driven 
economies and its most dependent sectors and territories; the second 
phase is impacting widen throughout most of the urban territories of the 
metropolis – namely on the ‘social transfers’ poorer classes but as well as 
on middle-classes and public employment; the third phase is approaching 
now and derived from the skills and demographic depression, due precisely 
to the lack of systemic economic and labour opportunities. On one hand, 
the relevance of national pressures – and hence of European politics, at 
least in the Portuguese case – is quite evident in the dual evolution of 
the crisis around early economic impacts of the economic burst, as well 
as on the socio-economic impacts of the austerity policies. And on the 
other hand, a confrontation is clearly growing between these austerity 
pressures and the developing sociopolitical local dynamics; which at the 
same time still lie in unstable capacitation grounds; none withstanding 
being reinforced by a steady civic capacitation.
As stated in previous analyses (Leontidou 2010; Nel.lo, 2001; 
Chorianopoulos, 2002), for many southern European urban areas there 
has been a distinctive path of development and restructuring, as well 
as distinctive modes of governance, at least throughout a major part of 
the XX century. Causing not only specific urban production processes 
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(strongly understood in major trends like the peri-urbanisation of 
vast Mediterranean urban and coastal areas), but also curtailing city 
qualification and competitiveness itself. Today, the hyper-positioning of 
urban geographies and human daily realities is bringing a complete set 
of dilemmas and challenges to Southern European cities (Seixas and 
Albet, 2012). This is an already complex panorama that the present crisis 
pressures seem to be widening even more; as the Lisbon metropolitan 
evolution since 2008 to present is showing.
Regional policies are an important tool to respond to territorial 
dynamics, especially in a context of crisis. Different institutional dynamics 
where identified with diverse settings and speeds. In the first case, the 
metropolitan context reveals a significant weight of autonomy of the 
capital. In the second, a context of medium-density region, there is a strong 
effort in deepening inter-municipal policies based on a strong relationship 
with the university as key partner for conceiving public policies.
The first results of the regional efforts reveal the potential of local 
and regional partnerships, particularly with regard to “share materials 
and information resources, have more innovation capacity, foster mutual 
learning, have more status and peer recognition, and to share costs and 
risks” (Mota, Luis and Rosa Pires, A, 2013). 
In the case of Aveiro, the development of a framework for partnership 
between the university and the region characterized by mutual respect, 
understanding and trust, involving selected partners who share interests 
with clear roles and guidelines of the institutions founded on clear and 
open communication platforms (Mota, Luis and Rosa Pires, a, 2013) were 
key to the design of a shared agenda and for a coherent framework of 
action which increased the possibility of funding and execution.
Local policies have a different regional reach, although the cases – 
Lisbon and Aveiro – are of completely different sizes. Both cases show the 
importance of innovative measures undertaken by both local authorities 
to support entrepreneurship – strong relationship with the local authority 
and the university sector and business concerns with the proximity of 
institutional support. 
Administrative reform Lisbon clearly reveals the importance of a smart 
political negotiation and the ability to intervene in territorial delimitation 
with a concern of allocating competences. The example of national 
administrative reform recommended by the Troika, did not follow this 
rule and simply add the parishes. 
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The response to new public policy approaches, related with the 
sustainability agenda in the context of urban regeneration, proved to be 
more problematic. In the case of Aveiro, an ambitious environmental 
public policy program, in line with the stakes of the European Union 
and the societal challenges – energy efficiency and climate change, in 
a context of scarce resources and economic crisis, showed a problematic 
methodological and conceptual approach, without a clear identification 
of problems to answer, the necessary technical skills and to produce 
responses, the lack of evaluation of consistency of results with objectives, 
and absence of communication with potential users, facilitators or 
managers. 
In response to the emergence of non-consensual proposals and 
understood as undermining the collective interest emerged an intense 
civic dynamics, reflection, critique and protest over the three years of 
project development; at the lack of response from the local authority, 
unusual in the national tradition of low participation.
The importance of participation shows that although citizens mainly 
express themselves when a lot is at stake for them personally, evidence 
shows that they do get involved in such processes when: they have more 
access to information; learn about the problems and potential solutions; 
notice that there is a common share of ideas amongst the community and 
their voices can be heard (Mota e Santinha, 2012).
Both cases also reveal that in times of crisis and in lack of public and 
overall financial resources, there is growing the potential for civic action 
by exploring and mobilizing social resources (knowledge, time, mind) 
to contribute to both alternative and more effective local public policies, 
which requires appropriate reflection on how to inspire these policies in 
response to problems and societal challenges.
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